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This dissertation investigates the role which the acquisition of external 
resources plays in firm strategy. External Resource Acquisition (ERA) is a 
core strategic action for firm survival, especially when firms are faced with 
high munificence and uncertainty in regards to their resource environment. 
Primarily driven by the theoretical premises of the Resource Based View 
(RBV) of the firm (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984), scholars have 
conceptualized ERA as predominantly a resource-driven action. Under this 
view, firms engage in ERA to alleviate their resource constraints (Combs & 
Ketchen, 1999), access complementary resources (e.g., Rothaermel, 2001b), 
and further enhance their knowledge base (e.g., Ahuja & Katila, 2001).  
These contributions significantly advance understanding on various 
dimensions of ERA, but they treat the competitive environment of the firm as 
an exogenous factor. While there is a good theoretical rationale of the 
exclusion of the competitive environment in terms of the explanatory power of 
the RBV and its theoretical limits (Peteraf & Barney, 2003), the treatment of 
ERA as solely a resource-driven action, I argue, significantly fails to provide a 
holistic assessment on the strategic implications of ERA. I address this gap by 
a) developing a conceptual framework of ERA that takes into account both the 
firm’s idiosyncratic attributes and its competitive environment, and b) 
providing an extensive empirical analysis on the patterns of ERA activity 
among competing firms. Departing from this resource-driven view of ERA, I 
argue that ERA can be also seen as a competitor-driven action. I propose that 
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firms engage in ERA to also respond to their competitive environment and 
more specifically to their competitors’ ERA-related actions. To build the 
competitive side of my argument, I draw upon the competitive dynamics 
literature and theories of interorganizational imitation. Taking these two views 
together, I argue that ERA can be seen as a strategic action that leads to a 
broader set of strategic choices. 
Drawing from an extensive sample of 4,729 ERA actions among the top 50 
biopharmaceutical firms between 1987 and 2006, my empirical analysis 
provides overall support for both the resource- and competitor- driven views of 
ERA.  
This dissertation makes at least three contributions to the field of strategy. 
First, it illustrates that firm strategy, at least in the context of ERA, can be 
better explained when both firm- and competitor- specific explanations of firm 
action are taken into account. This particularly important for scholars who 
view firms from a RBV point of view, and tend to exclude the competitive 
environment of the firm from their conceptual development and analysis. 
Second, to better understand complex strategic actions, such as ERA, scholars 
must adopt a broader theoretical perspective of strategic choice. The empirical 
support of ERA as both resource- and competitor- driven, illustrates that firm 
strategy cannot be sufficiently explained by one theoretical view.  Third, my 
empirical analysis provides support for the temporal dimension of strategy, 
when firms are faced with changing technological paradigms. In the case of the 
biotechnology paradigm, for example, the extent which firm- and competitor- 
specific factors explain patterns of ERA changes over time.  
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CHAPTER 1.   
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation investigates the acquisition of external resources, and its link 
with firm strategy. The acquisition of external resources has been of crucial 
strategic importance in the knowledge-based economies of the 21
st
 century. In 
today’s economic environments, firms merely compete on volume and price. 
The proliferation of knowledge and innovation, raise significant strategic 
challenges for competing firms. For example, in high-technology industries, 
rapid technological change intensified competition by decreasing time to make 
decisions, increasing strategic actions among competitors, and increasing the 
speed and frequency that new products come to market (Grimm, Lee, Smith, 
Hitt, Ireland, & Hoskisson, 2006).  
Of course, these emerging competitive conditions do not only raise strategic 
challenges for firms, but also provide opportunities to appropriate economic 
value. One of the key strategic challenges for firms is that they hardly possess 
all the necessary resources to seize rapidly emerging market opportunities 
(Alvarez & Barney, 2007).  Additionally, even when they do possess a wide 
range of resources, their value is uncertain and also contingent to the 
environmental conditions firms are faced with. Competing firms can hardly 
afford to not respond to their changing competitive environment, as they may 
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be faced with a competitive disadvantage (D'Aveni, 1994; Wiggins & Ruefli, 
2002). To keep up with the continuous race of competitive advantage, firms 
may engage in the strategic action to acquire external resources.    
The acquisition of external resources, here referred to as External Resource 
Acquisition (henceforth ERA) is of crucial importance for firm survival, 
especially when firms compete in competitive environments as described 
above (e.g., Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 2003). As such, in the broader field of 
strategy, scholars have been long concerned with the strategic implications of 
ERA, its dimensions and its consequences for competitive advantage. 
Contributions to this end have been offered at the resource-, firm- and dyadic 
level of inquiry. Scholars thus far have treated ERA as solely a resource-driven 
action. Primarily driven by the theoretical premises of the Resource Based 
View (RBV) of the firm (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984), scholars thus far 
have argued that firms will engage in ERA to alleviate their resource 
constraints (Combs & Ketchen, 1999), access complementary resources 
(Rothaermel, 2001b), and further enhance their knowledge base (Ahuja & 
Katila, 2001; Prabhu, Chandy, & Ellis, 2005). Scholars have also focused their 
research efforts on understanding how externally acquired resources, especially 
knowledge-based, are transferred and utilized by the focal firm through 
alliance formation (Das & Teng, 2000; Simonin, 1999).   
While there is a good theoretical rationale of the exclusion of the competitive 
environment in terms of the explanatory power of the RBV and its theoretical 
limits (Peteraf & Barney, 2003), the treatment of ERA as solely a resource- 
driven action significantly constrains our understanding of ERA. Recently, 
scholars have pointed out this theoretical lacuna, more broadly the 
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misalignment of RBV and the firm’s resource environment (Capron & Chatain, 
2008), but so far scant empirical evidence exist at this front. 
However, any strategic action of a firm to enhance its competitive position is 
directly observable to its competitors (Ferrier, 2001). I argue that ERA is no 
exception. Incorporating the competitive environment to advance 
understanding on the link between ERA and firm strategy is a difficult but 
promising research endeavour. This dissertation addresses this important task. 
In doing so, this study explores the following research question: ―What is the 
role of firm strategy in ERA?‖ In relation to my overarching research 
question, I explore the following empirical questions: “What patterns of ERA 
actions do we observe among competing firms? To what extent do firm-level 
idiosyncratic attributes explain firm ERA activity (resource-driven view)? To 
what extent do competitors’ ERA actions explain firm ERA activity 
(competitor-driven view)? Is there an interaction effect between firm- and 
competitor- level explanations of ERA, and if so what kind?  
Addressing these questions poses several research challenges. While scholars 
have devoted several theoretical and empirical efforts to the main concepts of 
the above research questions, their definitions remain ambiguous. To develop a 
strong base for my thesis and avoid conceptual confusion, I clarify relevant 
concepts further. In so doing, I illustrate my rationale on definitional and 
methodological choices that I make to empirically assess my research 
questions. While my choices have limitations, they also open avenues for 
theoretical and empirical contributions.   
12 
 
In their effort to identify mechanisms where resources direct firm strategy, 
and contribute to competitive advantage, scholars have conceptualized 
resources in numerous ways. Resources can be broadly defined as those 
―tangible or intangible assets that are tied semi-permanently to the firm‖ 
(Wernerfelt, 1984: 172). While the concept of resources, and their economic 
importance, dates back to Ricardo and his theory of scarcity rents, scholars in 
the strategy field have only recently been concerned with resources and its 
relation to the theory of the firm
1
.  Under the main theme of the RBV, firms 
have been treated as entities of idiosyncratic and heterogeneously distributed 
resources (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). Therefore, firms ―strategically‖ 
act to develop or acquire critical resources and achieve competitive advantage 
through unique product market strategies (Foss & Knudsen, 2003).While 
there is an overall agreement on the conditions that a resource must satisfy in 
order to be source of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Hoopes, Hadsen, 
& Walker, 2003), some scholars challenge the assumption that such resources 
must be owned and controlled by the firm (Dyer & Singh, 1998: 660). To 
clarify this point further, I explicitly define and distinguish between internal, 
shared and external resources. Briefly, internal resources are defined as those 
resources solely developed and owned by the firm. Shared resources are those 
resources that are embedded in idiosyncratic interfirm routines and processes 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998: 661). By external resources, I refer to critical resources, 
that is ―those factors that enable the firm to participate in its product market 
                                                 
1 Wernerfelt and Barney have very much reconceptualised the seminal work of Penrose 
(1959). While the concept of resources and its economic implications dates back to 
Ricardo (1817), Penrose was the first to provide us with a theory of the firm in relation 
to its resources. That seminal work very much provided the theoretical grounding for the 
resource-based view of the firm.  
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relatively more efficiently and effectively‖ (Peteraf & Barney, 2003: 316) 
which reside outside firm boundaries and can be acquired in strategic factor 
markets (Barney, 1986). In my empirical context, the global 
biopharmaceuticals industry, such critical resources take the form of 
technology based assets such as for example biological molecules, chemical 
libraries and other technological assets relevant to the drug development and 
discovery process.  
While I am not directly concerned with the conditions under which resources 
contribute to firm competitive advantage, I recognize that competing firms take 
strategic actions to improve their competitive position. In this sense, firm 
strategic behaviour is very much directed towards gaining and sustaining an 
advantage over competitors. Strategy research has been long concerned with 
how firms seek to obtain advantageous competitive positions (Ketchen, Snow, 
& Hoover, 2004). The origins of competitive advantage span the industry- 
(Porter, 1979), intraindustry- (Caves & Porter, 1977; Cool & Dierickx, 1993; 
Dranove, Peteraf, & Shanley, 1998; McGee & Thomas, 1986), and firm-level 
of inquiry (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 
1984). While these contributions play a significant role in the development of 
the strategic management field, some scholars have argued that these 
theoretical frameworks cannot be applied in competitive environments with the 
characteristics described above as they base their assumptions in the existence 
of an equilibrium state (Foss & Ishikawa, 2007; Priem & Butler, 2001).  
Relevant to the field of strategy, several theories address the quest for 
competitive advantage. Such theories are driven primarily by neo-classical 
economic theory and sociology and hold different implications for firm 
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strategic behaviour (Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1994). In relation to ERA, the 
main concept of this dissertation, scholars have primarily based their research 
efforts on the theoretical premises of the RBV. One explanation for this is that 
RBV has been the most prominent theoretical framework for understanding 
firm behaviour and competitive advantage (Hoopes et al., 2003). I will argue 
and show that by solely framing ERA in the context of RBV limits our 
understanding. In line however, with previous empirical efforts in this context I 
first discuss how ERA fits within the RBV.  
In the context of the RBV, scholars have argued that competing firms will 
strategically act to acquire critical resources only when such resources can be 
purchased at a lower price than their discounted present value suggesting the 
existence of informational advantages not reflected in the price of the resource 
traded in strategic factor markets (Barney, 1986; Foss & Knudsen, 2003).  
Thus, the acquisition of critical resources, as a strategic action, will make sense 
when the focal firm possesses superior (and in that sense asymmetric) 
information for the value-generating potential of the resource to be acquired in 
relation to that of its competitors. Under this treatment of ERA, and in the 
presence of strategic factor markets, scholars suggested that firms must focus 
their strategic efforts to develop resources internally, as only such resources 
can lead to competitive advantage (Dierickx & Cool, 1989).  
There is a considerable amount of empirical research that treats ERA in such 
way. Focusing at the firm level of inquiry, scholars have suggested that firms 
engage in ERA to access other firms’ valuable resources through alliance 
networks (Das & Teng, 2000), to alleviate resource constraints (Combs & 
Ketchen, 1999), to access complementary resources (Rothaermel, 2001b), and 
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further enhance their knowledge base (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Prabhu et al., 
2005). In relation to RBV, other scholars have taken a process view of ERA. 
They focus their empirical efforts on understanding how external resources, 
especially knowledge-based, are transferred and utilized among partner firms 
(e.g., Simonin, 1999), and with interorganizational forms of acquiring or 
accessing external resources (e.g., Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Grant & 
Baden-Fuller, 2004).   
While the above contributions advance the understanding of the conditions 
whereby firms will strategically act to acquire external resources, they view 
ERA as solely a resource-driven action and consequently treat the competitive 
environment that the firm operates in as an exogenous factor. This is 
surprising, as ERA has been a popular strategic action in several industrial 
contexts and has been perceived as a strategic response to environmental 
changes
2
. In recent critiques of RBV, scholars have pointed out that to better 
understand firm behaviour and its consequence for competitive advantage, the 
resource environment of the firm is of central importance (Capron & Chatain, 
2008; Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007). However, there is limited empirical 
evidence. This dissertation addresses this key gap in the literature by 
incorporating the competitive environment of the firm in the context of ERA.  
I question the assumption of RBV that firms engage in ERA to improve their 
competitive position driven by their idiosyncratic attributes. I argue that firms 
engage in ERA to also respond to their competitive environment and more 
specifically to their competitors’ ERA-related actions. I thus propose that ERA 
                                                 
2 In section 4.2, I illustrate how biopharmaceuticals firms engage in ERA to adapt to the 
new technological paradigm of biotechnology. 
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can be also seen as a competitor-driven action. In doing so, I adopt a multi-
theoretical perspective on the relevant conditions that drive firms to engage in 
ERA. This is important in order to allow for a theoretical grounding of my 
assumption that competing firms engage in ERA in relation to the actions of 
their competitors. To build the competitive side of my argument, I draw upon 
the competitive dynamics literature and theories of interorganizational 
imitation. In contrast with RBV, which suggests that the firm’s optimal goal is 
to devise unique strategies based on its idiosyncratic attributes and differentiate 
from its competitors, scholars concerned with Competitive Dynamics (CD) 
have long argued that firm behaviour may be contingent to that of its 
competitors. Scholars concerned with strategic actions of competing firms 
have illustrated that such actions are directly observable among competing 
firms and as such may result in strategic countermoves (Ferrier, 2001). As 
such, competing firms engage in strategic actions to respond to their 
competitive environment. In relation to the differentiation rationale of the 
RBV, competing firms may engage in ERA in order to pre-empt critical 
resources from their competitors (Fuentelsaz, Gomez, & Polo, 2002; 
Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). Other CD scholars, however, have 
suggested that competing firms engage in strategic actions to conform to the 
strategic orientations of similar competitors (Garcia-Pont & Nohria, 2002). 
Such strategic conformity can be a result of adopting practices of successful 
organizations [mimetic isomorphism; (e.g., Haunschild & Miner, 1997)], 
strategic group membership [local mimetism; (Garcia-Pont & Nohria, 2002)], 
or resource similarities among competing firms (Chen, 1996).  
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To this point, I have proposed that when competing firms engage in ERA 
driven both by their idiosyncratic attributes but also by the ERA-related actions 
of their competitors. By investigating ―To what extent do firm-level 
idiosyncratic attributes explain firm ERA activity?” I attempt to provide an 
empirical test of the resource-driven view of ERA. In relation to the firm’s 
idiosyncratic attributes, I am specifically concerned with resource commitment 
and prior experience with ERA. In line with previous RBV empirical work in 
other contexts, I expect these two factors to be significantly and positively 
associated with the focal firm’s ERA activity.  
In relation to the competitor-driven view of ERA, I am also concerned with the 
competitive environment of the firm.  By addressing the question ―To what 
extent do competitors’ ERA actions explain firm ERA activity?” I seek to 
provide new theoretical and empirical insights on the impact of competitors’ 
actions on firm behaviour in the context of ERA. Scholars concerned with 
competitive dynamics have provided several theoretical explanations of 
strategic interdependence among competing firms. One explanation for 
example is that firms will engage in a strategic action in order to mimic the 
strategic behaviour of their competitors. I would like to further explore this 
assumption by providing empirical evidence on imitative behaviour among 
competing firms engaging in ERA, and address recent calls for more empirical 
evidence of such kind of strategic behaviour(Lieberman & Asaba, 2006: 378).   
To provide a more complete understanding of ERA, it is important not to test 
these two proposed views of ERA in isolation, but to also investigate their 
interaction. By addressing the question “Is there an interaction effect between 
firm- and competitor- level explanations of ERA, and if so what kind?” I 
18 
 
empirically assess the existence of such interaction effect. Through my 
empirical analysis, I aim to complement recent attempts to provide new 
theoretical insights on how strategic behaviour is shaped both by the 
idiosyncratic attributes of the firm and its competitive environment (e.g., Park 
& Zhou, 2005).  
To address my research questions, I make several methodological choices 
regarding the conceptualization and measurement of my main constructs, the 
empirical setting of my study, and the data needed to conduct my empirical 
investigation. I briefly provide my rationale behind choices on these 
methodological issues.  
To operationalize ERA, I draw upon relevant studies that explicitly focus on 
the sourcing of external resources (e.g., Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006; 
Veugelers & Cassiman, 1999). As such, I measure an ERA-related action as 
the aggregate number of interfirm agreements that a firm engage in at any 
specific point of time. Interfirm agreements can take several forms 
(Hagedoorn, 1993), but here I am only concerned with R&D, licensing and 
marketing inward agreements. In contrast with Cassiman & Veugelers (2006), 
I exclude take-overs and M&A, and focus on non-equity based agreements. 
Such operationalization of external resource acquisition allows me to be 
consistent with my definition of external resources.  
To empirically investigate my research questions, I draw upon the empirical 
setting of the global biopharmaceuticals industry. I do so for a number of 
reasons. First, the biopharmaceuticals industry is a knowledge-intensive 
competitive environment where competing firms are faced with rapid 
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technological change (Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 2003). Second, emerging 
technological regimes such as the advent of biotechnology resulted in an 
exponential increase of ERA activity among competing firms, as it 
significantly altered new product development (Arora & Gambardella, 1990: 
362; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). Third, interfirm collaborative agreements 
are well documented.  
I construct a sample of the 50 biggest (in terms of sales) biopharmaceutical 
firms with global presence. I choose my sample under two main criteria. First, 
I would like to capture a large percentage of ERA activity in order to increase 
the validity of my study. Second, I would like to allow for some degree of 
variability in terms of firm behaviour but also focus on firms that compete for 
similar resources and exhibit some levels of multimarket contact. I collect 
longitudinal data on inward interfirm collaborative agreements between 1985 
and 2006. Marked by the Genentech initial public offering, the 
biopharmaceuticals industry has experienced the emerging technological 
paradigm of biotechnology.  Furthermore, to investigate patterns of ERA over 
time, the sample must allow for longitudinal observations. To measure ERA 
activity, I collect relevant data from the Recombinant Capital Alliances 
database
3
. This extensive database allows for detailed data collection for my 
sample and time frame, resulting in a total of 4,729 ERA-related actions (firm-
year observations).    
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 illustrates in detail the 
rationale of choosing the biopharmaceuticals industry as the empirical context 
                                                 
3 In section 5.4, I provide an in depth discussion on my rationale behind choosing the 
Recombinant Capital database for studying interorganizational relationships.  
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of this dissertation, and provides a review of empirical work related to ERA. 
More specifically, the first part of Chapter 4 illustrates how the emerging 
paradigm of biotechnology, altered competitive dynamics and raised unique 
strategic challenges for established biopharmaceutical firms. The second part 
of Chapter 2 provides a synthesis of relevant literatures concerned with the 
antecedents and consequences of ERA. This is an important section as it 
connects empirical work from several research streams in order to provide a 
current picture of our understanding of ERA. 
Chapter 3 sets the theoretical foundations for my thesis. I start by discussing in 
more detail the theoretical premises of RBV and its treatment of ERA. While I 
do not aim to provide a complete review of the RBV, I draw upon seminal 
contributions and synthesize important implications for firm strategic 
behaviour in relation to ERA. I build on the fundamental assumption that firm-
specific idiosyncratic resources can be a source of sustained competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). However, I criticize the persistent 
focus of initial RBV contributions on internal resources, and consequently their 
limiting conditions on the value-creating ability of external resources and their 
link with firm strategic behaviour. I draw upon recent theoretical models that 
revisit RBV and account for mechanisms where resources that span firms’ 
organizational boundaries contribute to sustained competitive advantage 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1998; Gulati, 
Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000; Lavie, 2006).  I then provide a summary on basic 
assumptions on my resource-driven view of ERA. Next, I move towards 
theoretical explanations of the competitor-driven view of ERA. In doing so, I 
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summarize important theoretical contributions in the competitive dynamics 
literature. 
In turn, Chapter 4 provides my conceptual framework and a set of hypotheses 
based on the research questions posed above. More specifically, it builds the 
resource- and competitor- driven views of ERA by framing firm behaviour in 
the theoretical context of strategic choice.  
Chapter 5 illustrates my methodological design. It is more specifically 
concerned with the rationale behind sample selection, operationalization of 
relevant constructs, and appropriate methods for modelling my dependent 
variables.  
Chapter 6 illustrates my empirical analysis, and more specifically a detailed 
discussion on hypotheses testing. In relation to appropriate methods illustrated 
in chapter 5, I discuss the application of these methods and issues for best 
practice.    
Chapter 7 provides a critical discussion on findings and draws implications for 
theory and practice. The dissertation concludes with a summary of potential 
contributions and avenues for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2.     
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The first part of this chapter illustrates a competitive environment with such 
characteristics; the biopharmaceuticals industry. First, I illustrate how the 
introduction of biotechnology shaped new industrial dynamics in the 
biopharmaceuticals industry. I then provide an introduction on the historical 
development of the drug development and discovery prior and post the 
biotechnology era, along with implications for competitive dynamics. 
The second part of this chapter provides a review of prior empirical work on 
ERA. Scholars, thus far, have predominantly treated ERA within the 
theoretical context of the RBV, and focused their empirical efforts on three 
main areas; a) organizational implications of ERA (and more intensively 
innovative performance), b) the process of acquiring critical resources 
(especially knowledge-based), and c) interfirm relationships, such as strategic 
alliances and M&A, as mechanisms of ERA.  
In addition to the three main research areas identified above, I also review a 
broader set of strategic motives under which firms to engage in ERA. In doing 




2.2 ERA and the dynamics of the biopharmaceuticals industry 
As it will be illustrated throughout this section, the biopharmaceuticals 
industry is an excellent setting for studying the link between firm strategy and 
ERA. First, the pharmaceuticals industry can be characterized as an 
environment driven by Schumpeterian competition. Faced with such 
competition, competing firms are unable to gain economic profits by simply 
producing a set of products with a well specified set of processes (Nelson, 
1991: 68). Rather, competing firms must continuously innovate in order to 
survive (Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 2003). In turn, innovation efforts are highly 
science driven and have a significant impact on competitive dynamics among 
rivals and the evolution of the industry (Malerba, 2002).  Second, given new 
industrial dynamics in the biopharmaceuticals industry, biopharmaceuticals 
firms are intensively engaging into ERA, through several modes, to acquire 
critical resources. Third, external resource acquisition shapes competitive 
dynamics by enabling firms to alter their technological trajectories. In contrast 
with other industrial setting, incumbent pharmaceuticals have actively pursued 
a transformation strategy of their technological identity rather than pursuing 
underinvestment and incompetence in the face of radical innovation (Zucker & 
Darby, 1997: 431). Fourth, in a broader sense, the biopharmaceuticals industry 
provides several opportunities to study both success and failure of firms 
through changes in a series of technological paradigms (Galambos & Sturchio, 




2.2.1 New industrial dynamics in the biopharmaceuticals industry: 
The introduction of the biotechnology paradigm 
Innovation has been historically the primary driver of competitive survival in 
the biopharmaceuticals industry. During the 1950’s, the biopharmaceuticals 
industry experienced an intensive innovation cycle which lead to the 
introduction of a series of innovative products (Lee, 2003). In terms of 
competition, biopharmaceuticals firms that were able to produce innovative 
compounds, in that case in the field of antibiotics, enjoyed sustained growth 
(Lee, 2003: 147). The biopharmaceuticals industry is faced with new industrial 
dynamics. The seminal discovery of recombinant DNA (r-DNA)
4
 by Cohen 
and Boyer in 1972 based on the Watson and Crick double-helix DNA model 
(Quere, 2003: 256), and consequently the birth of biotechnology altered 
significantly the process of biopharmaceuticals discovery and development. 
Departing from organic chemistry as the basis of drug discovery, 
biopharmaceuticals firms moved away from ―random screening‖ to a ―rational 
design‖ approach based on molecular biology and the application of genomics. 
As such, prior to the ―rational design‖ approach, the discovery of new drugs 
was based on random screening and in turn in the tacit knowledge of chemists 
(Gilsing & Nooteboom, 2006: 7).   
Broadly speaking, the emergence of biotechnology can be perceived as a new 
technological paradigm in the biopharmaceuticals industry. Three major 
characteristics describe this emerging paradigm. First in terms of funding, the 
commercial exploitation of biotechnology was based on the availability of 
funds through venture capital especially in the case of USA. Second, 
                                                 
4 The first successful cloning of foreign DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) in a host micro-
organism took place in 1973 (Grabowski & Vernon, 1994)  
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biotechnology was majorly organized in condensed geographical clusters. For 
example,  whilst the invention of most critical discoveries in bioscience took 
place in the UK and Europe, the exploitation of several biotechnology 
innovations can be attributed to the aggressive funding of the American VCs 
organized in geographical clusters (i.e. 132 biotech firms in Greater Boston 
area) (Cooke, 2001). Third, the commercial exploitation of biotechnology was 
instrumented by collaborations between the public and private sector. 
Universities and their scientists played a crucial role on developing 
biotechnology. A recent example is the Nano-biotechnology center (NBTC) in 
the USA, a collaboration initiative between universities and public 
organizations, which focuses on the application of nanofabrication to 
biosystems (Thomas & Acuna-Narvaez, 2006).   
The introduction of biotechnology in biopharmaceuticals drug discovery can 
be also described as a ―dramatic case of competence-destroying innovation‖ 
(Schweizer, 2005: 1053) affecting not only biopharmaceuticals drug discovery 
and development but also competitive dynamics. More specifically, the genesis 
of dedicated biotechnology firms (DBF), marked by the Genentech Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) in 1980, as industrial actors of promoting biotechnology 
in combination with the inability of incumbent biopharmaceuticals firms to 
internalize this upcoming technological regime resulted into a new form of 
competition (Quere, 2003). As (Galambos & Sturchio, 1998: 252) point out 
―[biotech revolution was] the first twentieth-century transition in which the 
initial stages of applied research and commercial development were centered 
in small, startup companies rather than the large, well financed organizations 
that have form many decades been the primary innovators in pharmaceuticals‖.  
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As such, a new wave of collaborating activities between biopharmaceuticals 
firms and DBFs has emerged
5
. This emerging interface can be perceived as the 
backbone of today’s competitive environment in the biopharmaceuticals 
industry (Quere, 2003: 258). Under such interface, biopharmaceuticals firms 
access innovative technologies and products through various forms of 
collaborations with their biotechnology counterparts. Collaborative activities 
under such motives can be perceived as ―an aid in transitioning from old to 
new methods of drug discovery and development‖ (Rothaermel & Boeker, 
2008: 53). DBFs are willing to supply biopharmaceuticals firms with their 
innovative products in order to secure funds for further research and 
development. Most importantly, DBF lack the downstream capabilities needed 
to develop, manufacture and conduct regulatory approval in order to bring their 
innovative compounds into the market (Danzon, Nicholson, & Pereira, 2005; 
Kollmer & Dowling, 2004). As Pisano (1990: 155) points out ―while 
biotechnology was competence destroying on the R&D end, it was competence 
preserving at the commercialization end‖. 
In terms of the biopharmaceuticals drug and discovery (D&D) process, this 
emerging model enables biopharmaceuticals firms to reduce associated risks 
and costs and increase productivity. For example, the application of genomic 
technologies (i.e. biomarkers) in drug discovery could lead to a 34% reduction 
of costs through more effective target validation (Riley, 2006: 43). More 
specifically, genetic engineering-based technologies such as monoclonal 
antibody technology, gene therapy, and high throughput screening have 
                                                 
5 It is worth noticing, that U.S. based biopharmaceuticals firms were favoured in terms 
of conducting collaborations by the antitrust policy that emerged during the 1980s 
(Galambos & Sturchio, 1998).  
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multidimensional implications for D&D both as process and research tools 
(Gilsing & Nooteboom, 2006). Given that the D&D process spans across 12-
15 years and costs approximately US$802m (DiMasi, Hansen, & Grabowski, 
2003), the introduction of such technologies can significantly affect the time 
that a product reaches the market (Schweizer, 2005). However, (Cuatrecasas, 
2006) argues that biotechnology advances impede the commercial success of 
biopharmaceuticals firms due to corporate policies that discourage innovation. 
By taking into account an exponential increase of R&D expenditures, 
Cuatrecasas suggests that the mismanagement of biotechnology across the 
D&D process and the reliance on mergers and acquisitions are the main drivers 
of low productivity.   
The above emerging model holds several implications not only for the D&D 
process but also for the competitive dynamics in the biopharmaceuticals 
industry. First, biopharmaceuticals firms are faced with an ―open innovation‖ 
model as they are relying on external sources of knowledge (Badawy, 2004; 
Greis, Dibner, & Bean, 1995; Lim, Garnsey, & Gregory, 2006) residing 
outside of their technological boundaries (Pisano, 1990). To access external 
technological knowledge, biopharmaceuticals firms engage into various 
interfirm collaborating activities in the form of strategic alliances or mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A). Through such collaborations, biopharmaceuticals 
firms were able to enter emerging markets or access newly developed 
biotechnologies. In terms of competition, extensive M&A activity resulted to 
industry consolidation (Grabowski & Vernon, 1994). In the case of Hoffman 
La Roche and Genentech acquisition (figure 4-1), for example, Roche’s 
acquisition strategy was to first purchase equity stakes and then gain share 
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control. Such strategy enabled Roche to quickly acquire generalized biotech 
capabilities (Galambos & Sturchio, 1998: 265).  
A second important factor that affects competition is the low concentration of 
the biopharmaceuticals industry. In their evolutionary simulation model of the 
biopharmaceuticals industry, (Malerba, 2002: 692) propose that low 
concentration is attributed to a) non-cumulative nature of innovation, and b) 
the fragmented nature of markets or put it differently the absence of economies 
of scope.       
 
Figure 2-1. Major Mergers and Acquisitions in the biopharmaceuticals industry, 
1980-1992 (Grabowski & Vernon, 1994) 
 
Before I go into further details on such collaborating forms, lets further explore 
implications for competition. Biopharmaceuticals firms are faced with a series 
of strategic challenges on identifying, accessing, assimilating and utilizing 
external technological resources. Firms must be able to intensively search their 
environment, local and distant, for technological opportunities that will result 
to new product innovations (Katila & Ahuja, 2002).Whilst, such process is 
inherently costly, firms that have been slow on developing necessary 
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absorptive capacity, the capability to acquire, assimilate and utilize external 
knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), were unable to successfully adopt new 
biotechnologies (Gilsing & Nooteboom, 2006: 8). In their study of R&D trends 
in the biopharmaceuticals industry, (Grabowski & Vernon, 1994) observe a 
reduce in concentration of innovation output among established 
biopharmaceuticals firms as a consequence of new product introductions from 
new biotechnology firms. In so doing, biopharmaceuticals firms may need to 
adapt to new organizational forms by extending their technological boundaries 
through networks (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). Such competitive 
pressures become more evident when taking into account the short time of 
patent coverage for biopharmaceuticals products (15 years). After the 
expiration of patents, biopharmaceuticals firms are faced with intensive 
generic competition which can significantly impede revenue streams 
(Kowalski, Fekete, & Yvon, 2005).  
 
2.2.2 Interfirm collaborative agreements in the biopharmaceuticals 
industry: Current trends 
The biopharmaceuticals industry has been experiencing an exponential 
increase in interfirm collaborative agreements being one of the highest 
performing R&D partnering sectors (Hagedoorn, 2002) particularly after the 
introduction of biotechnology (Roijakkers & Hagedoorn, 2006). Two main 
factors attributed to the exponential growth of collaborations in the late 1980s 
and 1990s: a) the non-availability of venture capital fund due to the 1987 stock 
market collapse, and b) the rise of government funded research projects (i.e. 
Human Research Genome project) (Roijakkers & Hagedoorn, 2006: 433).    
30 
 
Between 1990 and 1998, total collaborative activity value was estimated at 
$21billion (Arnold, Coia, Saywell, Smith, Minick, & Laffler, 2002) and 
accounted for one third of biopharmaceuticals firms’ revenues in 2001 
(Kalamas, Pinkus, & Sachs, 2002).  
Drugs developed under collaboration account for a significant percentage of 
the total drugs developed per development phase. For example, 33% (112) of 
drugs developed in Clinical Phase II are licensed (in and out) whilst 24% of 
drugs are licensed in Phase I (Rompas, 2005).   
A typical collaborative agreement consists of upfront payments to the licensor 
(usually 5-25%) and milestone payments that are set according to the current 
development stage of the compound being licensed followed by royalties. An 
example of such collaboration is the licensing agreement between Endo 
Pharmaceuticals and Novartis AG. Specifically the press release states:  
―Pain drug developer Endo Pharmaceuticals Holdings Inc. [ ] gained 
licensing rights to Novartis AG's osteoarthritis pain treatment Voltaren 
Gel. Endo will make an upfront payment of $85 million to Novartis; 
along with possible future payments of $25 million in annual sales 
exceed $300 million. Novartis also will receive royalties on U.S. sales 
of the drug‖. – The Associated Press, March 4, 20086 
 
Biopharmaceuticals firms engage in collaborative agreements under various 
strategic intents. Given the risk and costs associated with preclinical and 
clinical drug development stages, biopharmaceuticals firms prefer to engage 
into collaborative agreements in a more risk-adverse stage such development 
Phase II (Kalamas & Pinkus, 2003). Given the intense competition to access 
                                                 





future innovative products, biopharmaceuticals firms are moving towards 
collaborations at an earlier stage of development. An example is the Idera 
Pharma – Merck KGaA research collaboration in the therapeutic area of 
cancer. The press release states as follows:     
 
―(RTTNews) - Idera Pharma announced that it has signed a worldwide 
licensing and collaboration deal with Merck KGaA of Darmstadt, Germany, 
for the research, development and commercialization of its Toll-like Receptor 
9 agonists for the treatment of cancer. The company noted that as per the deal, 
it has decided to exclusively license the therapeutic oncology applications, 
excluding cancer vaccines, of its lead TLR9 agonists, IMO-2055 and IMO-
2125. The company stated that both the companies have decided to engage in 
research collaboration to identify a specified number of novel, follow-on 
TLR9 agonists, which would be derived using its chemistry-based approach 
and for which Merck would have the exclusive right to use in oncology 
applications other than cancer vaccines.‖  - RTTNews.com7 
2.3 Review of empirical ERA related work 
This section provides a review of empirical ERA related work. The review was 
conducted using the Business Source Premier (EBSCO) database. Following 
procedures used on meta-analytic studies (e.g., Newbert, 2007), I have used a 
number of keywords to identify relevant studies and their relevance. Relevance 
has been examined by investigating if keywords are present in the title, the 
abstract and the main body of the paper. While external resource acquisition 
                                                 




has not been a widely applicable concept (yields only 1 result when focused on 
the title field), several other keywords were used such as resource acquisition, 
external resources, resource sourcing to identify relevant studies. The review 
yielded 75 empirical studies that are directly or indirectly concerned with one 
of the major literatures described above. In addition, I have tracked forward 
citations of major theoretical works concerned with the acquisition of external 
resources (Barney’s (1986) seminal paper on strategic factor markets) and 
resources residing outside firm boundaries (Dyer and Singh’s (1998) relational 
view seminal paper and Gulati’s (2000) strategic networks paper). I have also 
drawn from recent reviews concerned with the RBV to identify empirical 
studies concerned with external resources (e.g., Newbert, 2007). 
While few empirical studies are directly concerned with ERA and firm 
strategy, there is an important amount of empirical work focused on the 
antecedents and consequences of firms acquiring external resources. As I have 
argued above, empirical efforts thus far have been rooted to the theoretical 
premises of the RBV. Given the proliferation of the RBV as the major 
explanatory theoretical framework in the strategic management field (e.g., 
Hoopes et al., 2003), ERA related empirical studies span across several 
literatures. Most notably, empirical work in this context can be found in 
literatures concerned with: a) the organizational (performance) implications of 
strategic resources, b) interorganizational relationships, such as strategic 
alliances, as mechanisms of accessing strategic resources, and c) process 
characteristics of acquiring/accessing strategic resources. I synthesize 
empirical work from these literatures in order to provide a review of empirical 
work concerned, directly and indirectly, with ERA.  
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This section is organized as follows. First, I discuss how prior work relates 
ERA with organizational performance. While I do not empirically investigate 
performance implications of ERA, it is important to illustrate how ERA relates 
to performance and thus competitive advantage. Second, I review other 
important effects related to ERA. Most importantly, scholars have viewed 
ERA as the underlying mechanism of acquiring knowledge-based resources, 
and concerned with interorganizational knowledge transfer. Third, I briefly 
review interorganizational modes of ERA. Fourth, I provide a broader set of 
strategic motives that act as drivers of ERA.  As it has been illustrated above, 
firms may engage in ERA to alter their technological trajectories, adapt to 
environmental changes, or respond to competitive pressures driven by 
technological change and industrial innovative activity.  
 
2.3.1 ERA and organizational performance 
In this section, I provide an extensive review of the relevant literature 
concerned with ERA and its consequences for organizational performance. As 
I have illustrated in chapter 3, management scholars have long investigated the 
antecedents of competitive advantage, and its relation with organizational 
performance. Through the theoretical lens of the RBV, an extensive amount of 
empirical research investigates the link between resources and organizational 
performance. While most of the empirical work has focused on resources that 
conceptually satisfy the VRIN conditions (strategic resources) proposed by 
Barney (1991), few empirical studies directly assess the theoretical premises of 
the RBV (Newbert, 2007). This empirical direction of the RBV holds also 
important implications for the empirical assessment of ERA. While external 
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resources have been of central theoretical importance on early RBV 
contributions (see section 3.2), most of the empirical work that aims to assess 
the impact of external resources to organizational performance does so in 
relation to the resource endowments of the firm.  
Empirical contributions have primarily focused on two measures of 
organizational performance; financial performance and innovative 
performance. Both of these performance measures have been of central 
interest. Scholars in the strategic management field have long employed 
financial (or economic) performance as a proxy of competitive advantage (e.g., 
Wiggins & Ruefli, 2002). Given the proliferation of knowledge and innovation 
as central to economic activity, scholars have extensively concerned with 
innovative performance. In the theoretical sphere of the RBV, scholars 
concerned with the organizational implications of ERA have focused more on 
innovative rather than financial performance. There are at least two main 
reasons for this. First, innovative performance has been seen as crucial to firm 
survival when firms compete in new technological paradigms (e.g., Hitt, 
Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1996; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). Second, it 
can be argued that innovative performance is operationally closer to resource 
development and deployment, as it usually operationalized through measuring 
patents or R&D expenditures.  
As I have argued above, few studies have directly concerned with the link 
between ERA and organizational performance (e.g., Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 
2003).  Rather, most empirical studies focus on intermediary (mostly 
moderating) firm-specific attributes that may affect such link. Primarily, the 
theoretical rationale of these studies lies on the RBV and is based in two basic 
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assumptions: a) firms will seek to acquire resources to enhance the value-
generating potential of firm-specific idiosyncratic attributes (mostly resources 
and capabilities) (e.g., Ahuja & Katila, 2001), and b) firms seek to acquire 
resources to alleviate knowledge- or technology- constraints (e.g., Mitchell & 
Singh, 1996; Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 2003). Table 2-1 provides a review
8
 of 
such resource-based empirical studies that have been concerned with a number 
of issues relative to ERA that affect, directly or indirectly, firm performance. It 
is worthwhile noting that the range of these studies not only illustrate the 
complex and multidimensional nature of ERA but also serves as an illustration 
of the complex link between ERA and firm performance. I briefly discuss 
direct and indirect effects of ERA on firm performance.  
As illustrated in Table 2-1, scholars have made significant research efforts to 
examine the link of ERA and firm innovative performance however providing 
inconsistent empirical findings. More specifically, on M&A and innovation, 
Prabhu et al. (2005) show that acquisitions can be a ―tonic‖ to innovative 
performance whilst Ahuja and Katila (2001) find that technological 
acquisitions have a diverse impact on innovative performance depending on 
the relationship between the structural characteristics of knowledge bases of 
the acquiring and acquired firm. On the other hand, several studies have 
showed a negative effect of ERA on innovative performance. Mathews (2003) 
attributes such negative effect to the fact that firms are unable to realize 
potential benefits from the technology acquired due to lack of specific 
organizational capabilities. Empirically, Ernst and Vitt (2000) find that ERA 
                                                 
8 The last column of the table illustrates which of the two assumptions presented above, 
the empirical study follows explicitly.   
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can heart innovation by reducing the post-acquisition inventive performance of 
key R&D personnel. In the empirical context of the manufacturing industry, 
Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland (2001) support the negative effect of 
acquisitions on innovation by illustrating how acquisitions impede firm 
financial controls. However, they do find that strategic corporate controls 
positively affect internal innovation activities. Gans and Stern (2000) further 
suggest that dependency on external sources of acquiring resources could 
impede innovation.     
Several empirical studies concerned with strategic alliances (as mode of ERA) 
and innovative performance have overall showed positive interaction effects 
based on a number of factors such as the size of partners (Stuart, 2000), 
complementary assets (Rothaermel, 2001b), relationships with customers and 
suppliers (Faems, Van Looy, & Debackere, 2005). Moreover, (Wuyts, 
Stremersch, and Dutta (2004) suggest that technological diversity and repeated 
partnering positively affects radical innovation. Fey and Birkinshaw (2005) 
find that external contracting has a negative impact on innovative performance 
whilst partnering with universities has a positive impact. In their study of the 
biopharmaceuticals industry, Nicholls-Nixon  and Woo (2003) find that the 
introduction of new biotech products (as a measure of innovation) is positively 
associated with different types of technology sourcing. They further show that 
highly innovative firms exhibit a higher number of interfirm alliances. Jones, 
LanctotJr, and Teegen (2001) illustrate that ERA (in the case of technology) 
negatively affects firm performance.  
Furthermore, a relevant stream of research has examined the existence of 
complementarity effects between internal and external resources. More 
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specifically, Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) illustrate a direct positive link of 
such complementarities to firm innovative performance in the empirical 
context of the Belgian manufacturing industry. Jones et al. (2001) provide 
further empirical support for the existence of a complementarity effect between 
ERA (focusing on technology) and internal resources. While these authors 
perceive ERA as a substitute of internal resource development, they argue that 
firms with greater level of internal resources will gain more from ERA, 
recognizing the positive moderating effect of absorptive capacity.Furthermore, 
in the empirical context of the biotechnology industry, Arora and Gambardella 
(1990) have empirically shown the existence of complementarities between 






Table 2-1. ERA related factors and organizational performance 
ERA mode Moderating Construct Effects on Innovative 
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2.3.2 ERA and knowledge-based resources 
In line with the theoretical assumptions of the RBV (and its extensions), 
strategic alliances have been treated as the main vehicle of acquiring  
knowledge-based resources (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). A large 
volume of studies in the strategic alliances literature have been concerned with 
the dynamics of alliance formation (for an excellent review on theories 
relevant to interfirm alliances see Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004) identifying 
interorganizational knowledge transfer as the primary motive of alliance 
formation (Hagedoorn, 1993). For example, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 
(1996) find that difficult market conditions and risky firm strategies increase 
the rate of alliance formation. In similar fashion, Anand and Khanna (2000) 
find that firms create value through experience accumulation in R&D joint 
venturing whilst experience has no learning effects on licensing arrangements.   
In their seminal study, Mowery et al. (1996) showed that equity joint ventures 
are a more efficient way of transferring knowledge than contract based 
strategic alliances. Furthermore, they illustrate that bilateral nonequity 
arrangements exhibit higher levels of knowledge transfer than unilateral 
contracts.  However, they suggested that prealliance experience was a key 
factor on absorbing technological capabilities. Chen (2004) supports the 
findings of Mowery et al. (1996) by concluding that equity based alliances is a 
higher conduit of tacit knowledge than contract-based alliances whilst the 
opposite holds for explicit knowledge. Furthermore, Lane and Lubatkin (1998) 
suggest that knowledge transfer across organizations can be extremely difficult 
due to differences in corporate culture, processes and knowledge bases. 
Simonin (1999, 2004) has been concerned with the implications of knowledge 
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attributes on knowledge transfer. She generally suggests that knowledge 
ambiguity has a significant positive effect on knowledge transfer. More 
specifically, she argues that knowledge properties such learning intent and 
tacitness will impede knowledge transfer. She concludes that firms with greater 
collaborative know-how exhibit more efficient knowledge transfer by 
minimizing complexity and organizational distance.  
In their field research of a Palestine NGO, Hardy et al. (2003) identify two 
dimensions, involvement and embeddedness, of interfirm collaborations that 
produce strategic, knowledge creation and political effects. They furthermore 
propose that high involvement will be associated with high strategic and 
knowledge creation effects whilst high embeddedness will result on high 
political effects (i.e. influence). 
However, current studies on the interorganizational knowledge transfer 
literature fail to provide empirical evidence on possible mechanisms that may 
affect innovative performance.       
 
2.3.3 Interorganizational modes as mechanisms of ERA  
   Firms engage in ERA using a number of interfirm modes such as mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A), joint ventures, licensing agreements, R&D 
collaborations and strategic alliances
910
.The rationale behind these modes may 
                                                 
9 Strategic alliances are defined as ―those cooperative agreements which are aimed at 
improving the long term perspective of the product market combinations of companies 
involved‖ (Hagedoorn, 1993). Taking a more contractual view, Anand and Khanna 
(2000) define strategic alliances as ―a complex organizational forms that are usually 
viewed as incomplete contracts‖. Strategic alliances can be categorized as horizontal and 
vertical. Alliances among competitors referred as horizontal alliances while vertical 
alliances refer to alliances between firms operating in adjacent stages of the value chain 
(Burgers, Hill, & Kim, 1993).     
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differ in terms of what is to be achieved and affects organizational outcomes, 
such as firm innovativeness, in various ways (Powell, White, Koput, & Owen-
Smith, 2005). Briefly, motives for collaboration range from research-oriented 
objectives to market access (Hagedoorn, 1993: 374). 
Relevant literature distinguishes interfirm collaboration modes into equity- and 
non-equity based. Such distinction is based on the organizational complexity of 
forming such collaborations and strategic objectives to be achieved. 
Differentiating between these two broad collaborative modes, (Hagedoorn, 
1993)argues that equity-based collaborations as for example joint ventures 
focus on long term strategic objectives through a more complex organizational 
form resulting into a joint owned firm. On the other hand, non-equity based 
collaborations such as R&D agreements have short-term one dimensional goals 
such as technology achievement. In terms of organizational outcomes, scholars 
have shown that equity-based collaborations facilitate knowledge transfer 
(Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996) and learning (Anand & Khanna, 2000a) 
compare to non-equity based collaborations.   
Taking a resource-based perspective
11
, interfirm collaborations can be 
perceived as ―devices that combine characteristics of markets and intrafirm 
organization‖ (Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1998), thereby enabling firms to 
access valuable resources and capabilities (Das & Teng, 2000; Eisenhardt & 
                                                                                                                                    
10 Todeva and Knoke (2005) identify 13 organizational forms of interfirm collaboration 
namely hierarchical relations, joint ventures, equity investments, cooperatives, R&D 
consortia, strategic cooperative agreements, cartels, franchising, licensing, subcontractor 
networks, industry standards groups, action sets, and market relations.  
11  Scholars have viewed interfirm collaboration through different theoretical lenses. 
Other than the resource-based perspective, scholars have employed a transaction-costs 




Schoonhoven, 1996; Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002). Strategic alliances can 
be further, viewed ―as a firm’s adaptive behaviour to maintain a match 
between firm strategy and resource endowment on the one hand and changing 
environmental conditions on the other‖ (Hoffmann, 2007: 829). Under such 
perspective, strategic alliances can be categorized in terms of resource 
contributions among partner firms. Following the scale-link typology, alliances 
where partner firms contribute similar resources termed as scale alliances, 
whilst alliances based on the combination of different resources termed as link 
alliances (Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2004: 701).   Specifically, strategic 
alliances may enable firms to access complementary resources (Rothaermel, 
2001a) or reduce hazards associated with liability of newness and market entry 
(Baum et al., 2000).  
It must be noted, however, that several ERA modes of can be viewed from a 
different theoretical perspective as for example the minimization of transaction 
costs (Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1991). In such case, several scholars 
have drawn from transaction cost theory to explain governance choices on 
strategic alliances (e.g., Colombo, 2003; Oxley, 1997).  
Whilst I acknowledge such contributions, my aim here is to provide further 
insights on empirical contributions that view ERA modes through resource-
related motives (Das & Teng, 2000; Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004; Mowery et 
al., 1998). Regardless of the theoretical views on strategic cooperation, 
Hagedoorn (1993) provides an extensive review on motives that drive strategic 
technology partnering. He identifies three major strategic motives: technology 
complementarity; reduction of the innovation time-span and influencing the 
market structure.    
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Going back to the case of the biopharmaceuticals industry, scholars have 
illustrated an overall positive impact of collaborations on organizational 
outcomes. For example, Danzon et al. (2005) showed that biopharmaceuticals 
indications developed under collaborations are significantly more likely to 
complete clinical drug development phases 2 and 3 than indications completed 
individually. Collaborations are also crucial for the survival of start-up 
biotechnology firms. As it has been illustrate above, the biotechnology 
paradigm enabled incumbent biopharmaceuticals firms to create value through 
economies of scale. Following this line of thought, (Henderson and Cockburn 
(1996) show that the success of research programs of biopharmaceuticals firms 
is directly associated with their size. However, firms exhibit a preferential 
tendency on joint R&D agreements over contractual forms (Roijakkers & 
Hagedoorn, 2006: 435). On the other hand, Anand and Khanna (2000a) argue 
that licensing agreements have been recognized as the preferred mode of 
cooperation and technology transfer in the biopharmaceuticals industry  as they 
take less time to be negotiated and completed. 
However, the engagement in such collaborations does not necessarily imply 
the realization of value especially in the case of equity based collaborations 
(Simonet, 2002). More specifically in the case of M&A, (Cartwright & 
Schoenberg (2006) found that 46-50% of M&A activities fail to provide value 
and firms can be caught up in integration hazards (Agarwal, Desai, Holcomb, 
& Oberoi, 2001). For example,  in his study of post-acquisition integration in 
the biopharmaceuticals industry, Schweizer (2005)show that M&A fall short of 
expectations as the two partner firms involved in the M&A activity are still far 
from being a united entity. More specifically, he suggests that in order to 
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realize the pre-acquisition motives, non R&D related portions of the acquired 
business must be rapidly integrated whilst R&D acquired units must preserve a 
high degree autonomy. In addition, M&A involve the acquisition of entire 
knowledge bases thus knowledge that is not required is acquired as well 
(2005). Firms engaging into strategic alliances are faced with several risks 
such as appropriability hazards, opportunistic behaviour, and knowledge 
leakage (Oxley, 2002; Oxley & Sampson, 2004). For example, in their study of 
biotechnology start-ups, Baum et al. (2000) found that alliances with rivals 
may inhibit firm performance.   
Furthermore, Hoang and Rothaermel (2005) conclude that partner specific 
alliance experience may decrease alliance performance in contradiction to 
general alliance experience which does not have any effect on alliance success. 
Oliver (2001) suggests that DBFs which are not actively engage into strategic 
alliances have a higher probability of organizational death whilst DBFs which 
increasingly form alliances will exhibit higher corporate growth.   
 
2.3.4 Strategic motives for ERA 
I have shown above empirical studies that are concerned with several 
dimensions of ERA. In this section, I summarize the strategic motives for ERA 
(see Table 2-2). Scholars have provided excellent reviews on different modes 
of ERA (for example Hagedoorn, 1993), thus there is no need for a similar 
review here. To this point, most empirical work in this context has treated ERA 
as primarily a strategic action driven by resource-related motives. This is 
particularly true for firms competing in environments where technological 
change and innovative activity shape the competitive advantage of firms and 
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thus their survival, the primary strategic motive for competing firms engaging 
in ERA is technological renewal (Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 2003). Under this 
primary motive, firms engage in ERA under several resource-based motives 
such as to enhance their resource endowments (e.g., Burgers et al., 1993), 
alleviate their resource constraints (e.g., Combs & Ketchen, 1999; Nohria & 
Garcia-Pont, 1991), alter the path-dependent technological trajectories (e.g., 
Henderson & Cockburn, 1996), and acquire complementary resources in order 
to enhance the value generating potential of their resource endowments (e.g., 
Chung, Singh, & Lee, 2000).          
Except for these resource-driven motives of ERA, there are several other 
motives that may drive a firm to engage in ERA. Empirical studies in this area 
have focused on identifying firm-specific characteristics as antecedents of 
ERA such as the reduction of risk and costs associated with the innovation 
process (Hagedoorn, 1993). (McEvily & Marcus, 2005: 1041), for example, 
highlight the importance of information-sharing, in the form of joint problem 
solving, as a major driver of ERA.   
Firms may also engage in ERA to seize environmental opportunities and gain 
first-mover advantages (Combs & Ketchen, 1999: 871).Specifically, scholars 
have focused their efforts on identifying environmental characteristics that act 
as motives such as technological positioning (e.g., Stuart, 1998), 
environmental uncertainty
12
 (e.g., Burgers et al., 1993; Eisenhardt & 
                                                 
12  Burgers et al. (1993) distinguish between demand and competitive uncertainty. 
Demand uncertainty arises from unpredictable changes in consumer purchasing patterns 
whilst competitive uncertainty arises from competitive interdependence, which is the 
competitive action of a firm has a direct impact on the market position of its rivals.  
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Schoonhoven, 1996; Hoffmann, 2007), and competitive behaviour of rivals 
(Fey & Birkinshaw, 2005; Silverman & Baum, 2002).   
Table 2-2. Motives for external resource acquisition 
Motive/incentiv
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The aim of this chapter is to review and synthesize theoretical perspectives on 
ERA. In line with my overarching research question, I review theoretical 
perspectives that scholars have employed thus far to explain firm behaviour in 
the context of ERA. In line with theoretical developments in the strategy field, 
I draw from the RBV and theories of competitive dynamics to frame my thesis 
and later develop my conceptual framework. As i will illustrate throughout this 
chapter, theoretical perspectives on ERA has been developed independently 
and only recently scholars have tried to connect these theoretical perspectives 
(e.g., Capron & Chatain, 2008). Of course, my aim here is not to provide an 
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exhaustive review of different theoretical perspectives, but to illustrate how 
these perspectives treat firm in the context of ERA.   
The acquisition of external resources has been a central theme in 
organizational and strategy research. In his seminal paper on competitive 
strategy, Barney (1986: 1235) suggests that ―…Most resources for 
implementing strategies must be acquired from a firm’s environment at some 
point in a firm’s history.” Barney goes on to argue that the acquisition of 
external resources is directly connected with a strategic factor market.  
Competition for resources in such markets assumes that competing firms 
exhibit a profit maximizing behaviour, and gain financial returns through 
implementing strategies that are based on competitive imperfections raised by 
asymmetric expectations of the future value of the resource to be acquired. 
Before I go into more details about the notion of strategic factor markets and 
its implications for ERA, it is important to note that other scholars have 
connected ERA with somewhat different firm strategic behaviour. For example 
scholars concerned with neoinstitutional explanations of competitive advantage 
have argued that competing firms may gain value through higher levels of 
legitimacy when acquiring resources (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  In this 
theoretical rationale, a firm gains legitimacy through adopting strategies 
similar to that of its competitors. In contrast with the implicit notion of 
Barney’s theory of strategic factor markets, firms acquire external resources 
not to differ but to conform to the strategies of their competitors.  
This dissertation further addresses this theoretical discussion by investigating 
the question: ―What is the role of firm strategy in ERA?‖ To address this 





 in the context of ERA. Thus far, strategic management scholars 
have been very much concerned with the link between firm strategic behaviour 
and competitive advantage. Drawing from the main concept of strategic 
similarity, scholars have intensively investigated how competitive advantage is 
created when firms are different or when firms are the same (Deephouse, 1999: 
147).   
Of course, competing firms do not simply choose to differentiate or conform to 
the strategies of their competitors. These two extremes of strategic choice are 
used here as a theoretical device and do not provide a complete understanding 
of firm strategic behaviour. As Nelson (1991: 69) points out ―… it is nonsense 
to presume that a firm can calculate an actual best strategy. The world is too 
complicated for a firm to comprehend.‖  
As I will argue later on, these two extremes of strategic choice hold different 
theoretical implications for explaining patterns of ERA among competing 
firms. In the introduction chapter, I have briefly illustrated that scholars have 
viewed ERA as a resource-driven action. In this view, firm strategic behaviour 
is very much in line with the RBV’s value-creation mechanism of 
differentiation. In contrast with this tradition, I will argue that ERA is not 
solely resource-driven but can be also competitor-driven. To build the 
competitor-driven view of ERA, I am also concerned with firms operate at the 
other extreme of strategic choice; that of imitation. In this sense, firms choose 
to strategically behave similarly with their competitors.   
                                                 
13 Firm strategic behaviour reflects the strategy of competing firms. In this context, 




This chapter is organized as follows. I start by discussing the RBV. The RBV 
has been the predominant theoretical framework not only for ERA but also 
more broadly in the strategy field (Hoopes et al., 2003). It is thus necessary to 
discuss its basic theoretical premises and assumptions in relation to my 
resource-driven view of ERA. In relation to my competitor-driven view of 
ERA, I synthesize relevant literature of competitive dynamics that draw from 
theories of imitation to explain firm strategic behaviour. Imitative behaviour 
has been of central concern both at microeconomics and organizational 
sociology. My objective here is not to provide a complete review of the 
literature but illustrate how imitation connects with ERA (for two excellent 
recent reviews see Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; Ordanini, Rubera, & DeFillippi, 
2008).  
 
3.2 Resource-driven firm behaviour and RBV 
This section illustrates the interplay and later transition between market 
positions and resources as sources of competitive advantage. I more 
specifically focus on the theoretical development of the RBV, which 
constitutes the theoretical foundation of my resource-driven view of ERA. I 
start by briefly discussing initial contributions to the RBV. I then discuss 
theoretical contributions that extend traditional RBV models, and illustrate 
how resources residing outside firm boundaries can lead to competitive 
advantage. By taking into account traditional and emerging work on the RBV, 
I provide the theoretical basis and fundamental assumptions for the resource-
driven view of ERA.  
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3.2.1 Origins of the RBV: from competitive structures to 
advantageous resource positions 
Understanding the source of superior economic rents has been a long research 
endeavour in industrial organization (IO) economics and strategy research. 
Scholars in this area have captured superior economic rents through the notion 
of competitive advantage. While several theories have been offered to explain 
the sources of competitive advantage, they mainly assume that competitive 
advantage stems from some short of interfirm heterogeneity. For example, 
scholars concerned with Bain type IO, assume that interfirm heterogeneity 
arises from differences in firm size (Conner, 1991: 125).  
Other scholars in this tradition have suggested that firms outperform their 
rivals and thus gain competitive advantage by occupying specific market 
positions (e.g., Caves & Porter, 1977; Porter, 1979: 138). In their view, 
interfirm heterogeneity is a result of competitive structures. Hunt’s (1972) 
seminal empirical observation
14
 that a group of industry competitors employ 
similar strategies, suggests that firms with similar characteristics may employ 
similar strategies. Initially, Caves and Porter (1977: 250) argued that ―… 
sellers within an industry are likely to differ systematically in traits other than 
size, so that industry contains subgroups of firms with differing structural 
characteristics‖. Strategic groups, such authors argue, will be generated as a 
response to raise barriers to entry to new entrants given structural similarities 
amongst competing firms. Such group of firms will exhibit mutual dependence 
in terms of their reactive strategy to new entrants thus raising mobility barriers.   
                                                 
14 The primary goal of the ―brewing studies‖ by Hunt, Hatten, Schendel and Cooper in 
the 1970’s was to explore the proposition that performance was a function of strategy 
and environment. The studies revealed greater levels of interfirm heterogeneity than 
what was originally assumed by IO scholars, giving rise to the concepts of strategic 
groups and competitive advantage (Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1994).  
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Later work revalidated the explanatory power of mobility barriers on the 
linkage between strategic group membership and competitive advantage 
(Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989; McGee & Thomas, 1986). As Cool and 
Schendel (1988: 208) point out ―it is not surprising that empirical evidence on 
the direct link between strategic group membership and performance are 
conflicting given the many intervening variables that arise since the 
formulation of the original [Caves and Porter] model‖. 
Given conflicting empirical evidence of a direct link between strategic group 
membership and firm performance (Fiegenbaum, Sudharshan, & Thomas, 
1990), scholars have shifted their focus on firm-specific attributes to explain 
inter-group performance variations. Most notably, Cool and Schendel (1988) 
highlighted the role of asset endowments (development of assets) and 
execution ability (strategy) during strategic investment decisions to account for 
variations on firm financial returns (profitability). In their longitudinal analysis 
of the U.S. biopharmaceuticals industry, Cool and Dierickx (1993) investigated 
between and within group rivalry as an intermediate link between strategic 
group membership and firm performance. They observed that while strategic 
distances between rival biopharmaceuticals firms remain stable over time, 
there was a repositioning of strategic groups (Cool & Dierickx, 1993: 57).  
While competitive structures can be seen as a source of interfirm 
heterogeneity, empirical evidence thus far has suggested a weak link between 
such structures and competitive advantage. Drawing from the neoclassical 
view of the firm as input-combiner (Conner, 1991: 132), the RBV has been 
able to offer a stronger explanation of interfirm heterogeneity and competitive 
advantage (cf. Short, Ketchen, Palmer, & Hult, 2007). Moving away from 
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competitive barriers, the firm, in this case, is a seeker of costly-to-copy inputs 
(Conner, 1991: 132), and thus earns superior profits due to resource position 
barriers (Wernerfelt, 1984). I explore further the link between resources, 
strategy and competitive advantage in the next section. 
   
3.2.2 Resources, firm strategy and competitive advantage 
A central research program to the field of strategy is to answer the question of 
why industry competitors vary systematically in performance over time (Crook, 
Ketchen, Combs, & Todd, 2008; Hoopes et al., 2003). As I have briefly 
illustrated above, strategy scholars have suggested that firms outperform their 
competitors and thus gain competitive advantage by occupying advantageous 
market positions through raising barriers to entry for competitors, or self-
organizing themselves in strategic groups
15
(Caves & Porter, 1977; Hatten & 
Hatten, 1987; McGee & Thomas, 1986; Porter, 1979; Rumelt, 1991). 
However, some scholars have argued that competitive structures do not 
sufficiently explain interfirm heterogeneity
16
, and thus provide an incomplete 
account of competitive advantage (and in turn above to normal economic 
rents). In contrast with the market-based explanation of competitive advantage, 
the RBV asserts that competitive advantage is a result of a strategy to acquire, 
combine and deploy firm-specific resources (Conner, 1991: 132).   
                                                 
15 Strategic groups are defined ―as a subset of industry competitors that exhibit similar 
characteristics‖ (Porter, 1979). 
16 In the RBV tradition, heterogeneity can be explained as an outcome of disequilibrium 
process of Schumpeterian competition (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992).  
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While economic theory has been long concerned with resources (as factors of 
production), the seminal work of Penrose (1959) was the first attempt
17
 to 
provide a theory of the firm that is explicitly concerned with the concept of 
resources. In her theory, Penrose views firms as collections of productive 
resources organized in an administrative framework (Foss, 2000: 17). 
However, it wasn’t until the theoretical contributions18 by (Wernerfelt, 1984), 
(Barney, 1991), and (Peteraf, 1993) that have placed firm-specific resources at 
the epicentre of interfirm heterogeneity, and competitive advantage.  
To provide some definitional clarity, resources are defined as ―[those] tangible 
and intangible assets that are tied semi-permanently to the firm‖ (Wernerfelt, 
1984: 172).  Firm resources are converted into final products or services when 
combined with other firm assets and bonding mechanisms such as for example 
incentive systems (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993: 35). In turn, competitive 
advantage stems from ―the successful implementation of a value creating 
strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential 
competitors‖ (Barney, 1991: 102).  
I will now briefly review these three important contributions to the RBV. The 
seminal papers discussed here and the works of Barney (1986) and Dierickx 
and Cool (1989), which I review later, consist the initial core of the RBV. 
Acedo and colleagues devise the core of the RBV by employing an ad hoc 
                                                 
17 Wernerfelt (1984: 171) highlights this gap and argues that ―…The reason, no doubt, 
is the unpleasant properties (for modelling purposes) of some key examples of resources, 
such as technological skills. The mathematics used by economists typically require that 
resources exhibit declining returns to scale, as in the traditional theory of factor 
demand‖. 
18 Foss (2000: 19) has argued that these contributions utilize equilibrium constructs and 
build directly on price theory. He further suggests that these contributions primarily 
draw from the work of Harold Demsetz and the UCLA-Chicago tradition rather, as it is 
most often, assumed from Penrose’s (1959) seminal theory of the growth of the firm.  
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heuristics method that ―…starts from an initial reduced core, made up of the 
most basic works on theory…‖ (2006: 624). Acedo and colleagues have also 
identified and separated works on RBV, the knowledge-based view (KBV) and 
relational view. The relational view extends RBV to account for resources that 
are shared in interorganizational relationships. I discuss the relational view 
more extensively in the next section.   
In his seminal paper, Wernerfelt was first to graphically argue that ―resources 
and products are the sides of the same coin‖ (Wernerfelt, 1984: 172). His 
objective of course was to illustrate how resources can be a source of 
profitability for diversified firms. In doing so, he builds on Porter’s work and 
his five forces framework, and identifies mechanisms where resources can 
provide advantages for diversified firms. Connecting back to the notion of 
entry market barriers, he perceives profitability as a result of resource position 
barriers. He however argues that ―for a resource position barrier to be valuable 
it should translate into an entry barrier‖ (Wernerfelt, 1984: 173). Most 
importantly, Wernerfelt goes on and identifies classes of resources that can be 
used to raise such resource position barriers. He thus, even implicitly, 
introduces the idea of ―strategic‖ resources (in his words attractive). Across his 
identified classes of resources, Wernerfelt’s basic assumption is that such 
resources are idiosyncratic, in a sense that associated returns can only be 
earned by the firm that developed these resources. Wernerfelt clearly illustrate 
this point in his example of production experience (as an attractive resource). 
He argues that ―late acquirers should pay more for the experience and expect 
lower returns from it‖ (Wernerfelt, 1984: 173).  Wernerfelt extends this point 
further by discussing the trade of resources through mergers and acquisitions. 
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He highlights further the role of idiosyncratic resources and resource position 
barriers by arguing that ―one's chance of maximizing market imperfection and 
perhaps getting a cheap buy would be greatest if one tried to build on one's 
most unusual resource or resource position‖ (Wernerfelt, 1984: 175).   
Drawing from the early contribution of Wernerfelt, Barney provides a more 
comprehensive framework of how idiosyncratic resources can provide a firm 
with competitive advantage. He more specifically argues: 
 
―The resource-based view of the firm substitutes two alternate assumptions in 
analysing sources of competitive advantage. First, this model assumes that firms 
within an industry (or group) may be heterogeneous with respect to the strategic 
resources they control. Second, this model assumes that these resources may not be 
perfect mobile across firms, and thus heterogeneity can be lost lasting. The resource-
based model of the firm examines the implications of these two assumptions for the 
analysis of sources of sustained competitive advantage.‖ (:101; own emphasis)  
 
Barney further argues that the heterogeneity of resources is important even 
when assumed that firms gain competitive advantage through advantageous 
market positions, resulting to the existence of mobility barriers. The same 
argument goes for the condition of immobility. Thus, it is explicitly assumed 
that mobility barriers are raised due to these heterogeneous and immobile 
resources. More specifically, there are four conditions that must be met for 
resources to constitute sources of competitive advantage. That is, resources 
must be valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and not substitutable (VRIN) 
(Barney, 1991:106). Such resources have been further conceptualized as 
―strategic‖ (e.g., Barney, 1991; Crook et al., 2008) or ―critical‖ (e.g., Peteraf & 
Bergen, 2003).  More specifically, resources are valuable when enable the firm 
to conceive of or implement strategies that improve its efficiency or 
effectiveness (Barney, 1991: 106); rare when are scarce in quantity and 
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valuable; imperfectly imitable when firms that do not possess them cannot 
obtain them; and non-substitutable when there are no strategically equivalent 
valuable resources that are themselves not rare or imitable (Barney, 1991: 111) 
Furthermore, Barney raises two important issues to complement his initial four 
conditions of the resource-based framework. First, he recognizes the path-
dependency of resource accumulation. Put it differently, there is a time element 
where the development of specific resources meet the above initial conditions. 
Second, firms may able to sustain competitive advantage due to the existence 
of causal ambiguity to the resources they own as such resources could not be 
imitated by competitors.  
In her seminal contribution, Peteraf (1993) provides a framework that connects 
resources to firm economic performance. While her framework is similar to the 
VRIN conditions proposed by Barney (1991), she is more concerned with how 
resources can generate economic rents. Building on the initial framework of 
Barney (1991), Peteraf argues that firms that possess superior heterogeneous 
resources will generate above to normal rents
19
. She identifies four conditions, 
which must be met in order for resources to contribute towards competitive 
advantage. Given the importance of resource heterogeneity, firms preserve 
long-term rent generation by limiting ex post competition. Such competition 
may inhibit firm performance by the supply of scarce resources. Dierickx and 
Cool (1989) argue that for resources to be a source of competitive advantage 
must be non-tradeable. At this point, Peteraf suggests that tradeable resources, 
                                                 
19  More specifically, Peteraf distinguishes between Ricardian and monopoly rents. 
Ricardian rents are earned as firms with superior resources have lower average costs 
than other firms (Peteraf, 1993: 180). On the other hand, monopoly rents are earned by 
firms with heterogeneous resources resulting to product differentiation or spatial 
competition (Peteraf, 1993:181). 
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what she terms imperfectly mobile, can appropriate rents and thus positively 
affect firm performance. The underlying idea of imperfect mobility is that rents 
are jointly appropriated by the firm that originally develops the resource (factor 
firm) and the firm that employs the resource given an opportunity cost. 
However, Peteraf suggests that the firm employing the resource will be unable 
to appropriate higher value than what the factor could achieve. The last 
condition that must be met in order for firms to create competitive advantage is 
ex ante limits to competition.  
Peteraf further argues that firms will appropriate above to normal returns in the 
case that possess superior resource positions compare to their rivals. However, 
such rents can only be generated if markets for resources do exist and are 
imperfect. That said, in the absence of such markets, firms could not acquire 
resources crucial to the implementation of their strategies and thus can only 
enjoy normal rents (Peteraf, 1993:184).  Amit and Schoemaker (1993: 39) add 
to the conversation of resources and organizational rents
20
 by illustrating three 
major reasons why VRIN resources will create more value than other 
resources. First, they argue, resources that they are in high demand and 
difficult to imitate will allow fewer firms to pursue market strategies based on 
such resources, while other firms not possessing such resources will find it too 
costly and time consuming to pursue a similar strategy. Second, firm-
specificity and the presence of transaction costs affect the value potential of 
                                                 
20 Mahoney and Pandian (1992: 364) distinguish between four types of organizational 
rents. First, Ricardian rents can be earned through owning resources that can be scarce. 
Second, monopoly rents can be earned through collusive arrangements. Third, 
entrepreneurial rents may be earned through risk taking and entrepreneurial insight in 
uncertain and complex environments. Fourth, quasi-rents (or Pareto) rents can be earned 
when resources are firm-specific. 
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resources. Third, the more durable the resources the smaller will be the 
investment to offset their depreciation.  
The above theoretical contributions suggest that heterogeneously distributed 
resources among competing firms that are VRIN are a source of (sustainable) 
competitive advantage. Drawing from the core of the RBV, scholars have 
intensively directed their research efforts towards understanding the link of 
resources and firm performance (as a proxy of competitive advantage). In their 
meta analysis of RBV-related empirical work, Crook et al. (2008) provide 
empirical support
21
 to the main theoretical predictions of the RBV. They also 
find that ―strategic‖ resources exhibit a higher impact on organizational 
performance than resources that they do not meet the VRIN criteria.    
 
3.2.3 Emerging RBV Models: Resources residing outside firm 
boundaries as source of sustained Competitive Advantage 
As it was illustrated above, resources are of crucial importance on explaining 
sustained competitive advantage. Building on market barriers and entry theory, 
RBV scholars have initially provided a set of limiting conditions that resources 
must meet in order to contribute towards competitive advantage. Recently, 
scholars have challenged these limiting conditions by broadly suggesting that 
resources reside outside firm boundaries can also contribute towards 
competitive advantage. In contrast with traditional contributions on RBV, these 
scholars view firms as interconnected entities, and are thus concerned with 
resources shared or exchanged through interfirm relationships (e.g., Gulati, 
                                                 
21 In another recent empirical assessment of RBV-related empirical research, Newbert 
(2007) finds that only 53% of empirical studies provide support for the basic RBV 
theoretical assumptions. Newbert also finds that capabilities have been found to explain 
firm performance than resources (Newbert, 2007: 137). 
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Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000).  Scholars have been mostly concerned with two 
major mechanisms of accessing external resources; strategic alliances and 
inter-firm networks.  
Taking a RBV perspective
22
, scholars have viewed alliances as a medium of 
aggregating, sharing or exchanging valuable resources (Das & Teng, 2000: 
37). Accordingly, firms enter strategic alliances with primarily two strategic 
motives; to either obtain resources essential to competitive advantage or retain 
resources for later effective use (e.g., Ireland et al., 2002). For example, 
competitive advantage can be gained through external resources by altering the 
firm’s vulnerable strategic position (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996) and 
overcoming resource constraints (Combs & Ketchen, 1999). In terms of the 
limiting conditions of resource heterogeneity and imperfect mobility, Das and 
Teng (2000) argue that alliances are formed as a response to the non-existence 
of resource markets. Put it differently, the existence of factor markets would 
allow firms to bid for needed resources eliminating the need for a strategic 
alliance. Hence, Das and Teng (2000:41) propose that the higher the imperfect 
mobility, imitability and substitutability of resources the more likely the firm 
to enter a strategic alliance. In terms of performance, the authors argue that the 
higher the contribution of resources to the alliance the higher the accumulation 
of new resources and thus the value appropriated by the alliance partners.     
Drawing from the rapid proliferation of alliances, scholars have started to 
investigate the strategic importance of networks in terms of accessing 
                                                 
22  Scholars in the alliance literature have also employed transaction cost theory to 
investigate differential performance implications of alliance governance forms (e.g., 
Colombo, 2003; Oxley, 1997) instead of focusing on the exchange of resources under 
the strategic motives of enhancing innovation or learning.  
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resources outside firm boundaries (Gulati et al., 2000). These scholars argue 
that focusing only at resources that are developed or owned by the firm, 
provides an incomplete understanding of competitive advantage. Rather, these 
scholars highlight that ―the search for value-creating resources and capabilities 
should extend beyond the boundaries of the firm‖ (Gulati et al., 2000: 207). 
They further argue that a strategic network can be considered as an inimitable 
resource itself, and as a means for participating firms to access inimitable 
resources, (Gulati, 1999). In terms of the VRIN conditions, (Gulati et al., 2000) 
further suggest that network resources are heterogeneous (idiosyncratic) and 
non-imitable as they are unique to firms’ participating in the network.  They 
extend their argument that network structure and membership can be 
idiosyncratic and thus constitute a strategic resource.   
Dyer and Singh (1998) further recognize that strategic resources can extend 
beyond firm boundaries and extend RBV by offering a relational view of 
competitive advantage. In their relational view, competing firms earn 
economic (relational
23
 in this case) rents through network-specific 
routines/processes. In contrast with initial contributions that view resources as 
firm-level attributes, they focus at the dyad level of analysis.  
More specifically, Dyer and Singh (1998) identify four specific rent-generating 
mechanisms. First, firms can generate relational rents through interfirm 
relation-specific assets. Interfirm relation-specific assets are basically strategic 
assets that are specialized in conjunction with assets owned by the alliance 
                                                 
23 A relational rent is defined as ―a supernormal profit jointly generated in an exchange 
relationship that cannot be generated by either firm in isolation and can only be created 
through the joint idiosyncratic contributions of the specific alliance partners‖ (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998: 662) 
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partners. Relational rents are generated through lower total value chain costs, 
greater product differentiation, fewer defects, and faster product development 
cycles (Dyer & Singh, 1998: 664). Second, firms can generate relational rents 
through knowledge sharing routines. Drawing from the importance of 
knowledge as the primary source of competitive advantage (e.g., Grant, 1996), 
Dyer and Singh (1998) argue that such routines are the most important sources 
of new ideas and information that result in the generation of relational rents 
through new technologies and innovation. Third, complementary resource 
endowments can be a source of relational rents. Complementary resource 
endowments are those resources of alliance partners that collectively generate 
greater rents than the sum of those obtained individually (Dyer & Singh, 1998: 
666). Dyer and Singh further propose that the more synergistic the effect of 
these complementary resources the greater the potential of generating 
relational rents. Fourth, relational rents can be earned through the effective 
governance of the interfirm relationship. Effective governance can either 
minimize transaction costs among the alliance partners or provide incentives 
for value-creation initiatives (Dyer & Singh, 1998: 670).  
To preserve such rents, several isolating mechanisms can be employed such as 
inter-organizational asset connectedness, partner scarcity, resource 
indivisibility, and the institutional environment.  In contrast with the ―core‖ 
RBV assumptions, the relational view suggests that firms gain competitive 
advantage by sharing rather than protecting firm-specific resources.  
Extended the relational view offered by Dyer and Singh (1998), Lavie (2006) 
distinguishes between shared and non-shared resources and their relative 
contribution to firm competitive advantage. Shared (network-specific) 
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resources will appropriate relational rents for the partnering firms accrued by 
idiosyncratic resources committed to the alliance. Lavie suggests that firms 
participating in alliance networks facilitate asset flows thus leading to resource 
homogeneity (2006: 643). In terms of imperfect mobility, he suggests that 
alliances act as an isolating mechanism on accessing particular resources. 
Furthermore, Lavie identifies several factors that may affect the appropriation 
of relational rents. Of particular importance is the moderating role of 
absorptive capacity and scale and scope of resources. Lavie proposes that the 
higher the absorptive capacity of the focal firm and the smaller the overlapping 
between resource sets (scale and scope) the higher the relational rents accrued. 
I discuss further the important concept of absorptive capacity later on.  
 
3.2.4 RBV Assumptions & ERA 
In the two previous sections, I have provided an overview of theoretical 
contributions to the RBV. More specifically, I have illustrated mechanisms 
under which resources reside inside (section 3.2.2) and outside (section 3.2.3) 
the boundaries of the firm can constitute a source of competitive advantage, 
and thus create economic rents. Table 3-1 provides a summary of the 
mechanisms (and conditions) through which resources contribute to firm 
competitive advantage.  
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Table 3-1. Resource types and competitive advantage 
 
 
In this section, I provide the theoretical foundations of the resource-driven 
view of ERA. While RBV has not been developed per se as a theory of ERA, it 
holds significant implications for the overarching question I have set out to 
answer. I more specifically discuss how external resources can contribute to 
competitive advantage. In so doing, I revisit some of the RBV’s basic 
assumptions in relation to ERA.  
Central to the view of ERA as a resource-driven action is the argument that 
external resources can be a source of sustainable competitive advantage. This 
argument is based on four major assumptions: a) firms possessing Valuable, 
Rare, Inimitable and Non-substitutable (VRIN framework; Barney (1991)) 
resources enjoy competitive advantage, b) firms compete in environments 
where resources are central both to their strategy and competitive position, c) 
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firms can acquire (external) resources in imperfect strategic factor markets, 
and d) external resources can lead to competitive advantage. These 
assumptions are directly relevant to the quest for competitive advantage. After 
all, the RBV is a theory of efficiency and as such it is concerned with how 
firms strategize based on their resources to gain an advantage over their 
competitors (Peteraf & Barney, 2003).  The concept of competitive advantage, 
in the theoretical sphere of the RBV, holds important implications for firm 
strategic behaviour. One such implication is that firm strategic behaviour will 
be very much directed by the VRIN resources that a firm possesses. To this 
point I have discussed how VRIN resources can lead to competitive advantage 
(assumption (a)). Below, I discuss the rest of the assumptions that I have 
identified above.  
The first important issue is that of strategic factor markets and the mechanisms 
where external resources can be a source of competitive advantage. In his 
seminal paper, Wernerfelt (1984) has raised the issue of acquired resources in 
relation to his concept of resource position barriers. He more specifically 
argued that: 
―Let us here focus on the purchase of resource bundles, taking as given the 
profitability of using different combinations. In this perspective, one's chance of 
maximizing market imperfection and perhaps getting a cheap buy would be greatest if 
one tried to build on one's most unusual resource or resource position. Doing so 
should make it possible to get into buying situations with relatively little competition, 
but also with relatively few targets. Although, in theory, it would be best to be the 
sole suitable buyer of a lot of identical targets, even a bilateral monopoly situation 
would be better than a game with several identical buyers and sellers. Especially since 
the latter situation will most likely lead one into heavier competition in the race to 
build resource position barriers after the acquisitions have taken place.‖ (: 175) 
 
The point that Wernerfelt is trying to make here is that markets for resources 
are highly imperfect and as such the value generating potential of acquired 
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resources depends on the resources that the acquirer already possess. This 
implied synergistic effect between targeted and already owned resources is of 
central importance to the RBV. Wernerfelt seems to suggest is that resources 
traded in such markets can be a source of competitive advantage only when 
combined with resources already controlled by the firm.  
Barney (1986) develops this argument further by providing a framework on 
how competing firms gain value through strategic factor markets. Barney 
defines such markets as ―a market where resources to implement a strategy are 
acquired‖ (Barney, 1986: 1231). Barney argues that a strategic factor market is 
developed whenever the implementation of a strategy requires the acquisition 
of resources (Barney, 1986: 1232). By understanding the underlying 
mechanisms of strategic factor markets, one can make inferences on the 
potential economic returns that a firm can accrue by acquiring resources. 
Barney makes this point very clear by arguing that the acquisition of resources 
can lead to greater than normal returns only when the firm exploits competitive 
imperfections
24
. Competitive imperfections arise when competing firms expect 
a different value for acquiring the target resource and implement a strategy. Put 
it differently, differences in (value) expectations constitute a strategic factor 
market imperfection (Barney, 1986: 1234). 
Barney goes on and identify several strategic factor imperfections such as lack 
of separation (the firm owns all the necessary resources to implement their 
strategy), uniqueness (unique history of owned resources), lack of entry (the 
                                                 
24 In contrast, if competing firms, participating in the strategic factor market, hold the 
same information about the future value of the strategies to be implemented through the 




firm chooses not to enter the market), profit maximizing (firm behaviour to 
maximize profits), financial strength (financial backing to enter the strategic 
factor market), and luck of understanding (firm does not understand the rent 
generating process underlying the strategy). Given these competitive 
imperfections, a firm can obtain above to normal returns when it holds more 
accurate expectations
25
 about the value of the strategy to be implemented or 
simply by being lucky (Barney, 1986: 1238).   
Taking away the element of luck, asymmetry on expectations about the future 
value of the targeted resource is then the most important factor that will 
determine the value generating potential of the resource to be acquired (and its 
potential to create a competitive advantage) (Makadok & Barney, 2001). 
Accurate expectations, Barney argues, are more probably to stem through an 
internal analysis of the skills (resources) that a firm already possess rather the 
information obtained from the firm’s competitive environment. In their recent 
information model, Makadok and Barney (2001) argue that ―the most 
fundamental asymmetry capable of generating competitive advantage are 
interfirm differences in skill at collecting, filtering, and interpreting 
information about the future value of resources‖ (Makadok & Barney, 2001: 
1623). If a firm lacks such special resources then it can only rely to a sub-
optimal strategy of imitating the strategy of its competitors (Barney, 1986: 
1238).  
This may be true when we assume that firms behave in a profit maximizing 
way and they can recognize the imperfections described above. While Barney 
                                                 
25 Barney’s argument of superior information and thus more accurate expectations is 
very much in line with the efficient market hypothesis (Denrell et al., 2003). 
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recognizes that sometimes firms act in a non profit maximizing manner, he 
fails to expand further on what other kind of firm behaviour is to be expected 
when firms engage in resource acquisition and thus choose to enter a strategic 
factor market.  
Building their arguments on Barney’s notion of strategic factor markets, 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989) argue that product market positions are affected by 
the opportunity cost to build resources necessary to occupy such positions. If 
opportunity cost is not taken into account, the authors argue, measured returns 
of product market activities will be inflated. They extend the discussion of 
Barney (1986) on strategic factor markets by focusing on how and if resources 
can be traded and how such resources can be accumulated through time. 
Contrast to Barney, Dierickx and Cool propose that resources that can be 
acquired in the presence of strategic factor markets cannot be a source of 
competitive advantage. Rather, they suggest that such idiosyncratic (strategic) 
resources must be accumulated internally (Dierickx & Cool, 1989: 1506).   
Dierickx and Cool clearly state that their main concern is with the 
sustainability of resource positions rather with the creation of competitive 
advantage. Building on their powerful proposition that strategic resources 
cannot be traded, they suggest that competing firms can either imitate (create 
their own) or substitute them.  They identify several characteristics of the 
resource accumulation process such as time compression diseconomies, asset 
mass efficiencies, interconnectedness of asset stocks, asset erosion, and causal 
ambiguity that can protect a firm’s internal resources by imitation or 
substitution. Briefly, time compression diseconomies refer to the time required 
for resource accumulation. Simply, the input required for such accumulation 
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cannot substitute for time. Asset mass efficiencies refer to the path-dependent 
nature of resource accumulation. Interconnectedness of asset stocks suggests 
that resource accumulation is connected with a number of resources not only to 
the resource to be accumulated. Asset erosion refers to the cost associated with 
the resource accumulation process of a particular resource. Causal ambiguity 
refers to the complex nature of resources as the resource accumulation process 
may be stochastic and discontinuous. Alternatively, competing firms may 
employ alternative stock of resources (substitute) given that these are available 
through markets. The threat in this case is that substitution may decrease the 
value of the substituted resource (Dierickx & Cool, 1989: 1509)    
To this point, I have reviewed contributions that provide us with insights on 
how, and under what conditions, external resources can be a source of 
competitive advantage. While these contributions starting point is that firms 
are heterogeneous on the resources that they possess, Dierickx and Cool (1989) 
suggest that external resources cannot be a source of competitive advantage, if 
they can freely traded in strategic factor markets. In contrast with Barney’s 
(1986) framework of strategic factor markets, Dierickx and Cool argue that if 
resources can be traded they cannot be VRIN. This suggests a tension between 
assumptions (a) and (d) that I have provided above. This tension does not only 
hold theoretical implications for ERA but has also directed empirical research 
in the context of the RBV.  
Connecting back with the conversation on the traditional models of the RBV, 
scholars have implicitly assumed that only internally developed resources can 
contribute towards competitive advantage and thus have initially focused their 
empirical efforts on resources endogenous to the firm. Certain competitive 
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conditions, however, such as the proliferation of knowledge and innovation, 
has forced scholars to revalidate their initial views and account for mechanisms 
that resources residing outside the boundaries of the firm (shared or external) 
can contribute to firm competitive advantage (Mathews, 2003; Miller, Fern, & 
Cardinal, 2007). However, these contributions work under the assumption that 
such resources are a source of competitive advantage only in relation to the 
resources that the firm already owns. Put it differently, such resources can be 
heterogeneous (and in a sense VRIN) only when combined with the 
idiosyncratic resources of the firm.   
While these contributions advance significantly our understanding on 
resources, firm strategy and competitive advantage, they fail to incorporate the 
environment of the firm. This is an important limitation that we must address if 
we are to better understand why firms are heterogeneous in the first place 
(Foss, 2000). In the next section, I review recent theoretical work that tries to 
incorporate the environment of the firm in the theoretical sphere of the RBV. 
This is important as scholars have shown that ERA can be central to firm 
survival when firms are faced with changing competitive conditions such as for 
example, the technological paradigm of biotechnologies(Nicholls-Nixon & 
Woo, 2003).  
3.2.5 Towards a dynamic view of the RBV: competing through 
external resources in dynamic competitive environments 
So far, I have provided an overview of the dominant theoretical framework on 
explaining intraindustry performance variations and sustained competitive 
advantage, namely the RBV. Taking into account initial contributions (Amit & 
Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991; Barney, 1986; Conner, 1991; Dierickx & 
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Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984), I have highlighted limiting 
conditions for resources to be a source of sustained competitive advantage. 
Following Barney’s original model (1991), resources can be a source of 
competitive advantage when they are valuable, rare, costly-to-copy, and hard 
to substitute (VRIN conditions). In turn, competitive advantage is sustained 
when resources are heterogeneously distributed among competing firms 
(resource heterogeneity) and non-tradeable into (perfect) strategic factor 
markets (purchased for a specific price).   
As it has been illustrated above, scholars have significantly extended the 
theoretical basis of RBV by illustrating mechanisms where network- and 
alliance- specific resources can contribute to firm competitive advantage. 
Whilst these contributions shed important light to the applicability of the RBV 
in competitive environments where firms compete in an interconnected way, 
they fail to account for dynamic environment conditions that competing firms 
are faced with. It is under such competitive conditions, where understanding 
the interplay between external resources and sustained competitive advantage 
becomes even more important.  Recently scholars have attempted to expand 
the theoretical boundaries of the RBV by taking into account environment 
conditions such as uncertainty, and munificence. A recent example is the study 
of Sirmon and colleagues (2007) which connects uncertainty and munificence 
(as environmental contingencies) with managing resources.  Specifically, the 
authors focus on three environmental contingency factors that may produce 
uncertainty such as industry structure, the stability of market demand, and 
environmental shocks. Under high uncertainty, the authors argue, firms will 
seek to acquire a broader set of resources in order to seize environmental 
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opportunities and increase their flexibility towards competitors’ actions. 
Environmental uncertainty, in terms of resources, holds several implications 
for firm strategic behaviour. First, uncertainty can be seen as one dimension of 
perceived competitive action among rival firms. Second, uncertainty may 
affect the management of a firm’s resources but also competitive actions 
towards the occupation of environmental opportunities. Third, resource 
uncertainty highlights the strategic importance of competitors’ actions on the 
focal firms’ strategic behaviour. The relationship between uncertainty and 
resources can be seen as an outcome of Schumpeterian competition. In his 
early attempt to provide theoretical implications of how firms strategize under 
Schumpeterian competition, Barney (1986) argued: 
―...certain firms in the industry may have the unique skills required to be the 
source of revolutionary changes in that industry... Other firms may have the 
unique ability to rapidly adapt to whatever evolutionary changes may occur ... 
However, as long as some irreducible uncertainty remains in the industry, 
firms will be unable to anticipate perfectly which particular changes in an 
industry will cause a revolution, or which firm or firms will be the sources of 
this change...‖  
―If it were possible to anticipate a Schumpeterian revolution with certainty, 
then most firms will be able to respond accordingly by acquiring the 
appropriate resources and implementing the necessary strategies. However, 
Schumpeterian revolutions can only can be imperfectly anticipated, the effects 
of Schumpeterian revolutions of defining some organizations’ abilities and 
assets as newly valuable, are partially stochastic in nature... Firms that have 
what turn out to be newly valuable skills and assets are, to some extent, lucky. 
These lucky firms may be able to retain their resource and skills advantages 
for a substantial period of time, thereby becoming dominant actors in their 
newly defined industry.‖ (: 796-797)   
 
Barney brings out some important implications for ERA that unfortunately 
does not fully incorporate in his theory of strategic factor markets. Such 
dynamic conditions, such as uncertainty, hold important implications 
specifically for the differential expectations that competing firms must build on 
if any value can be appropriated when acquiring resources in strategic factor 
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markets. More generally, in line with the argument of Dierickx and Cool 
(1989) on the (non)tradability of strategic resources, Denrell et al (2003: 985) 
suggest that competing firms can seize opportunities in strategic factor markets 
when the future value of the resource to be acquired is contingent to already 
owned resources. It is not hard to imagine that such strategic opportunities will 




It follows from the above discussion that resource uncertainty both enables and 
constrains strategic action. Competing firms can take strategic actions to seize 
opportunities in strategic factor markets. Such (resource) opportunities are 
created due to competitive imperfections that firms try to exploit (Alvarez & 
Barney, 2007). Of course, such imperfections suggest that some firms are more 
prepared to seize resource acquisition opportunities than others. Denrell and 
colleagues argue that internal resources (that are idiosyncratic) can either 
enable or constrain firms to capitalize on strategic factor market inefficiencies. 
Either way, they prescribe that internal resources ―is a necessary component of 
a successful search of strategic opportunities‖ (Denrell et al., 2003: 989).   
In terms of exploiting opportunities, internal resources may be of little help 
when firms are faced with high environmental uncertainty. One important 
factor that may hinder the value of internal resources is their path-dependent 
nature. Firms with a very rigid development trajectory may be unable to put 
such resources into use (develop value-creating strategies) to exploit resource 
                                                 
26 The link between strategic opportunities and uncertainty in the context of the RBV has 
been also captured on the theory of the entrepreneurial firm (Langlois, 2007). To be 
consistent with previous sections, and my main concern with ERA, I do not extend my 
conversation to that literature.  
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opportunities. Another factor that may further hinder the value of internal 
resources is the causal ambiguity of putting such resources into new uses. As 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989: 1508) point out, the accumulation of resources in 
dynamic environments can be described as stochastic and discontinuous. As 
such, high causal ambiguity will further hinder the value of internal resources 
to appropriate any opportunities.  
Competing firms however, may act to acquire resources in strategic factor 
markets for other strategic reasons. As it has been illustrated earlier, one 
necessary condition for sustaining competitive advantage is the scarcity (rare 
condition) of resources. Resource imitation may eradicate the scarcity of 
resources (Peteraf & Barney, 2003: 1038). For firms to sustain competitive 
advantage must not only acquire superior resources faster than their 
competitors, to sustain scarcity, but also be able to deploy them. In the 
presence of uncertainty, firms may also seize opportunities to strategic factor 
markets to decrease the competitive positions of their competitors. For 
example, Makadok’s (2001) resource-picking resource-deploying model 
suggests that competing firms may participate in strategic factor markets in 
order to pre-empt strategic resources. The pre-emption of strategic resources 
can lead competing firms to gain a first mover advantage (Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988) or decrease the value of competitors’ resource profiles 




3.3 Competitor-driven behaviour and theories of imitation 
So far, I have reviewed the theoretical premises of the RBV and illustrated its 
connections with ERA. In this section, I build on a different set of theoretical 
perspectives in order to provide the theoretical grounds for my competitor-
driven view of ERA. In doing so, I draw upon the competitive dynamics 
(hereafter CD) literature and theories of imitation to illustrate why firms will 
strategically behave to conform towards the actions of their competitors. In 
contrast with the resource-based rationale provided above, which perceives 
firm strategic behaviour as solely driven by the firm’s idiosyncratic resources, 
firms may strategically act in similar ways (Gimeno, Hoskisson, Beal, & Wan, 
2005: 297). Firms may exhibit a similar strategic behaviour for several reasons. 
Such firm behaviour is conceptually captured through the concepts of strategic 
similarity (deviation) and strategic interdependence. It is important to note, that 
strategic similarity does not necessarily mean that firms are in some way 
homogeneous. In line with the RBV, competing firms can still be 
heterogeneous but exhibit similar strategic behaviour. I return to this important 
point when I discuss CD research that examines the relationship between 
resource similarity and strategic behaviour. My objective in this section is not 
to be exhaustive
27
 of relevant research but to provide sufficient theoretical 
grounds for my conceptual development later on.  
3.3.1 Competitive explanations of strategic similarity and imitative 
behaviour 
Scholars concerned with CD, have long argued that competing firms are 
strategically interdependent. Rooted primarily in the IO paradigm, scholars 
                                                 
27 Recently, Lieberman and Asaba (2006) and Ordanini et al. (2008) have provided us 
with two excellent reviews on interorganizational imitation. 
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have concerned with such strategic interdependence by investigating the 
implications of strategic similarity and interfirm rivalry. Strategic similarity
28
 
is defined as ―similarity in the general pattern of resource deployments and 
competitive orientations independent of the specific markets served by the 
firm‖ (Gimeno & Woo, 1996: 324). The concept of strategic similarity dates 
back to Bain-type IO research on competitive structures. From a structural 
perspective, Caves and Porter (1977) criticized neo-classical economic theory, 
and suggested that firms differ in traits other than size. Firms with structural 
similarities, Caves and Porter argue,  ―are likely to respond in the same way to 
disturbances from inside or outside the group, recognizing their 
interdependence closely and anticipating their reactions to another’s move 
quite accurately‖ (Caves & Porter, 1977: 251). Such strategic interdependence 
suggests a collusive
29
 strategic behaviour across the structural dimensions of a 
group of similar firms. The major rationale behind such strategic behaviour is 
the reduction of competitive intensity.   
Caves and Porter (1977) suggest that higher levels of tacit coordination, among 
structurally similar firms, will lead to lower levels of competitive intensity 
(rivalry). Chen (1996) provides a similar rationale on how strategic similarity 
will affect interfirm rivalry. Focusing at the dyadic-level of analysis, he 
                                                 
28  Deephouse (1999) offers a similar definition of strategic similarity. He defines 
strategic similarity as ―the extent to which a firm’s strategic position resembles the 
strategic positions of other firms competing in its market at a particular point in time‖ 
(Deephouse, 1999: 148). Gimeno and Woo’s (1996) definition treats strategic similarity 
as independent of the markets that the firm and its competitors operate in. This is 
because these scholars distinguish between strategic similarity and multimarket contact, 
as two distinct dimensions of interfirm similarity. The concept of multimarket contact 
refers to the homogeneity of specific markets served by competing firms (Gimeno and 
Woo, 1996: 324).  
29 Collusion defers from imitation. Collusion is the ex ante coordination of strategic 
decisions where imitation is the ex post decision to copy the strategies of others.  
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suggests that the likelihood of the firm to take a strategic action against a 
competitor will be reduced if the two competing firms are strategically similar. 
However, Chen also suggests that a firm will be better able to respond to a 
competitors’ action if it possesses similar resource endowments with that of its 
competitor. Chen’s rationale lies on the fact that organizational requirements to 
respond to a competitors’ action will be easier to manage when the focal 
(defending) firm has a similar resource base with its competitor (Chen, 1996: 
115).  In contrast with the Caves-Porter hypothesis, and Chen action-response 
framework, Gimeno and Woo (1996) provide empirical evidence that firms 
with high levels of strategic similarity compete more intensively. In a later 
study of multimarket contact and strategic similarity of the US computer 
software industry, Young, Smith, Grimm, and Simon (2000) find support for 
the Caves-Porter hypothesis by showing that lower levels of strategic similarity 
is associated with higher levels of competitive behaviour (frequency of 
competitive moves).  
As I have briefly illustrated above, CD empirical research has provided us with 
conflicting findings on firm behaviour and the concept of strategic similarity. 
While CD scholars have suggested that further empirical evidence must be 
provided to this complex relationship (e.g., Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006), two 
conclusions seem to emerge. First, firms with high strategic similarity will 
exhibit less competitive behaviour. Second, firms with low strategic similarity 
will exhibit higher competitive behaviour through their efforts to differentiate 
(by exploiting their idiosyncratic resources).  
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When firms are faced with high levels of strategic similarity, they may choose 
not differentiate but to imitate
30
 the strategic actions of their competitors in 
order to mitigate rivalry (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). While the RBV suggests 
that, in this case, firms will be better off to differentiate, such strategic choice 
is highly risky and uncertain especially when firms compete under the dynamic 
conditions described above (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006: 374). Imitative 
behaviour will be more prevalent when competitors’ actions are highly visible 
and easily to respond to (Chen & Miller, 1994: 97). Close (that exhibit high 
levels of strategic similarity) competitors will then be more likely to match 
their actions in order to preserve their status quo without escalating rivalry 
(Gimeno et al., 2005: 300).   
 
3.3.2 Noncompetitive explanations of strategic similarity and 
imitative behaviour 
In the previous section, I have briefly illustrated competitive explanations of 
imitative behaviour. More specifically, I have highlighted conditions whereby 
firms will imitate the strategic actions of their competitors. In this section, I 
expand the above conversation by focusing on noncompetitive explanations of 
firm imitative behaviour. Drawing from sociological and cognitive theories
31
, 
contributions to this end have provided powerful explanations on why 
competing firms will strategically behave in similar ways.  
                                                 
30  In rivalry-based explanations of imitative behaviour, competing firms avoid high 
levels of rivalry through tacit collusion (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). As I have explained 
above, tacit collusion is a primary mechanism for the formation of strategic groups.  
31 In comparison with competitive explanations of imitative behaviour that stem from 
economic theories, sociological theories conceive firm behaviour as more stable and 
harder to change across time (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). 
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In response to strategic group theory critiques, several scholars have taken a 
cognitive
32
 approach on understanding strategic similarity and the existence of 
strategic groups (Reger & Huff, 1993). Under such perspective, (Fiegenbaum 
& Thomas, 1995: 462) have argued that strategic groups ―may act as a 
reference point for group members when they make competitive strategy 
decisions‖. Furthermore, Peteraf and Shanley (1997) proposed that strategic 
groups may raise an identity based on the mutual understandings of managers 
of group member firms. Firms could also increase competitive interactions 
with their close rivals in order to develop the assets required to keep up with 
such technological change (Dranove et al., 1998). Nair and Filer (2003) 
illustrated that there is a co-integration of strategies amongst close rivals 
leading to the diminishing of intra-group variations over time. Overall, this 
cognitive approach suggests that strategic groups exist not due to the structural 
characteristics of similar firms but due to cognitive elaboration in terms of the 
competitive environment (Reger & Huff, 1993: 118).  
 Imitative behaviour can be also explained from a new institutional 
perspective. The basic argument in this perspective is that competing firms act 
in strategically similar ways in order to avoid legitimacy challenges in their 
organizational field
33
. Legitimacy is gained through isomorphic pressures that 
                                                 
32 Reger and Huff (1993) identify three mechanisms under which managers might focus 
on groups of firms rather to individual competitors; simplification, elaboration, and 
interaction. Through simplification, strategists simplify the complex cognitive problem 
of independently analysing a large number of competitors by grouping them. 
Elaboration refers to following a dominant design when strategists are faced with 
incomplete information. Interaction refers to the managers’ shared perceptions of the 
competitive environment.  
33  An organizational field is defined as ―the collection of organizations, such as 
suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations 
that produce similar products or services‖ DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. 1983. The iron 
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drive firms to adopt similar strategies. This particular case of isomorphism, 
strategic isomorphism, is defined as ―the similarity of a focal organization’s 
strategy to the strategies of other organizations in its industry‖ (Deephouse, 
1996: 1025).  In their seminal paper on institutional isomorphism, DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) provide a compelling explanation on how such firm 
behaviour, to adopt similar strategies, emerges in an organizational field. They 
specifically argue that ―Strategies that are rational for individual organizations 
may not be rational if adopted by large numbers. Yet the very fact that they are 
normatively sanctioned increases the likelihood of their adoption‖ (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983: 148).  
In relation to my discussion of dynamic competitive environments above, 
where competing firms faced with high levels of uncertainty, isomorphic 
pressures further drive imitative behaviour. In this situation, organizations will 
try to model their behaviour in organizations that are more legitimate or 
successful (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 152). In his study of diversification and 
market entry, Haveman (1993) provides some empirical support for the 
existence of imitative behaviour in a strategic context. He specifically found 
that firms will imitate the strategic actions of their successful (more profitable) 
peers. In contrast with early assumptions on institutional isomorphism, 
Haveman found that size had no effect on imitative behaviour of competing 
firms. Haunschild and Miner (1997), add to the empirical findings of 
Haveman, by distinguishing between three distinct modes of imitative 
behaviour. In the first mode, frequency-based imitation, firms engage in 
                                                                                                                                    
cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational 
fields. American sociological review: 147-160.. 
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actions employed by a large numbers of competitors. Trait-based imitation 
captures firm imitative behaviour driven by firm-specific similarities such as 
size. In the third mode, outcome-based imitation, firms imitate the actions of 
competitors that they perceived as successful. In relation to Haveman’s 
findings, Haunschild and Miner (1997) provide empirical support for the 
existence of imitative behaviour (in all three distinct modes). Interestingly, 
their findings also reveal a strong correlation between environmental 
uncertainty and frequency-based imitation.  
In relation to ERA, firms may exhibit imitative behaviour to eliminate 
legitimacy challenges with potential exchange partners.  Deephouse (1999: 
153) provides three reasons why legitimacy challenges may hinder the ERA 
efforts of competing firms. First, he argues that firms with low levels of 
legitimacy will be unable comprehend each other strategies. Second, less 
legitimate firms will be faced with less favourable acquisition terms. Third, 









This dissertation investigates an important yet challenging question in strategy 
research: “What is the role of firm strategy in ERA?” Scholars have paid 
significant attention to the antecedents and consequences of ERA. Drawing 
from the resource-based view of the firm, such contributions assume that ERA 
is a strategic action primarily driven by the firm’s idiosyncratic attributes and 
more specifically its resource endowments. While these contributions advance 
understanding on how firm-specific idiosyncratic attributes relate to ERA, they 
exclude the competitive environment of the firm from their analysis. As such 
ERA is perceived as a resource-driven action, whereby value is created 
through the relation of externally acquired resources to the firm’s idiosyncratic 
attributes. I argue that this is a serious limitation if we are to better understand 
the link between ERA and firm strategy. Recently, scholars have tried to 
address this gap by illustrating conditions where ERA can provide competitive 
advantage by not only improving the competitive position of the focal firm but 
also impeding the competitive positions of its rivals (Capron & Chatain, 2008). 
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Building on this recent effort, I propose that competing firms engage in ERA 
not only in relation to their idiosyncratic attributes but also in response to their 
competitors’ ERA related actions. My conceptual development goes one step 
further by investigating this question not only in relation to the theoretical 
assumptions of the RBV but within a broader theoretical perspective of firm 
strategic behaviour.  
In this chapter, I attempt to provide a conceptual framework where ERA can 
be seen both as a result of the firm’s idiosyncratic attributes and its competitive 
environment. I define ERA as ―the strategic action of the firm to acquire 
critical resources residing outside the firm’s boundaries”. Previously scholars 
have conceptualized ERA as a process rather than a strategic action. For 
example, Sirmon et al. (2007: 277) define ERA as ―the process of purchasing 
resources from strategic factor markets‖. In contrast with these previous 
conceptualizations, my definition allows for a direct empirical test of both 
firm- and competitor- specific explanations of ERA. While empirically 
investigating the process of ERA can yield some important insights on how 
firms search, acquire and assimilate external resources, viewing ERA as a 
strategic action can lead to important empirical insights by unravelling the 
extent to which firm- and competitor- specific factors drive patterns of ERA 
among competing firms. As I have argued in chapter 3, this definition of ERA 
assumes the existence of strategic factor markets in order to be in line with the 
early foundations of the RBV. Strategic factor markets are defined as ―a 
market where there would be no arbitrage opportunities to be gained by 
acquiring some combination of resources and selling this combination for a 
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higher price than the cost of the individual resources‖ (Denrell et al., 2003: 
980). 
Instead of focusing solely on external resources per se and their value 
generating potential, I conceptualize ERA as a strategic action that a firm 
employs to gain competitive advantage over its competitors. In turn, a strategic 
action is defined as an externally directed, specific, and observable competitive 
move initiated by a firm to enhance its competitive position (Ferrier, 2001). 
While understanding the complex relationship of firm-level actions and 
competitive advantage has been an established research endeavour, we 
currently understand some strategic actions more than others (Young et al., 
2000: 1218). Surprisingly, ERA has been an exception and no study exists to 
explicitly provide a theoretical framework of ERA actions among competing 
firms. As I will illustrate in more detail later, viewing ERA as a strategic action 
allows for an explicit inclusion of the firm’s competitive environment, and as 
such provide us with an opportunity to progress our understanding in several 
fronts.  Given my overarching theoretical question and my conceptualization of 
ERA, I address the following empirical questions: “What patterns of ERA 
actions do we observe among competing firms? To what extent do firm-level 
idiosyncratic attributes explain firm ERA activity (resource-driven view)? To 
what extent do competitors’ ERA actions explain firm ERA activity 
(competitor-driven view)? Is there an interaction effect between firm- and 
competitor- level explanations of ERA, and if so what kind? 
To answer these research questions, I develop a conceptual framework that 
incorporates the main constructs of my arguments. In so doing, I draw from the 
theoretical perspectives of the RBV and theories of interorganizational 
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imitation. While these different theoretical perspectives have been developed 
somewhat independently, scholars have provided us with several concepts that 
bridge these rather disjoint theoretical views of firm strategic behaviour. A 
central component to this theoretical effort is the concept of ―strategic 
similarity‖. Its central question is why firms choose to be similar or different 
(Deephouse, 1999). Through my conceptual development I argue that by 
adopting such perspective we can advance understanding on the link between 
ERA and firm strategy. Whilst adopting a multi-theoretical perspective poses 
several challenges it also allows for a significant theoretical and empirical 
contribution in this research area. My aim here is not to provide an all-
encompassing theory of ERA. Rather, I will argue that ERA is a product of 
both firm- and competitor- level explanations of firm strategic behaviour. 
Thus, my conceptual development aims at providing a direct test of both the 
resource- and competitor- view of ERA. In contrast with previous work in this 
area that focus primarily on either explanation, I argue that these two views are 
complementary. By investigating the question ―Is there an interaction effect 
between firm- and competitor- level explanations of ERA, and if so what 
kind?” I aim to provide empirical support for my view of ERA. In summary, 




Figure 4-1. Research questions and theoretical “map” 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, I provide the theoretical basis for 
my conceptual development. I then proceed with setting the boundaries of my 
conceptual framework and accordingly develop a set of testable hypotheses for 
each of my research questions.   
4.2 Theoretical Background 
Strategy scholars have long investigated the conditions under which firms 
strategically act to gain competitive advantage. While the quest for competitive 
advantage has been the major research agenda in the area of strategy (Hoopes 
et al., 2003), theories of strategic choice and firm behaviour have been very 
much developed independently. This is a serious limitation, if we are to better 
understand why firms engage in certain strategic actions and thus investigate 
patterns of strategic behaviour. Towards this end, I suggest that ERA is an 
excellent context of adopting a multi-theoretical perspective. I frame ERA in 
theories broadly concerned with strategic choice. I shall argue that firms 
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engage in ERA at the extremes of firm strategic behaviour; differentiation and 
imitation. As it has been illustrated earlier (chapter 3; section 2), the RBV 
suggests that the firm’s optimal strategic goal is to differentiate from its 
competitors by obtaining unique product market positions. However, firms 
may choose not to differentiate but imitate the strategic actions of their 
competitors. In this broad theoretical framework, scholars have been very 
much concerned with the link of such strategic behaviour (in the context of 
these two extremes) and competitive advantage (Deephouse, 1999). I add to 
this discussion by focusing on the strategic action of ERA.  
In the context of ERA, scholars thus far have adopted a resource-based 
perspective of firm behaviour. Under this dominant logic, competitive 
advantage is a function of firm-specific resources which can be hardly imitated 
by competitors or substituted (Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Initial theoretical work on the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) suggests 
that only resources developed inside organizational boundaries can be a source 
of competitive advantage as they are idiosyncratic and costly-to-copy (Barney, 
1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Some scholars extend this initial thought and 
suggest that share resources—resources that span organizational boundaries—
can also be a source of competitive advantage (Dyer & Singh, 1998).  
Scholars are still in disagreement to the extent which external resources can 
contribute to competitive advantage. Previous empirical efforts have focused 
on identifying mechanisms where a firm can improve its competitive position 
through the acquisition of external resources. Such contributions go one step 
further and identify several firm-specific factors that may further impact on the 
ability of external resources to improve organizational performance. For 
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example, one way that external resources can lead to superior organizational 
performance is through new combination of value-generating resources given 
the firm’s ability to effectively acquire, assimilate, and utilize newly acquired 
resources (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).  
The acquisition of external resources, however, holds not only firm- but also 
competitor- specific implications. Focusing at the intra-industry level of 
analysis, scholars have illustrated several mechanisms where a firm can gain 
competitive advantage through ERA. A firm can gain competitive advantage 
through ERA by pre-empting critical resources (e.g., Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1998). This is not to say however that resource pre-emption 
always leads to competitive advantage. Scholars have argued that often firms 
may acquire the ―wrong‖ resources and as such suffer a disadvantage over 
their competitors (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998: 1112). Furthermore, the 
focal firm may engage in ERA not necessarily under the incentive to improve 
its own resource position but to limit the competitive moves of other firms 
(―product space‖; the notion of spatial pre-emption) (Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988: 44). More specifically, Capron and Chatain (2008) argue 
that the focal firm can gain competitive advantage by deploying strategies that 
decrease both the quantity and effectiveness of competitors’ resources.  
In line with the RBV, we would expect that patterns of ERA among competing 
firms are associated with the firms’ idiosyncratic attributes. I develop a set of 
hypotheses in order to provide a direct empirical test of the RBV in the context 
of ERA. However, I expect that varying levels of firm-specific idiosyncratic 
attributes will be associated with differences in ERA patterns. I thus expect 
heterogeneous firm behaviour among competing firms engaging in ERA.  
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While engaging in ERA can provide the firm with opportunities to differentiate 
and move away from competition, it also increases competitive interaction. A 
firm’s effort to either improve its competitive position or inhibit the 
competitive position of its competitors will be likely to draw significant 
attention, and as such increase rivalry by initiating countermoves from its 
competitors (Young et al., 2000). It is thus likely that a firm may engage in 
ERA to respond to its competitors. One immediate response would be for the 
firm to imitate the strategic action of its competitors. Scholars have provided 
us with several mechanisms where imitation can either create or limit a firm’s 
competitive advantage in a number of contexts (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). 
While imitative behaviour can increase competition for resources it can also be 
beneficial as it eliminates legitimacy
34
 challenges that may hinder the firm’s 
access to critical resources (Deephouse, 1999: 152). Scholars have paid 
significant attention on imitative behaviour in several empirical contexts such 
as international expansion (e.g., Delios, Gaur, & Makino, 2008), M&A activity 
(e.g., Haunschild, 1993; Yang & Hyland, 2006), strategic alliances (e.g., 
Garcia-Pont & Nohria, 2002) and international joint ventures (e.g., Xia, Tan, & 
Tan, 2008). In line with previous research in this area, I investigated whether 
firms engage in ERA in response to their competitors’ actions. Thus, I argue 
that ERA can be seen as a competitor-driven action. I accordingly frame my 
arguments in the competitive dynamics (CD) literature and theories of 
interorganizational imitation.  
 
                                                 
34
 A legitimate firm obtains resources of higher quality and at more favourable 
terms than does a firm whose legitimacy is challenged (Deephouse, 1999: 152). 
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4.3 Conceptual development  
4.3.1 Definitions and boundaries of the study 
Before I proceed with my conceptual development, it is important to explicitly 
define the main concepts of my arguments, and set the boundaries of my study. 
First, in line with the theoretical premises of the RBV, I perceive the firm as an 
entity of heterogeneously distributed costly-to-copy resources. Firms compete 
under the assumption of Schumpeterian competition, where the economic rents 
derive by market opportunities that arise through innovative activity (Roberts 
& Amit, 2003). I am not concerned with the broader implications of 
competition rather I am interested in a set of firms competing in the same 
industry, offering similar products and thus targeting similar customers. In line 
with Baum and Korn (1996), I perceive competition as a firm-level property in 
contrast with classic economic theory where competition is a property of 
market structure and thus unrelated to firm strategic behaviour. This set of 
firms is defined as competing firms (Chen, 1996). If we are to study ERA and 
firm strategic behaviour, we need a set of firms that share the same resource 
space and strategic factor markets. Otherwise, ERA will be a strategic action 
unrelated to firm behaviour and the dynamics of competition among firms. The 
definition adopted here of ―competing firms‖ includes this necessary condition 
in order to study ERA. In such competitive contexts, rivalry occurs when the 
strategic actions of one firm have noticeable effects on its competitors and thus 
increase the propensity of counter-actions (Young et al., 2000). Firm strategy 
is thus defined as a series of strategic actions with the objective of achieving 
competitive advantage. Based on its strategy, the firm gains competitive 
advantage when is able to create more economic value than its competitors 
(Peteraf & Barney, 2003). 
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 Under the competitive conditions described above (Schumpeterian 
competition), competing firms are faced with high degree of environmental 
uncertainty and environmental munificence in terms of the resources they 
possess to achieve competitive advantage (Sirmon et al., 2007). As such, there 
is no ―perfect‖ strategy that can lead the firm to enjoy sustained competitive 
advantage. Firm strategic behaviour is thus contingent on such environmental 
conditions and in a sense temporal. After all, if competing firms can simply 
deploy their internal resources and enjoy sustained competitive advantage, 
there is no need for ERA! Such simplistic strategic behaviour however is 
unrealistic for several reasons a) firms do not hold complete information about 
the value-generating potential of their resources that they own, and for 
resources exchanged in strategic factor markets, b) possessing valuable, rare, 
inimitable and non-substitutable resources is necessary but insufficient 
condition for value creation, c) competing firms are faced with constrained 
product/market space to be efficient and differentiate, d) firm strategy is 
constrained by the competitive environment that the firm operates in, and e) 
competing firms are strategically interdependent.  
4.3.2 Basic assumptions & conceptual framework 
As I have briefly illustrated above, I depart from studies that focus on the 
organizational implications of ERA. Instead, I conceptualize ERA as a 
strategic action and aim to provide new insights as to its link with firm 
strategy. In so doing, I connect with recent studies that conceptualize the 
competitive environment of the firm as an endogenous factor of firm action 
(Capron & Chatain, 2008). My conceptual development builds on this recent 
work, and offers two (complementary) views of ERA. Briefly, I propose that a) 
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Competing firms direct their ERA actions in relation to their idiosyncratic 
attributes (the resource-driven view), b) Competing firms direct their ERA 
actions in relation to their competitors’ actions (the competitor-driven view), 
and c) patterns of ERA actions among competing firms are driven both by 
competitors’ ERA activity and firm-specific idiosyncratic attributes.  
Furthermore, I assume that a firm is faced with competitive pressures to act 
towards its external environment. If firms take strategic actions irrespective of 
their competitors, then it will not be possible to investigate my overarching 
research question. As I have argued in the previous section, in today’s 
competitive environments the above scenario will be rarely true.  Rather rapid 
technological change and industrial innovative activity force competing firms 
to intensively engage in ERA-related actions (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1996; Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 2003). Hence, I develop my arguments by 
assuming that firms compete under the competitive dynamics described above.  
Scholars thus far have tended to focus solely on one aspect of ERA rather than 
trying to examine both firm-specific and competitive factors simultaneously. 
On one hand, contributions, drawing from the theoretical proponents of the 
RBV, have ignored the external environment of the firm. On the other hand, 
contributions in the CD literature have provided us with theoretical insights but 
rather inconclusive empirical evidence on the competitive implications of 
ERA. To this end, I bridge these two rather independent streams of research by 
empirically showing how and whether competitor- and firm- level factors 
interact and consequently affect patterns of ERA behaviour among competing 
firms. My overall objective here is to provide a more complete understanding 
of ERA and its link with firm strategic behaviour. In doing so, I offer further 
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conceptual development in relation to these research streams. I do this by 
investigating the resource- and competitor- view of ERA. I then argue that 
these two views are complementary, and offer an interpretation of their 
interaction.  Figure 5-2 illustrates my conceptual framework and more 
specifically the concepts that are involved in my conceptualization. 
 
 Figure 4-2 Conceptual framework 
 
In relation to the above assumptions, I investigate these research questions: To 
what extent do competitors’ ERA actions explain firm ERA activity? To what 
extent do firm-level idiosyncratic attributes explain firm ERA activity? Is there 
an interaction effect between firm- and competitor- level explanations of ERA, 
and if so what kind? To answer these questions, I develop a set of testable 
hypotheses that act as the basis for my empirical analysis. The main objective 
of the hypotheses presented below is to predict when a firm will be more likely 
to engage in ERA, and the intensity of its ERA actions. I am thus concerned 
with both the likelihood and intensity of firm ERA action. I argue that to better 
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assess the competitive implications of a strategic action, one must assess both 
the likelihood and the intensity of such action. In doing so, I aim to provide a 
more holistic understanding of the link between firm strategy and ERA. I 
expect a two stage strategic process of when firms engaging in ERA. I return to 
this important point later when I develop my hypotheses in relation to my 
research questions.  
In a broader context, scholars have argued that competing firms must balance 
between differentiating and imitative strategic actions as in their extreme both 
activities may deter competitive advantage (Deephouse, 1999). I contend with 
this view of balancing between such actions, and aim to provide some further 
empirical evidence to this end. As I have argued earlier, ERA can be seen both 
as a resource- and competitor-driven strategic action. I have also suggested that 
these two views are not mutually exclusive and are both related to ERA 
patterns among competing firms.  Actually I expect that ERA patterns among 
competing firms to be a by-product of both firm- and competitor- level factors. 
In contrast with the resource-driven view of ERA described above, I expect 
that emerging ERA patterns are significantly associated with strategic 
similarity among a set of competing firms (as described by hypotheses H4 and 
H5 below). Put it differently, I will argue that it is this ―interplay‖ between 
firm- and competitor- level factors that drive strategic similarity (and may be 
strategic balance) among competing firms engaging in ERA. Empirical 
evidence to this end will aid on our understanding of how firm strategic 
behaviour in this broad theoretical context unfolds over time (Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1998: 376). While scholars have provided us with several 
insights on how strategic similarity affects competitive behaviour (Fuentelsaz 
98 
 
& Gómez, 2006; Gimeno & Woo, 1996), no study so far have provided 
insights on how strategic similarity
35
 emerges in the context of ERA. My 
conceptual framework addresses this important gap.  
 
4.3.3 ERA as a competitor-driven action 
I have argued so far that to gain a better understanding of ERA, and its link 
with firm strategy, the competitive environment of the firm must be explicitly 
treated as an endogenous factor. Recently, scholars have suggested that by 
incorporating the competitive environment of the firm to our analysis, we can 
gain a better understanding of firm strategic behaviour and competitive 
advantage (Capron & Chatain, 2008; Sirmon et al., 2007). In line with this 
recent critique, I explore further the predominant view of ERA as a resource-
driven action. In contrast with RBV tradition in the context of ERA, I propose 
that the focal firm will be also likely to engage in ERA when it is faced with 
high levels of competitors’ ERA activity. Put it differently, I suggest that the 
firm’s ERA behaviour is contingent on that of its competitors. Competitors’ 
ERA activity is conceptualized as the potential impact of competitors’ ERA-
related actions on the focal firm’s strategic behaviour and survival (Ang, 2008; 
Barnett, 1997).      
CD Scholars have long argued that competing firms strategically act in similar 
ways (in economic terms firms are strategically interdependent). As I have 
illustrated in chapter 3, scholars in the strategy field have captured such 
                                                 
35  Insofar, strategic similarity has been treated as an explanatory variable of firm 
performance (e.g., Deephouse, 1999; Gimeno & Woo, 1996). Instead, I treat strategic 
similarity, in the context of ERA, as a dependent variable. I thank David Deephouse for 
his advice on this point. 
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strategic interdependence through the concept of strategic similarity. Strategic 
similarity refers to ―the extent to which a firm’s strategic position resembles 
the strategic position of competing firms at a particular point in time‖ 
(Deephouse, 1999: 148). Strategically similar firms are faced with high levels 
of rivalry as they depend on the same resources. The more similar the resource 
requirements of the focal firm to those of other firms the greater the degree of 
competition it is likely to experience (Baum & Korn, 1996: 258). In line with 
the RBV that perceives firms as ―idiosyncratic‖, it will thus make sense for 
competing firms to aim their strategic efforts to differentiate and avoid intense 
levels of competition. However, competing firms may strategically choose to 
conform to the strategies of similar competitors. Strategic group scholars, for 
example, argue that strategic similarity may actually decrease rivalry among 
competing firms due to tacit coordination
36
 (Gimeno & Woo, 1996). From a 
cognition point of view, strategic similarity may be the result of shared 
cognitive structures among strategists in competing firms and the adoption of 
widely adopted strategic recipes (Reger & Huff, 1993).  
A firm may thus strategically act to imitate the strategies of its competitors. 
Interorganizational imitation refers to interdependent or mutually referential 
decision making in which strategic actions by some firms increase the 
likelihood of the focal firm taking the same strategic action (Gimeno et al., 
2005; Haunschild, 1993).  Firms may imitate the strategic actions of their 
competitors when faced with high levels of competitive activity (Lieberman & 
Asaba, 2006: 380). In this scenario, firms are more likely to engage in an 
                                                 
36
 The hypothesis that strategic similarity decreases interfirm rivalry has been 
also known as the Caves-Porter hypothesis.  
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immediate competitive response (Miller & Chen, 1994) in order to avoid a 
potential competitive disadvantage (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993). By 
taking under consideration other related competitive factors (i.e. multimarket 
contact), CD scholars have empirically illustrated that imitative behaviour 
intensifies rivalry among competing firms. 
Apart from competitive pressures, competing firms may be faced with 
increased levels of institutional pressures to engage in a specific strategy in 
order to pursuit legitimacy. Some strategies (or strategic actions) can be more 
legitimate than others as they may be endorsed by a larger number of 
competing firms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Scholars concerned with 
legitimacy and strategic behaviour have argued that not all competing firms 
exhume the same legitimacy pressures to their peers. Interorganizational 
imitation can be seen as one mechanism
37
 to increase legitimacy (Haunschild, 
1993). For example, in his study of market entry and diversification, Haveman 
(1993) finds that firms are more likely to imitate the strategic actions of their 
successful peers. He also observes a curvilinear effect of legitimacy and 
competition. While an increase in the number of successful firms engaging in 
the same strategic action, in this case market entry, increases legitimacy, it also 
increases competition. Thus, imitative behaviour
38
 can be a result of the large 
number of competing firms engaging in a strategic action (adopting a strategy). 
                                                 
37 Factors that lead organizations to adopt similar practices, strategies and processes are 
captured through the notion of ―mimetic isomorphism‖. Specifically, strategic 
isomorphism refers ―to the extent to which an organization’s strategy resembles 
conventional normal strategies in its competitive environment‖ (Deephouse, 1996: 
1029).  
38  Imitative behaviour is also captured through the notion of contagion. Contagion 
occurs between organizations when one organization’s adoption of a practice increases 





 imitation suggests that the adoption of a specific 
strategy by a large number of firms enhances legitimacy and thus increase the 
likelihood of adoption by other firms (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). In relation 
to ERA, increased levels of legitimacy may be associated with more 
opportunities of obtaining critical resources. A firm with high legitimacy may 
be favoured both in terms of resource availability and exchange (Deephouse, 
1999: 153).  
Given the above competitive and institutional explanations, I expect that high 
levels of competitors’ ERA activity will be associated with higher likelihood 
and intensity of the focal firm engaging in ERA. Hence, I hypothesize that: 
H1a. The higher the competitors ERA activity that the focal firm faces, the 
higher the firm’s likelihood of engaging in ERA.  
H1b. The higher the competitors’ ERA activity that the focal firm faces, the 
higher the firm’s ERA intensity. 
By testing hypotheses H1a and H1b, I aim to provide further empirical 
evidence on the link between competitors’ actions and firm strategy in the 
context of ERA. To my knowledge, this is the first attempt to assess the 
relationship between competitors’ ERA related actions and the focal firm’s 
ERA behaviour. Furthermore, this is a direct test of both competitive and 
institutional explanations of firm strategic behaviour in the context of ERA. 
                                                 
39 In the case of frequency-based imitation, firm strategy may not be always a direct 
result of rational managerial decision making in terms of strategic objectives and 
outcomes. In contrast with this rational assumption adopted by Deephouse (1999) in his 
strategic balance theory, Haunschild and Miner (1997: 494) suggest that firms may 
adopt a strategy without having a specific intent but as a response for that strategy been 
taken-as-granted among competing firms.  
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Through the empirical test of the hypotheses proposed above, I also aim to 
identify other factors that may affect firm ERA behaviour over time. For 
example, I have assumed above that firms compete under both high 
environmental munificence and uncertainty
40
. As such, I expect that patterns of 
firm ERA behaviour evolve over time.  
 
4.3.4 ERA as a resource-driven action 
In this section, I investigate further the conditions where ERA, as a strategic 
action of seizing opportunities in relation to the firm’s resource environment. 
In so doing, I identify several firm-specific propensity factors that affect the 
firm’s strategic response to opportunities raised to acquire resources. Without 
trying to be exhaustive, I focus on two major propensity factors: a) firm prior 
experience with ERA, and b) firm resource commitment. Extensive empirical 
research has focused on the interplay between internal and external resources 
and more specifically on its performance implications. My aim here is not to 
further contribute to this stream. Rather, I am concerned on how these 
propensity factors may relate to firms engaging in ERA in relation to its 
environment. 
I have argued above that ERA can be seen as a competitor-driven action. 
Insofar, scholars in the RBV tradition have suggested that firms engage in 
ERA driven by their idiosyncratic attributes. While ERA has been perceived as 
a strategic action to alleviate resource constraints (Combs & Ketchen, 1999), 
                                                 
40  Uncertainty affects the amount and type of the resources needed in the 
resource portfolio, the capabilities necessary to outperform rivals, and the 
leveraging strategies required to gain and maintain competitive advantage 
(Sirmon et al., 2007: 275).  
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empirical research has shown that firms with a larger resource base (in terms of 
both breadth and depth) gain more from ERA than firms with a constrained 
resource base. Relative to the empirical context of this study, the global 
biopharmaceuticals industry, recent studies have shown a positive association 
between ERA and resource base structural characteristics in terms of 
organizational outcomes and more specifically innovation performance (Ahuja 
& Katila, 2001; Prabhu et al., 2005). Paradoxically, scholars argue that 
resource constrained firms are faced with lower value generating potential 
when engaging in ERA. One rationale is that such firms will exhibit a lower 
capacity to absorb and utilize newly acquired resources, as such capacity is a 
by-product of the firm’s commitment to internal resource development (Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1990). For the sake of simplicity, I henceforth use the term 
resource commitment to refer to the firm’s commitment to the development of 
internal resources. Remember that internal resources are defined as those 
resources solely developed by the firm. In contrast with resource constrained 
firms, firms with high levels of resource commitment may enjoy 
complementarities between internal and external resources as resource 
commitment may reduce inefficiencies and problems associated with ERA 
(Veugelers, 1997). In the case of the biopharmaceuticals industry for example, 
Rothaermel (2001a: 695) shows that incumbent biopharmaceuticals firms that 
exploit such complementarities, in this case with their start-ups counterparts, 
experience improved new product development and superior performance.  
Resource commitment however, is accumulated through time and is inherently 
path-dependent. Except from the structural characteristics of the firm’s 
resource base, resource commitment and its relation to ERA is very much 
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related to firm-specific experience with ERA. It is expected that historical 
conditions on how firms develop their resources play a crucial role on future 
ERA activity. For example, scholars have illustrated that firms with a broader 
experience with ERA, through strategic alliances or networks, will be overall 
more effective with future ERA related actions (e.g., Goerzen & Beamish, 
2005) by for example minimizing strategic uncertainty associated with ERA 
(e.g., Hoffmann, 2007: ). Furthermore, a firm intensively engaging in ERA will 
accumulate experiential-based knowledge and thus be very likely to 
consequently engage in ERA. Higher levels of accumulated experience may 
lead to the development of ERA specific capabilities and thus positively 
reinforce consequent ERA actions. A higher experience with ERA may also 
enable the firm to search for critical resources more efficiently than its 
competitors (Katila & Ahuja, 2002). As such I expect that ERA experience is 
path-dependent
41
 and be positively related with consequent ERA actions.  
I formally hypothesize that: 
H2a. The likelihood of the focal firm engaging in ERA is positively associated 
with its prior ERA experience and resource commitment. 
H2b. The intensity of the focal firm to engage in ERA is positively associated 
with its prior ERA experience and resource commitment.  
Scholars thus far have highlighted the importance of these two firm-specific 
factors when investigating the acquisition of external resources (e.g., Ahuja, 
2000; Combs & Ketchen, 1999). I build on these studies but, instead of treating 
                                                 
41 Path dependency refers to ―the tendency for what a firm is currently doing to persist in 
the future‖ (Kogut and Zander, 1992: 392). 
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them as moderating factors to organizational performance, I conceptualize 
them as ERA-related propensity factors. As I am concerned with firm strategic 
behaviour, I would like to investigate further how varying levels of resource 
commitment and prior ERA experience are associated with ERA patterns 
among competing firms. While I have argued above that firms with higher 
resource commitment will be more likely to engage in ERA (and with higher 
intensity), some scholars have perceived ERA as a substitute of internal 
resource development (e.g., Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1990). Furthermore, 
other scholars have shown a non-linear relationship between resource 
commitment and ERA. For example, in their study of the U.S. medical sector, 
Karim and Mitchell (2000: 1079) found that firms engage in acquisitions either 
for close reinforcement of existing skills or for substantial jumps into new skill 
sets. By testing the above hypotheses, I aim to provide additional empirical 
evidence to the ongoing discussion between the external sourcing of resources 
and internal resource development. 
4.3.5 The interaction effect between firm- and competitor- level views 
of ERA 
Up to this point, I have offered two views of firm ERA behaviour; the 
resource- and competitor-driven. In the resource-driven view, I argue that 
competing firms will engage in ERA as a response to their idiosyncratic 
attributes. More specifically, I expect that firms with high levels of resource 
commitment and prior experience with ERA will be more likely to engage in 
ERA and they will do so with higher intensity. This argument is very much in 
line with the theoretical premises of the RBV which perceives firm strategic 
behaviour as a function of firm-specific idiosyncratic attributes. In the 
competitor-driven view, I argue that competing firms will engage in ERA as a 
106 
 
response to their competitive environment. I thus expect a positive association 
between competitors’ ERA activity and the likelihood and intensity of the focal 
firm engaging in ERA.  
In this section, I argue that these two views are not mutually exclusive but 
complementary. To build my arguments, and test this important proposition, I 
draw from both the RBV and CD literatures. Surprisingly, these two research 
streams have largely developed independently
42
. Through my conceptual 
development and consequently my empirical analysis, I aim to provide a more 
holistic treatment of firm behaviour at least in the context of ERA. My 
conceptual and empirical efforts complement recent research in other contexts 
such as for example the study of Park and Zhou (2005) on alliance formation 
motives. More specifically they argue that ―firms not only form alliances to 
differentiate themselves from others but also as a competitive response to 
prevent others from gaining a competitive edge by accumulating more 
capabilities‖ (Park & Zhou, 2005: 533)43. I build a similar argument here but 
offer a broader theoretical rationale that incorporates interorganizational 
imitation as mechanism of such firm behaviour. Earlier work of Park and 
colleagues has provided us with novel empirical evidence on the interplay 
between internal resource conditions and market changes in the context of 
alliance formation (Park, Chen, & Gallagher, 2002). In contrast with their 
                                                 
42 Scholars have provided us with several theoretical contributions on how these two 
streams can be combined. For example, Lieberman and Montgomery (1998) provide 
insights on how RBV can be combined with FMA theory.  
43  Park and Zhou (2005: 545) conclude that ―along with the classic cost-benefit 
analysis, it is the competitive dynamics in a given market that trigger competitors’ 
alliance decisions. Despite no substantial benefits from an alliance, it is often a rational 
choice to form an alliance, primarily to prevent potential losses as a firm’s competitors 
strengthen their competitive positions through cooperative alliances.‖ 
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study, I am not concerned with market dynamics but rather with dynamics 
between competing firms engaging in ERA.  
As I have argued above, I expect a positive association between competitor-
level factors (competitors’ ERA activity) and firm-specific factors (resource 
commitment and ERA experience) with firm ERA likelihood and intensity.  I 
propose that there is a significant moderation effect between the firm-specific 
factors identified and competitive pressures to engage in ERA. More 
specifically, I expect that firms with higher resource commitment and 
experience with ERA will be less prone to react to the actions of their 
competitors. On the other hand, firms with lower levels of resource 
commitment and ERA experience will be more sensitive to competitive 
pressures.  
From a RBV perspective, firms with limited resource commitment and 
experience will be better off not engaging in ERA. However, such firms will 
choose to engage in ERA not necessarily to improve their own competitive 
position but avoid competitive disadvantage (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 
1993). In this scenario, firms will engage in ERA in order not be disadvantaged 
in the race of obtaining critical resources with its competitors. This would be 
particularly true in a competitive environment where firms are intensively 
compete in a limited resource space with high resource scarcity (Park et al., 
2002), as for example in the empirical context of this study; the 
biopharmaceuticals industry. Of course, such constrained firms are faced with 
several challenges as they engage in ERA. In this case, the firm’s probability 
of engaging in ERA is inhibited due to a misalignment between the firm’s 
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current strategic configuration and the external environment (Bingham & 
Eisenhardt, 2007). 
From a neo-institutional perspective, firms with a limited set of resources and 
experience will be faced with low levels of legitimacy among their peers. As 
such they will be less favoured when searching for ERA opportunities in their 
resource environment (Deephouse, 1999). While these firms may gain less 
when engaging in ERA, I expect that these firms will intensively engage in 
ERA in order to respond to their competitive environment. In a positive spirit, 
even as a matter of strategic luck, these firms may pre-empt resources that are 
critical to other competitors, or can be recombined in innovative ways not yet 
conceived. In line with my competitor-view of ERA, I expect that these firms 
will respond to their competitive environment by intensively imitating the 
ERA-related actions of their competitors. While there are several types of 
interorganizational imitation (Haunschild & Miner, 1997), I expect that these 
firms will not imitate specifically targeted resources with their competitors, as 
they are unable to assess the value-generating potential of such resources. 
Rather, such firms will try to imitate the actions of their competitors as a 
broader strategic response. This is not to say that imitation is an erratic 
strategic behaviour. Rather imitator firms are driven by a growing awareness 
of the benefits of the new practice, in this case ERA, adopted by other 
competing firms (Garcia-Pont & Nohria, 2002).  
In contrast with the scenario described above, I expect that firms with high 
levels of resource commitment and experience with ERA will be less prone to 
respond to competitive pressures. I believe that these firms develop their own 
view of the competitive environment, and are more likely to direct their ERA-
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related actions in line with their idiosyncratic attributes. While these firms may 
be better able to gain value from ERA (as predicted by the resource-driven 
view), they may be also faced with inertial forces driven by the path-dependent 
nature of their idiosyncratic attributes. Inertia may be particularly present when 
competing firms are faced with a newly developed resource space, as for 
example when incumbent biopharmaceuticals firms were faced with the 
introduction of biotechnology. Path-dependencies may result in firms being 
more selective on what kind of resources they target and be less prone to 
competitive pressures to widely engage in ERA.  Such selective behaviour may 
also be the result of tacit coordination amongst strategically similar firms 
(Garcia-Pont & Nohria, 2002).  These firms will be insulated by competitive 
pressures to engage in ERA in order to preserve the status quo in the 
competitive environment. Furthermore, such firms may be able to seize 
opportunities in strategic factor markets. High levels of resource commitment 
and prior experience with ERA may enable these firms to ―appraise resource 
combinations and carry out commercial ventures that correspond to specific 
combinations of resources‖ (Foss & Ishikawa, 2007: 756). Thus, highly 
―idiosyncratic‖ firms will be able to isolate themselves from competitors’ ERA 
actions even when competing firms can acquire resources that can be put to 
similar uses. One may argue that such isolation stems from the complex 
relations between resource combinations (Foss & Ishikawa, 2007). 
Taking together the above arguments, I hypothesize that: 
H3a. The positive impact of competitors’ ERA activity on the focal firm’s 
likelihood to engage in ERA is moderated by the firm’s prior ERA experience 
and resource commitment. 
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H3b. The positive impact of competitors’ ERA activity on the focal firm’s ERA 
intensity is moderated by the firm’s prior ERA experience and resource 
commitment.  
While firm resource endowments and prior experience have been identified as 
important factors related to ERA, few empirical evidence exist on the 
interaction effect between competitors’ ERA activity and these firm-level 
attributes. Instead, scholars have assumed thus far that firms which wish to 
imitate their competitors’ actions must possess similar resources (Chen, 1996; 
Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). However, we know little on how varying levels of 
such idiosyncratic attributes relate to the competitive pressures that the firm 
experiences in its competitive environment. By testing hypotheses H3a and 
H3b, I aim to provide further empirical evidence on this interplay between 
competitors’ actions and firm-level idiosyncratic attributes that direct ERA. In 
their empirical study of the financial services industry, Yang and Hyland 
(2006) found that both prior experience with M&A and the number of M&A 
initiated by competing firms in the same product market positively affects the 
focal firm’s likelihood of consequent M&A activity. They however suggested 
that further empirical work on the dynamics of imitation must investigate the 
interplay between competitors’ activity and firm-level attributes (Yang & 
Hyland, 2006: 396). My empirical analysis addresses this point.  
4.3.6 Firm ERA behaviour and the two extremes of strategic choice 
So far I have developed the resource- and competitor-view of ERA. I have also 
argued in the previous section, that these two views are not mutually exclusive 
but rather complementary. More specifically, I expect a significant interaction 
effect between competitors’ ERA activity and two firm-specific attributes—
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resource commitment and prior ERA experience—when predicting the 
likelihood and intensity of the focal firm engaging in ERA. In this section, I 
conceptualize further this interaction effect in the context of strategic choice at 
its two extremes; differentiation and imitation. While the benefits of both 
differentiation and imitation have been well established (see section 5.2), it still 
remains unclear how firm- and competitor- specific factors will simultaneously 
drive firms to choose either of these two extremes of strategic choice. Previous 
research has provided arguments in favour of both differentiation and 
imitation. Empirical evidence thus far suggests that competing firms can gain 
competitive advantage at both extremes. Other scholars have suggested that 
firms that balance
44
 between these two extremes are better performing and thus 
more likely to enjoy competitive advantage (Deephouse, 1999).  While we 
have a clear idea about the value implications of being different or the same, 
we know little on how firm strategic behaviour shapes strategic choice. This 
gap is most evident when examining the dynamics of ERA. To address this 
gap, I derive a set of hypotheses (H4 and H5 below) that aim to predict 
strategic similarity as a proxy of strategic choice given varying levels of 
competitors’ ERA activity that the focal firm is faced with and its levels of 
resource commitment and prior ERA experience. To be clear, I am not 
concerned with how competing firms make such choices but with their 
strategic behaviour retrospectively, in the two extremes of strategic choice.  
Up to this point, CD scholars have largely provided contradictory views of 
how strategic similarity emerges among competing firms (Gimeno & Woo, 
                                                 
44  More specifically, the strategic balance hypothesis states that ―moderately 
differentiated firms have higher performance than either highly conforming or highly 
differentiated firms‖ (Deephouse, 1999).  
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1996). Some scholars have argued that strategic similarity will be associated 
with low levels of rivalry (Chen, 1996). For example, in their empirical study 
of the U.S. software industry, Young et al. (2000) show that as resource 
dissimilarity (inverse of strategic similarity) increases, competing firms will 
engage in more strategic actions.  
Let’s first assume a scenario where a focal firm has low propensity to engage 
in ERA. In this case, I propose that the firm will engage in ERA in order to 
imitate the resource positions of its competitors. Based on the proponents of 
the RBV, firm-level studies have shown that a firm in this scenario will be 
better off not to engage in ERA as it may not benefit from favourable firm-
level conditions such as extensive prior experience (Hoang & Rothaermel, 
2005), broad resource base (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Prabhu et al., 2005) or 
resource complementarities (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006). However, when 
the firm is faced with high competitive pressures (competitors’ ERA activity), 
staying inert may not be the best strategic action. Instead, I argue that the focal 
firm will engage on ERA in order to reduce the likelihood being disadvantaged 
over its competitors.  
Given a competitive environment with the characteristics described above, the 
focal firm will be highly dependent on its external environment for critical 
resources (Park & Zhou, 2005: 534). As such, a firm with low propensity to 
acquire such resources will be forced to imitate its competitors. CD scholars 
make a similar argument by suggesting that a firm will engage in an imitative 
action in order to stay abreast with close competitors (Garcia-Pont & Nohria, 
2002). In the case of alliance formation, Park and Zhou (2005: 545) suggest 
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that a firm will engage in an ―alliance race‖ in order to prevent losses 
occurring from the strengthening of its competitors’ positioning.           
In line with the above argument, I hypothesize that:  
H4 (strategic similarity is high). When faced with high competitors’ ERA 
activity, firms with low levels of resource commitment and prior experience 
will differentiate from the ERA-related actions of their competitors.   
 
Let’s now assume a scenario where the firm exhibits high propensity to engage 
in ERA. Under this scenario the firm has several incentives to obtain a 
differentiated resource position through ERA. One incentive for example 
would be to pre-empt critical resources (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988) and 
further reduce resource competition (Deephouse, 1999). In contrast with the 
previous scenario, a firm with high propensity to ERA will be less dependent 
to its external environment. While the firm is faced with intense competitive 
activity, it will be able to employ a resource differentiation strategy by 
acquiring first critical resources. In line with the VRIN conditions proposed by 
Barney (1991), the scarcer the resources being acquired the higher the benefits 
from resource differentiation. In their economic theory of strategic opportunity, 
Denrell et al. (2003) provide a similar argument. They argue that ―the view of 
each firm is shaped by its own existing resources and information, including 
the ability to assess the resources of other firms, and is to that extent unique. 
The more distinctive the firm’s own view, the more likely that such view can 
encompass valuable opportunities not similarly visible to other firms‖ (Denrell 
et al., 2003: 978). Accordingly, I propose that: 
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H5 (strategic similarity is low). When faced with high competitors’ ERA 
activity, firms with high levels of resource commitment and prior experience 
will imitate the ERA-related actions of their competitors. 
While it has been assumed that imitative behaviour is directly dependent on 
firm resource endowments, and more specifically, to the extent which firms’ 
resource endowments are similar, this assumption (Caves-Porter hypothesis) is 
somewhat in contradiction to the theoretical premises of rivalry-based 
competition. By testing the interaction effect of competitors’ ERA activity and 
firm-level ERA propensity in predicting strategic similarity, I aim to provide 








In the previous chapter, I have provided a conceptual framework that aims to 
test both the resource- and competitor- driven views of ERA. More 
specifically, I have offered two sets of hypotheses.  
The first set of hypotheses (H1-H3) predicts the focal firm’s ERA activity as a 
function of the ERA actions of its competitors and its idiosyncratic attributes, 
and their interaction. Overall, I expect that: a) competitors’ ERA activity is 
positively associated with focal firm ERA activity, b) firm-specific 
idiosyncratic attributes (resource commitment and prior experience with ERA) 
are positively associated with focal firm ERA activity, and c) the positive 
impact of competitors’ ERA activity on focal firm ERA activity is negatively 
moderated by the firm’s idiosyncratic attributes.  
The second set of hypotheses (H4 & H5) predicts patterns of ERA behaviour in 
the two extremes of strategic choice (through strategic similarity). In summary, 
I expect that: a) strategic similarity can be explained by competitors’ ERA 
activity and firm-specific idiosyncratic attributes, and b) strategic similarity is 
positively associated with competitors’ ERA activity, but such positive effect 
decreases for firms with high levels of idiosyncratic attributes. 
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To empirically test my hypotheses, I need to make several methodological 
choices in terms of sample selection, operationalization of constructs, and 
measurement. This chapter is concerned with such methodological issues. 
First, I briefly discuss my research design and its appropriateness in answering 
my research questions. Second, I offer a rationale on sample selection. I more 
specifically illustrate why the biopharmaceuticals industry is an appropriate 
context on testing my hypotheses, and more broadly investigating firm ERA 
behaviour. Third, I illustrate issues with operationalization and measurement of 
my constructs. Fourth, I am concerned with econometric modelling and 
estimation procedures on assessing my hypothesized relationships.  
 
5.2 Research design 
In the previous chapter, I have proposed a conceptual framework that provides 
two distinct views of ERA. In relation to my research questions, I would 
empirically investigate the competitor- and resource- driven views of ERA 
offered above, and thus assess my empirical questions. Remember, there are 
three empirical research questions that I am concerned with. These questions 
are: To what extent do firm-level idiosyncratic attributes explain firm ERA 
activity? To what extent do competitors’ ERA actions explain firm ERA 
activity? Is there an interaction effect between these firm- and competitor- 
specific factors on the focal firm’s ERA activity, and if so what kind?  
Through these questions, I aim to provide an assessment of alternative 
theoretical explanations of firm behaviour in the context of ERA. In doing so, I 
adopt a hypothetico-deductive methodological approach. While my aim is not 
117 
 
to provide a super theory of firm ERA behaviour, a (deductive) test of 
alternative theoretical explanations of ERA behaviour during the 
biotechnology paradigm in the biopharmaceuticals industry will allow for a 
better theoretical description of a complex strategic action (phenomenon) such 
as ERA (e.g., Christensen, 2006; Colquitt & Zapata-Phelan, 2007). Strategy 
scholars have long adopted a hypothesis testing paradigm to investigate 
complex phenomena by adopting multiple theoretical perspectives (for a set of 
examples, see Hitt, Gimeno, & Hoskisson, 1998). I have argued above for 
example, that firms engage in ERA in response to their idiosyncratic resources. 
While it is empirically impossible to observe such idiosyncratic resources 
(Godfrey & Hill, 1995), a hypothesis testing approach based on a population of 
firms will allow for a direct observation of how theoretical predictions, in this 
case resource-driven ERA, can be assessed through measurable proxies 
(variables) in the context of a real world phenomenon (the biotechnology 
paradigm). 
I expect that firms (as part of a population) differ in their ERA behaviour 
across time. In relation to my empirical questions, I propose that these 
differences, leading to patterns of ERA behaviour among competing firms, can 
be at a certain degree explained by firm- and competitor-specific factors, 
which I have identified in my conceptual framework. From a method’s point of 
view, to identify patterns of ERA behaviour and assess how these patterns are 
driven by the factors (parameters) identified above, we must use methods that 
model parameter variation across firms and over time (Bowen & Wiersema, 
1999).    In section 5.6, I explain in greater detail appropriate statistical 
methods for my research design.  
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5.3 Empirical context  
To empirically investigate firm ERA activity and emerging patterns of ERA 
behaviour, I need a population of firms that engage in ERA across time. Such 
population must allow for some degree of variability of ERA activity at the 
firm-year level. In line with these methodological requirements, I draw my 
population of firms from the global biopharmaceuticals industry. While a 
multi-industry sample could increase the generalizability and the statistical 
power of my empirical results, I focus on one industry for at least three main 
reasons. First, my population of firms must satisfy the theoretical assumptions 
that my conceptual development is based on (see section 4.3.2). In line with 
my theoretical assumptions, firms within a single industry compete for similar 
resources (and thus share strategic factor markets), face similar industry 
conditions that collectively affect business decisions, and exhibit similarities in 
organizational factors such as culture (Hitt et al., 1998; Rouse & J. 
Daellenbach, 1999). Second, by focusing on one single industry, I aim to avoid 
variable definition problems and consequent comparability of competing firms 
(Pangarkar and Klein, 1998: 61). Remember, that competing firms are defined 
as those firms offering similar products and thus targeting similar customers. 
As such, competing firms target similar resources and exhibit a degree of 
multimarket contact. While it could be possible to statistically control for 
industry variance (by introducing industry-level dummies), such a design 
would inhibit the conceptual definitions of variables of interest such as 
competitors’ ERA activity and the conceptual mechanisms underlying its 
hypothesized impact on focal firm ERA activity. I have previously offered 
several theoretical explanations for this hypothesized relationship. One 
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explanation (see section 4.3.3) for example is that the focal firm will engage in 
ERA as a competitive response to similar competitors. It would be empirically 
very difficult to assess this mechanism across multiple industries as firm 
strategic behaviour is contingent on several industry-specific effects such as 
market structure and size distribution (Anand & Khanna, 2000b). Thus, in line 
with previous relevant empirical research, I control for industry variance by 
drawing my sample of firms from a single industry (e.g., Shan, 1990). Third, 
by focusing on the global biopharmaceuticals industry, my empirical analysis 
can provide further insights in how patterns of ERA behaviour unfold over 
time. This is important not only for understanding firm ERA behaviour but 
also for commenting on the evolution of competitive dynamics in the 
biopharmaceuticals industry in relation to the biotechnology paradigm.  
Based on a single industry design, the biopharmaceuticals industry is an 
excellent context for studying ERA and firm strategic behaviour. In section 
2.2, I have illustrated the dynamics of the biopharmaceuticals industry, and the 
emergence of the biotechnology paradigm. In relation to these emerging 
dynamics, ERA has been an integral part of firm strategy. At the industry level, 
competition is very much driven by innovation. In contrast to other industries, 
the biopharmaceuticals industry is less prone to external factors such as 
challenges in the economy and exchange rates (Bierly & Chakrabarti, 1996: 
126). Biopharmaceuticals firms must exhibit high levels of research 
productivity if they are to gain an advantage over their competitors (Henderson 
& Cockburn, 1994). With the emergence of the biotechnology paradigm, 
however, biopharmaceuticals firms must look outside their boundaries and rely 
on external resources in order to innovate (Gambardella, 1992).  Thus, ERA is 
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an important strategic action in this competitive context. ERA activity (through 
several interorganizational arrangements) has seen an exponential growth since 
the very early stages of the biotechnology paradigm. For example, in 
comparison to the volume of initial public offerings in the biopharmaceuticals 
industry, ERA activity provided eight times more capital to fund R&D (Wuyts 
et al., 2004). 
 
From a practical point of view, ERA activity in the biopharmaceuticals 
industry is well documented both in the press and specialized databases. As 
such, several secondary sources capture ERA activity and allow for data 
validity checks and high comparability with prior empirical work. The 
biopharmaceuticals industry is highly regulated from governmental agencies 
such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the U.S. The FDA has 
closely documented the biopharmaceuticals industry and offers long term 
historical data which is publicly accessible (Sorescu, Chandy, & Prabhu, 2003: 
88).  
   
5.4 Sample and data collection 
I have illustrated above my rationale for choosing the biopharmaceuticals 
industry as the empirical context of my study. To empirically test my 
hypotheses, I construct a panel data set on the biggest 50 biopharmaceutical 
firms with global operations between 1987 and 2006. ERA is a complex 
strategic action given its resource requirements, and as such, a panel data 
design allows for observations across a long time window. Before I illustrate in 
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more detail the data sources that I have drawn from to collect my data, I 
discuss further some characteristics of my sample firms and the selected time 
frame.  
I started constructing my sample by focusing on biopharmaceutical firms with 
global operations that have been historically focused on drug discovery and 
development across several therapeutic areas (firms with SIC codes  #2834,  
#2836,  #2800)
45
. I focus on the biggest biopharmaceutical firms as ERA is a 
resource intensive and risky strategic action associated with firm size
46
. Firms 
outside my sample rarely engage in ERA (sample captures almost 93% of total 
ERA activity).  Furthermore, in order to empirically assess my hypotheses, it is 
important for the sample firms to exhibit some multimarket contact (serving 
similar markets) and without exhibit large differences in size and financial 
strength. Wide differences on these two firm-specific dimensions could 
significantly affect ERA behaviour (for a similar design see Nicholls-Nixon & 
Woo, 2003). As I have also illustrated above, ERA can be seen as an adaptive 
strategic response of established biopharmaceuticals firms in the biotechnology 
paradigm. I have drawn my sample firms from the Biopharmaceuticals 
executive “Pharm Exec 50” annual report (Biopharmaceuticals Executive 
Biopharmaceuticals Report, 2005). The Biopharmaceuticals Executive
47
 is a 
well established practitioner’s magazine focusing on a range of business issues 
in the biopharmaceuticals industry. In 2005 in which the data were collected, 
                                                 
45 SIC codes  #2834,  #2836,  #2800 correspond to biological products, 
biopharmaceuticals preparations, and chemical products respectively.  
46 In the next chapter, I provide some empirical insights in the important effect of firm 
size on firm ERA activity. 
47 The biopharmaceuticals executive magazine can be accessed electronically at 
http://pharmexec.findpharma.com/pharmexec [date last accessed: 26/04/2009] 
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the top 50 biopharmaceuticals firms had a total of $387bn on ethical sales and 
$76bn total R&D expenditures. Table 5-1 illustrates the top 50 
biopharmaceutical firms of my initial sample.  
Table 5-1. Top 50 biopharmaceutical firms (Pharm Exec 2005) 
Firm 
Ethical Sales (US 
$bn) 
R&D expenditure (US 
$bn) 
Abbott 13.756 1.69 
Aisai 5.006 0.724 
Akzo Nobei 2.37 0.642 
Alcon Labs 1.542 0.4 
Allergan 1.842 0.35 
Altana 2.23 0.504 
Amgen 10.6 1.996 
AstraZeneca 21.426 3.803 
Baxter 
International 3.504 0.517 
Bayer 5.44 1.527 
Biogen Idec 1.486 0.686 
BMS 15.482 2.5 
Boehringer-
Ingelheim 8.698 1.527 
Chugai 2.62 0.454 
Forest Labs 2.65 0.246 
Fujisawa 3.201 0.695 
Genentech 3.749 0.948 
Genzyme 1.976 0.391 
GSK 31.377 5.195 
Ivax Corporation 1.577 0.162 
J&J 22.128 5.203 
King 
Pharmaceuticals 1.304 0.679 
Lilly 13.059 2.69 
Lundbeck 1.518 0.295 
Merck 21.493 4.01 
Merck KGaA 3.845 0.597 
Mitsubishi 1.812 0.476 
Mylan Labs 1.374 0.101 
Novartis 18.5 3.48 
Novo Nordisk 3.51 0.664 
Ono 1.31 0.25 
Otsuka 3.719 0.5 
Pfizer 46.133 7.52 
Purdue Pharma 1.34 0.294 
Roche 17.322 5.4 
Sankyo 2.908 0.661 
Sanofi-Aventis 30.919 9.31 
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Schering AG 6.085 0.745 
Schering-Plough 6.417 1.607 
Serono 2.177 0.595 
Shionogi Seiyaku 1.641 0.281 
Shire 1.363 0.196 
Solvay 2.163 0.358 
Takeda 8.274 1.223 
Tanabe Seiyaku 1.296 0.232 
Teva 4.276 0.338 
UCB 2.08 n/a 
Watson 1.641 0.134 
Wyeth 13.964 2.46 
Yamanouchi 3.73 0.661 
 
Most of the biopharmaceutical firms in Table 5-1 such as Pfizer, GSK, 
AstraZeneca and Novartis were established under the technological paradigm 
of chemical screening (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005: 335).  However, there are 
other biopharmaceutical firms such as Genentech and Biogen which were 
established at the early stages of the biotechnology paradigm.  
As my interest lies with ERA and firm strategy, I collect relevant data on these 
50 biopharmaceutical firms between 1987 and 2006. While the Genentech IPO 
in the early 1980’s marked the beginning of extensive ERA activity in the 
biopharmaceuticals industry (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005), according to my 
data few firms have engaged in any collaborations prior to 1987. Post 1987, 
overall ERA activity has exponentially increased. Figure 5-1 illustrates overall 
ERA activity across the observed time frame. As it is illustrated by the four-
year moving average, in the first 10 years of the time frame, we observe an 
exponential increase in ERA activity (~six fold increase). After 1996, however, 
total ERA activity follows a lower rate of increase (~one fold increase). I 




Figure 5-1. Overall ERA activity (1987-2006) 
 
I draw data from 3 secondary sources. To measure my ERA related variables, I 
draw from the Recombinant Capital Alliances database. Recombinant Capital
48
 
(RECAP) is a private consulting firm specializing in the biopharmaceuticals 
industry. The Alliances database holds extensive information
49
 on more than 
20,000 interfirm agreements between biopharmaceutical firms.  In her study of 
                                                 
48 I would like to thank Recombinant Capital for granting me complementary access in 
order to collect data for this study. Complementary access was granted in the basis of 
not-for-profit use of the data collected.  
49 RECAP describes the Alliance database as follows: ―RECAP Alliance Database 
contains high-level summaries of more than 13,500 alliances in the life sciences which 
have been formed since 1973. These high level summaries are derived by RECAP from 
one or more of three principal public sources: (1) biotechnology and biopharmaceuticals 
company press releases and other literature; (2) U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) filings; and (3) company presentations made at investment 
conferences and other public meetings. The Alliance Database is principally concerned 
with biotechnology alliances - where a biotechnology company partners with a major 
drug company (drug/biotech), with a university (university/biotech), or with another 
biotechnology company (biotech/biotech). In addition, the Database contains many, 
although by no means all, high level summaries of alliances of non-biotechnology 
alliances in the life sciences. Agreements involving medical device companies, two 
major drug companies (drug/drug), or a university partnering with a major drug 
company (university/drug) are among the non-biotechnology alliances included in the 













Total 4 per. Mov. Avg. (Total)
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alliance databases, Schilling (2009) provides a direct comparison of RECAP 
with other multi-sector and specialized in biopharmaceuticals industry 
databases such as BioScan. Schilling identifies some advantages and 
disadvantages for using each of the reviewed databases. The two major 
advantages of RECAP are the extensive coverage of agreement types and the 
great depth of information on individual alliance agreements (Schilling, 2009: 
239). For example, in comparison with BioScan, RECAP holds 6 times the 
number of agreements. Overall, Schilling finds high consistency of alliance 
patterns over time among the five databases examined.  
To measure my financial related variables, I draw from Standard & Poor’s 
COMPUSTAT database and DATASTREAM. Unfortunately, I was unable to 
collect data for all 50 firms in my initial sample. Three of these 
biopharmaceutical firms, Alcon, Purdue Pharma and Ono are private and as 
such no available financial data were available in the COMPUSTAT database. 
For other firms such as Lundbeck and Boehringer-Ingelheim, more than 90% 
of the required financial data were missing. Furthermore, some firms in my 
initial sample (Table 5-1) have been merged or acquired. For example, 
Yamanouchi and Fujisawa were merged to Astellas Pharma in 2005. Following 
(Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005), I include the newly formed firm in my final 
sample by combining interfirm agreements data of both firms prior to the 
merger.  
My final sample consists of 37 firms. 17 firms are incorporated in the U.S., 14 
firms are European, and 5 firms are Japanese. 1 firm in the sample, Teva 
Pharmaceuticals, is incorporated in Israel. Table 5-2 illustrates my final sample 
of firms as described in the COMPUSTAT database. The ―ticker symbol‖ and 
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―Gvkey‖ variables were used to query the database in order to collect relevant 
financial data. In cases where minor data were missing, I draw additional data 
from the DATASTREAM database and in some cases specific Security and 
Exchange Committee (SEC) filings. Correcting for missing data is an 
important part of the empirical analysis. I explain this further when I discuss 
the econometric models employed to test my hypotheses.  
Table 5-2. Final Sample of 37 firms  
Company name Ticker 
Symbol 
Gvkey Details 
Abbott Laboratories ABT 1078  
Akzo Nobel Nv AKZOY 15334  
Allergan Inc AGN 15708  
Altana Ag AAAGY 100004  
Amgen Inc AMGN 1602  
Astrazeneca Plc AZN 28272  
Baxter International Inc BAX 2086  
Bayer Ag BAYRY 100080  
Bayer Schering Pharma 
Ag 





Biogen Inc BGEN 2226  




JP4519 100441  
Forest Laboratories  -Cl 
A 
FRX 4843  
Fujisawa 
Biopharmaceuticals Co 
JP4511 100412  
Genentech Inc DNA 5020  
Genzyme Corp GENZ 12233  
Glaxosmithkline Plc GSK 5180  
Ivax Corp IVX. 14446  
Johnson & Johnson JNJ 6266  
Lilly (Eli) & Co LLY 6730  
Merck & Co MRK 7257  
Merck Kgaa  220301  
Merck Serono Sa SRA 102045 PREVIOUSLY 
SERONO 
Mylan Inc MYL 7637  
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Novartis Ag NVS 101310  
Novo Nordisk A/S NVO 8020  
Pfizer Inc PFE 8530  
Daichi Sankyo JP4568 205509 
 Sanofi-Aventis  101204 
Schering-Plough SGP 9459  
Shionogi & Co Ltd JP4507 100707  
Solvay Sa  101394  
Takeda 
Biopharmaceuticals Co 
JP4502 100718  
Teva Pharmaceuticals TEVA 14538  
Ucb Sa-Nv  100751  
Watson Pharmaceuticals 
Inc 
WPI 27845  
Wyeth WYE 1478  
 
The average firm in the final sample has revenues of US$24641 (000) and 
R&D expenditures of US$ 
2796 (000) per financial year. 
In terms of ERA activity, the 
average firm performed 99 
agreements between 1987 
and 2006.  
 Overall, the average firm performed 98 ERA actions across the 9 distinct 
stages of the drug discovery and development process. More specifically, 65 
ERA actions were performed in preclinical phases (discovery, formulation, 
lead molecule & preclinical), 17 in clinical phases (Phases I, II & III), and 16 
in approval phases (BLA/NDA filed & Approved). More than 1/3 of the total 




5.5 Operationalization and measurement  
In this section, I provide a detailed description of the operationalization and 
measurement of variables of interest. I start by discussing the dependent 
variables involved in hypotheses H1-H5; firm ERA likelihood (ERA_BIN), 
firm ERA intensity (ERA_COUNT), and strategic similarity (STRAT_DEV). I 
then discuss the independent and control variables. Table 5-5 provides a 
summary of operationalization and measurement.   
Scholars thus far have operationalized ERA by focusing on a broad set of 
interorganizational relationships. Interorganizational relationships have been 
treated as the main mechanism of acquiring strategic resources (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996). Scholars have shown that some modes of 
interorganizational relationships are more effective than others depending on 
the strategic intent underlying such relationships (Mowery et al., 1996). It is 
thus common for researchers, concerned with interorganizational relationships, 
to distinguish
50
 between equity and non-equity relationships (Nicholls-Nixon 
& Woo, 2003). In line with previous empirical research, and to be more 
restrictive in hypothesis testing, I exclude agreements that do not incorporate 
the acquisition of a particular resource (such as assets, copyrights, marketing 
rights, technologies, compounds, and molecules). As my interest lies with ERA 
and not with interorganizational relationships per se, I need to distinguish 
between agreements that do not satisfy my theoretical assumptions. In the next 
section, I explain in more detail how I distinguish ERA actions.  
                                                 
50 In their empirical study of the biopharmaceuticals industry, Arora and Gambardella 
(1990) find that different interorganizational linkages (research agreements, equity 
stakes in biotech firms, and acquisitions of firms) are complementary strategies.  
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5.5.1 Coding ERA actions using the RECAP Alliances database 
As I have illustrated above, several empirical studies have used interfirm 
collaborative agreements as a proxy of ERA (e.g., Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1996). To be restrictive on hypothesis testing, and consistent with my 
theoretical assumptions (see section 4.3.2), I measure ERA related variables by 
focusing on nonequity-based interfirm agreements, and thus excluding equity-
based agreements. Furthermore, I exclude agreements that do not incorporate 
the acquisition of a particular resource (such as assets, copyrights, marketing 
rights, technologies, compounds, molecules). In doing so, I exclude 
agreements with types Acq, CoM, CoP, Col, D, Di, E, JV, LoI, Lo, Man, Mrg, 
Sec, Set, Ter, War (see Table 5.4). In the case where an agreement is described 
with more than one of the above types, I include it in the sample only if its 
TYPE description contains ―License‖.  As I am interested on the acquisition of 
resources for my sample firms, I also exclude all outward (out-licensing) 
agreements, thus focusing only on agreements in which the sample firm is the 
―R&D Company‖. Table 5-3 illustrates an example of an agreement that is 
coded as an ERA action (Client firm: ABBOTT). 
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In this example, the biopharmaceuticals firm Abbott Labs acquired a screening 
technology in the therapeutic area of nutritionals from biotech firm Genaera. 
During the data collection process, I assign a unique ID to every agreement 
categorized ERA action. The letter assigned to the ID denotes the discovery 
and development stage that the agreement was signed (stage at signing; see 
Appendix A). In this case, the agreement is signed at the discovery phase.  
Table 5-4. RECAP interfirm agreements codes 
Abbreviation Type Description (RECAP) 
Acq Acquisition In an Acquisition agreement, the Client Company 
acquires legal control (greater than 50% of voting 




An Asset Purchase is an agreement in which the 
Client Company acquires legal control of one or 
more physical assets, such as manufacturing plants 
or business units, from the R&D Company. 
Asn Assignment In an Assignment agreement, the R&D company 
transfers title or legal interest in an intellectual 
property asset to the Client company. 
CoD   Co-
Development 
In a Co-Development agreement, both parties 
participate to some degree in the clinical 
development of a compound or project within a 
licensed territory and the Client company does not 
fully reimburse development expenses incurred by 
the R&D company. 
CoM  Co-Market A Co-Market agreement defines a commercialization 
venture whereby two or more parties promote and 
sell a single product with each party obtaining sales 
revenues and/or net profits only from its own sales of 
the product. 
CoP  Co-Promotion A Co-Promotion agreement defines a 
commercialization venture in which two or more 
parties promote and sell a single product, with each 
party obtaining sales revenues and/or net profits 
from either party's sales of the product. 
Col  Collaboration In a Collaboration agreement, two or more parties 
perform research and/or development activities in a 
single R&D program. 
CrL  Cross-license In a Cross-License agreement, one party obtains a 
license to an intellectual property asset (e.g. a patent) 
in at least partial exchange for granting a license to 
its own intellectual property asset. 
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D  Development In a Development agreement a sponsoring party 
engages another party to perform R&D services 
beyond the stage of lead generation. 
Di  Distribution In a Distribution agreement one party is engaged to 
promote or sell a product in final manufactured form 
as supplied by the originating party 
E  Equity An Equity agreement describes the issuance of a 
minority share (<50%) of legal ownership interest in 
an entity. 
JV  Joint Venture A Joint Venture agreement concerns the legal 
creation of a separate entity (i.e. corporation, 
partnership, or limited liability corporation) by two 
or more parties. 
LoI  Letter of 
Intent 
A Letter of Intent is a written description of 
economic terms and any other principle elements of 
an agreement between two parties. It may be binding 
or non-binding. 
L  License A License is a written agreement whereby one party 
obtains permission to make, have made, use, sell, or 
have sold an intellectual property asset (e.g. a patent 





A Loan is a payment or promise of future payment 
from one party to another whereby such payment is 
repayable (either with cash, equity, or a combination 
of the two) at a future time. 
Man  
Manufacturing 
In a Manufacturing agreement, the Client company 
will make or have made a product for use or sale by 
the R&D company. 
Mkt  Marketing In a Marketing agreement, the Client company 
obtains certain rights to a product not otherwise 
disclosed or classified. A Marketing agreement is a 
commercialization designation that does not meet the 
criteria of either a License or a Distribution 
agreement. 
Mrg  Merger In a Merger agreement legal control (50%+) of two 
entities passes to a third entity from which the 
business of the two will be conducted on an ongoing 
basis. 
O  Option An Option is a legal right, acquired for some 
consideration, for a party to gain access or license to 
an asset at some future time for fixed economic 
terms. 
R  Research In a Research agreement, a sponsoring party engages 
another party to perform R&D services in the 
discovery and/or lead stages of an R&D project. 
Sec  Security A Security is a legal interest in an asset given by one 
party to another as a pledge of repayment of a loan 
or other obligation. 
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Set  Settlement A Settlement is a written agreement following 






A Sublicense concerns the conveyance of a license 
from one party to another, wherein that license was 
earlier granted to the conveyor by a third party. 
S  Supply In a Supply agreement, the R&D company will make 
or have made a product for use or sale by the Client 
company. 
Ter  Termination A Termination agreement concludes or dissolves an 
earlier arrangement between two companies. 
War  Warrant A Warrant is the issuance of a future share of legal 
ownership interest in an entity whereby the acquirer 
has the option, but not the obligation, to purchase 
such ownership interest for a designated period of 
time for fixed economic terms. 
 
Overall, the 37 biopharmaceutical firms in the final sample engaged in 4,729 
ERA actions between 1987 and 2006 (across 592 firm-year observations).  
 
5.5.2 Dependent Variables 
 
Firm ERA activity 
I have illustrated in the previous section, the procedure of coding ERA actions 
through different type of inward nonequity-based interfirm agreements. The 
first three hypotheses (H1-H3) presented in the conceptual chapter aim to 
provide a direct empirical test of the competitor- and resource- driven views of 
ERA. To predict the focal firm’s ERA activity, I am concerned with two 
variables. The first dependent variable is concerned with the likelihood of the 
firm engaging in ERA (ERA_BIN). ERA_BIN is measured as a binary 
variable that takes 1 when firm i engages to 1 or more ERA actions at year t 
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and 0 if firm i does not engage in any ERA action at year t. Scholars concerned 
with firm strategic behaviour have widely employed a similar 
operationalization in several empirical contexts. In their study of the 
automotive industry, (Garcia-Pont & Nohria, 2002) employ a binary measure 
to predict alliance activity between a pair of firms. Other scholars employ a 
similar measure to capture the event of a firm entering a technological field 






























 Intensity (ERA_COUNT): 
Number of interfirm inward 
nonequity-based agreements for 
firm i in year t. 
 
 Likelihood (ERA_BIN): 1 if firm i 
engaged on 1 or interfirm inward 
nonequity-based agreements at 
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Strategic similarity (STRAT_DEV): 
Comparison of number of interfirm 
inward nonequity-based agreements 
of firm i in year t to the industry 
mean expressed as standard 
deviation (strategic deviation 
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 FIRM_EXP: total number of 
interfirm inward nonequity-
based agreements for firm i at 
t-2.  
 FIRM_RES: R&D intensity 
of firm i measured as R&D 
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Firm sizei,t-1  Number of employees (natural logarithm)  COMPUSTAT 
 EDGAR online (SEC) 
 DATASTREAM 
Ahuja and Katila, 
2001; Rothaermel 
and Boeker, 2008; 
Chen and Miller, 
1994; 
Country of origin Boolean variable for distinguishing between US, 
European and Asian firms 
RECAP alliances database Pangarkar and Klein, 
1998 
   Financial strength i,t-1   Return on Assets (ROA) 
 Return on Equity (ROE) 
 Debt-to-equity ratio (D-E) 
 COMPUSTAT 
 EDGAR online (SEC) 
 DATASTREAM 
Stuart,1998; Wiggins 




The second dependent variable that I am concerned with is the focal firm’s 
intensity when engaging in ERA. To measure the intensity of the focal firm’s ERA 
actions, I employ a count variable expressed as the total number of inward 
nonequity-based agreements of firm i at year t (ERA_COUNT). ERA_COUNT 
simply captures the frequency of firm ERA action at any given point in time. 
Scholars concerned with similar strategic actions have employed a frequency 
measure to capture the intensity of firm action. For example, Haunschild (1993) 
employs a similar measure to examine the impact of corporate ties on the focal 
firm’s acquisition activity.    
While scholars have employed likelihood and intensity measures to operationalize 
strategic action, few studies have been empirically concerned with both measures. 
A recent exception is the recent study of Park et al. (2002) which examines the 
competitive dynamics of alliance formation. In line with Park and colleagues 
(2002), I believe that we can gain a better understanding of firm strategic 
behaviour by examining both likelihood and intensity in a single empirical study. I 
expect that the independent variables employed to explain ERA will exhibit a 
varying effect on these two dependent variables.  
 
Strategic similarity 
The third dependent variable that I am concerned with is strategic similarity. 
Recall that hypotheses H4 and H5 try to predict firm ERA behaviour at the two 
extremes of strategic choice. Thus far, scholars concerned with competitive 
dynamics have conceptualized strategic similarity as an independent variable. 
While I employ a similar operationalization with previous empirical studies, I treat 
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strategic similarity as a dependent variable
51
. To measure strategic similarity, I 
draw from the concept of strategic deviation (Deephouse, 1999). Strategic 
deviation is measured as the ―distance‖ between the focal firm’s strategy and that 
of its competitors. Firm strategy can be captured along a set of dimensions. In this 
case, I use two distinct ERA strategies; R&D-oriented ERA actions and 
marketing-focused ERA actions. In a similar fashion with (Deephouse, 1999), 
strategic deviation (STRAT_DEV) for firm i at year t is calculated by the 
following equation: 
𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑇_𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  𝐴𝐵𝑆  







where: Pait = the proportion of ERA strategy a for firm i at year t; 
M(Pat) = the mean of ERA strategy a in year t for the firms in the sample; 
SD(Pat) = the standard deviation of ERA strategy a in year t for the firm 
sample;   
ABS = absolute value function 
 
STRAT_DEV is a firm-level property and can take any non-negative continuous 
value, including 0. A STRAT_DEV of 0 suggests that the strategy of firm i in year 
t is perfectly aligned with the strategies of its competitors. The higher the value of 
STRAT_DEV (above 0), the more differentiated the strategy of firm i in year t. 
                                                 
51 I would like to thank David Deephouse for his valuable input on how to operationalize and 
measure strategic similarity in the context of ERA.  
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The more the value of STRAT_DEV approaches zero, the more firm i conforms to 
the strategy of its competitors in year t.  
Strategy scholars concerned with the concept of strategic similarity have employed 
similar measures, mostly drawing from strategic group research. For example, 
scholars have employed a strategic similarity measure based on Euclidean 
distances at the dyad-level (Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006; Gimeno & Woo, 1996; 
Young et al., 2000). Similarly to the strategic deviation measure described above, 
these scholars start their calculation of strategic similarity by choosing a set of 
strategies that best reflect the strategic position of the firm in its competitive 
context. In contrast with my conceptualization of strategic similarity as a 
dependent variable, these studies employ strategic similarity as a predictor of 
either intensity of rivalry
52
 (Gimeno & Woo, 1996; Young et al., 2000) or market 
entry (Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006). Another notable difference is that these studies 
choose a set of strategies to provide a generic strategic profile of competing firms.  
My concern however is not to generically describe the strategic profile (strategy) 
of the biopharmaceutical firms in my sample, but to choose strategic dimensions 
relevant to ERA. I thus distinguish between R&D-oriented ERA actions and 
market-oriented ERA actions as two distinct strategies in my empirical context. To 
distinguish between these two types of ERA actions, I use the New Drug 
Application submission decision making point in the drug discovery and 
development process. I operationalize R&D-oriented ERA actions as those 
interfirm inward nonequity-based agreements that take place at the preclinical 
                                                 
52 In contrast with Young and colleagues’ (2000) study of firm competitive behaviour, 
Gimeno and Woo (1996) employ a price-cost margin profitability measure to investigate the 
interfirm rivalry across markets.  
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stages of the drug discovery and development process. In line with the RECAP 
categorization, such agreements can take the following values at the ―stage at 
signing‖ field: discovery, formulation, lead molecule & preclinical. One recent 
example of a R&D-oriented ERA action is the agreement between Pharmagene 
and GlaxoSmithKline:  
“Royston, UK, 24 July 2002 - Pharmagene announced today that it has signed a 
further agreement with GSK to assist in the characterisation of the metabolism of 
a number of development compounds in human tissues prior to beginning full 
clinical development. Under the terms of the agreement, GSK will gain access to 
specific Pharmagene capabilities in the area of compound validation with an 
option to extend the scope of the agreement if required. Pharmagene's unique 
human tissue-based approach can assist in identifying clinical trial errors early 
and thus help reduce the high attrition rates and costs associated with drug 
discovery and development” 
 
In turn, market-oriented ERA actions are those interfirm inward nonequity-based 
agreements completed at later stages of the D&D process such as clinical phases 
(I, II & III) and approval stages (BLA/NDA filed & Approved). An example of 
collaboration market-oriented ERA action is the licensing agreement between 
Aventis (now Sanofi-Aventis) and Danippon: 
“Strasbourg, France – Aventis announced today that it is has entered into an 
agreement with Dainippon to license its novel antidementia agent AC-3933, 
currently under development in Europe by Dainippon. Under this agreement, 
Aventis has received exclusive worldwide development and marketing rights 
(excluding Japan) for AC-3933, with option rights for China, Taiwan and South 
Korea. AC-3933 is a potential cognitive enhancer with a novel mechanism of 
action. IAC-3933 acts as a partial inverse agonist at the GABA-benzodiazepine 
receptor complex, enhancing cholinergic function. Because of these properties, it 
is anticipated that AC-3933 will demonstrate better efficacy for improving 




Scholars investigating, alliance activity and formation in the biopharmaceuticals 
industry, have highlighted differences along these two distinct strategies. For 
example, Rothaermel and Deeds (2004: 202) build on the exploration-exploitation 
model of organizational learning and argue that biopharmaceutical firms form 
exploratory alliances (early stage) to search for new technological knowledge, and 
exploitation alliances (late stage)  to commercialize developed knowledge. These 
scholars further argue that while there are distinct strategic motives underlying 
these two different types of alliances, they are interlinked (exploitation alliances 
depend on exploration alliances) throughout the new product development process. 
At an earlier conversation of the exploration-exploitation model as a framework of 
firm adaptation to its environment, Koza and Lewin (1998: 256) argue that ―the 
firm’s choice to enter into an alliance can be distinguished in terms of its 
motivation to exploit an existing capability or to explore new opportunities. This 
dichotomy applies equally to any strategy of the firm‖.  
The point that I am trying to bring across here is that there is good theoretical 
reasoning for distinguishing between R&D-oriented ERA actions and marketing-
oriented ERA actions as two distinct strategies serving different value chain 
functions (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006: 798). Another methodological option would 
be to not distinguish between these two types of ERA actions, but treat ERA at one 
dimension. However, given the above discussion, and the plethora of empirical 
work on the application of the exploration-exploitation model on 
interorganizational relationships, I believe that such a distinction could lead to a 
more insightful empirical analysis by taking full advantage of my extensive dataset 
of ERA actions in the biopharmaceuticals industry.   
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5.5.3 Independent Variables 
 
Competitors’ ERA activity 
The first independent variable of interest is competitors’ ERA activity 
(COMP_ACT). COMP_ACT captures the impact of competitors’ ERA related 
actions to the likelihood (ERA_BIN) and intensity (ERA_COUNT) of the focal 
firm’s subsequent ERA actions (H1 & H3). COMP_ACT also acts as a predictor 
variable of strategic similarity (H4 & H5).  
Scholars concerned with firm competitive behaviour have employed similar 
measures to describe competitors’ activity. Ferrier, Smith, and Grimm (1999: 378) 
define competitors’ activity (in their word total competitive activity) as ―the total 
number of newly created competitive actions…‖ Scholars have widely applied 
aggregate count measures to investigate imitative behaviour (operationalized as the 
impact of competitors’ strategic actions on the probability of the focal firm 
engaging in the same action). Haunschild and Miner (1997) use the term 
frequency-based imitation to describe the increased probability of the focal firm to 
engage in a strategic action when a large number of competitors engage in the 
same action. Haunschild and Miner (1997) measure frequency-based imitation as 
the aggregate number of prior competitors adopting a specific action (in their case 
the use of a specific investment banking firm). In their study of firm imitative 
behaviour and the dynamics of alliance formation, Garcia-Pont and Nohria (2002) 
employ a similar measure to capture the impact of global mimetism (the larger the 
aggregate number of prior alliances in an industry, the more likely any two firms 
enter an alliance) on alliance formation. They employ a measure based on the 
density of the alliances formed between two competing firms at a particular point 
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in time. To study interorganizational mimetic behaviour in the context of market 
entry, Delios et al. (2008) construct a similar density measure based on the natural 
algorithm of the count of competitors’ previous entries.  
Through my conceptualization of COMP_ACT, I aim to investigate the existence 
of imitative behaviour in the context of ERA. As illustrated above, scholars have 
predominantly employed aggregate based measures to investigate imitative 
behaviour. The problem is however, that competing firms may engage in several 
modes of mimetic behaviour (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). Aggregate measures 
could be more appropriate when competing firms engage in a strategic action as a 
response to a large number of competitors (frequency-based imitation). (Garcia-
Pont & Nohria, 2002), however, argue that firms don’t just imitate any other firm 
in their competitive environment but focus on those firms that are strategically 
similar (local mimetism). In contrast with Garcia-Pont and Nohria’s study (2002), 
I am not concerned with strategic groups as a theoretical anchor of imitative 
behaviour, and I do not therefore empirically identify strategic groups as an 
identifier of strategically similar firms.  While my theoretical interest lies with 
frequency-based imitation, given my focus on a well defined set of competitors, I 
do contend with Garcia-Pont and Nohria (2002) that competing firms may differ in 
the way they view their competitors’ actions.  
In line with these studies, I provide alternative measures of COMP_ACT. The first 
measure is simply the cumulative count of ERA actions that sample firms N 
engage at t-2 minus the ERA actions of the focal firm’s i at the same period. For 
example, if GlaxoSmithKline has engaged in 10 ERA actions in 1995 and all the 
other firms in my sample cumulatively engaged in 100 ERA actions then 
COMP_ACT for GlaxoSmithKline in 1997 is equal to 90.   
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I draw from empirical work on resource niches in order to develop the second 
measure of COMP_ACT. Organizational ecology scholars have argued that firms 
competing in the same market segments tend to draw from similar resources and 
compete more intensively (e.g., Dobrev, 2007). Competitive dynamics scholars 
have provided a similar argument by showing that firms in the same markets are 
more aware of their respective strategic actions (e.g., Chen, 1996). Thus, one way 
to construct a more specific measure of COMP_ACT would be to distinguish 
between firms that directly compete in the same markets (market overlap).  In line 
with these argument, COMP_ACT is calculated as the aggregate number of 
interfirm inward nonequity-based agreements that competing firms C (C is a subset 
of N) of firm i engage in t-2, prior to the firm’s i ERA actions in year t. Competing 
firms, of firm i, are defined as those firms that engage in ERA actions in the same 
markets m as firm i. For example, if firm i faces competitors C1 and C2 with total 
ERA actions at year t-2 c1 and c2 respectively in market M1, and competitors C3 
and C4 with total ERA actions at year t-2 c3 and c4 respectively in market M2 then 
COMP_ACT for firm i at year t is simply the cumulative count equal to 
c1+c2+c3+c4. As in the first measure of COMP_ACT, I employ a 2-year lag to 
account for the time required for the focal firm to be aware of the ERA actions of 
its competitors.  
It is important to note that both measures yield similar results for my sample of 
biopharmaceutical firms (significance and direction). One reason for this may be 
that firms in my sample serve very similar markets (high market overlap). I discuss 
this further in the next chapter where I illustrate my empirical results and the 




Firm-specific attributes  
Apart from competitors’ ERA activity, I see two firm-specific (idiosyncratic) 
attributes driving firm ERA behaviour; prior experience with ERA and resource 
commitment. Scholars thus far have provided us with extensive empirical efforts 
on understanding how these two firm-specific attributes are associated with the 
focal firm’s propensity to engage in a specific strategic action. As I have illustrated 
in the previous chapter, these two firm-specific attributes hold important 
theoretical implications in the resource-driven view of ERA (section 4.3.4). 
Strategy scholars, especially within the RBV tradition, have provided us with 
several measures of these two important firm-specific attributes.  As I will 
illustrate below, measuring prior experience is a much easier task than measuring 
resource commitment.    
Prior experience with ERA. Scholars have long argued that firm action is a 
function of historical events (e.g., Mir & Watson, 2000). Empirical studies in the 
strategy field have predominantly measured firm experience as the aggregate 
number of prior actions (usually at t-1 or t-2) that the focal firm engages in (e.g., 
Delios et al., 2008; Yang & Hyland, 2006).  Scholars concerned with firm 
experience in other contexts have employed similar count based measures. For 
example, in their empirical study of the biopharmaceuticals industry, Nerkar and 
Roberts (2004) measure firm technological experience as the aggregate count of 
patents granted in 10 years prior to launch of a new product. In line with these 
empirical studies, I measure firm’s prior experience with ERA (ERA_EXP) as the 
total number of interfirm inward nonequity-based agreements for firm i at t-2.  
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Resource commitment. Strategy scholars have long argued that internal resources 
direct firm strategic action. As I have discussed in chapter 2, the concept of 
internal resources has been of particular empirical concern within the theoretical 
premises of the RBV. As I have illustrated above, competing firms engage in ERA 
in response to their resource endowments. While internal resources has been of 
high theoretical importance, their operationalization and measurement remains 
problematic (e.g., Priem & Butler, 2001). The problem primarily lies with the 
theoretical premises of the RBV, and more specifically, the VRIN conditions that 
resources must satisfy in order to be a source of competitive advantage. These very 
limiting conditions however, make strategic resources hard to measure
53
. Scholars 
concerned with the dynamics of interorganizational relationships have used several 
different measures to operationalize firm resource endowments. Most notably, 
scholars have measured firm resource endowments through R&D intensity.  In this 
case, internal resources express the commitment that a firm makes to R&D 
(Goerzen, 2007; Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998).  
In their empirical study of the biotechnology industry, Nicholls-Nixon and Woo 
(2003) show that higher levels of commitment in internal R&D are positively 
associated with the technological output of the firm. In line with this prior 
empirical research, I measure resource commitment (FIRM_RES) by R&D 
intensity of the focal firm i at t-2. R&D intensity is defined as R&D expenditures 
divided by total sales (Chang, 2003; Goerzen, 2007; Schoenecker & Cooper, 
1998). Some other scholars have defined R&D intensity as R&D expenditures 
                                                 
53 Godfrey and Hill (1995: 523) highlight this point by arguing that ―the power of the [RBV] 
theory to explain performance persistence over time is based upon the assumption that 




divided by total assets (Miller, 2004). I use the former measurement of R&D 
intensity. Recently, scholars have criticized the use of R&D intensity as a measure 
of internal resources. Crook et al. (2008: 1144) argue, for example, that ―R&D 
intensity appears to be a distant proxy for an organization’s underlying R&D 
resources because investment levels say little about the quality of the outputs from 
those investments‖. Armstrong and Shimizu (2007: 966) further argue that 
―…using readily measurable variables is certainly legitimate, but in our opinion, it 
offers limited contributions towards understanding the real value of the resource-
based theory‖. My operationalization of resource commitment through R&D 
intensity does not aim on a direct test of RBV per se but a resource-driven view of 
ERA. As such, R&D intensity is used as a proxy of the commitment of the focal 
firm to internal resource development, rather than a direct measure of internal 
resources (for a similar application see Young et al., 2000).         
 
5.5.4 Control Variables 
I use three set of variables to control for other effects that may drive firm ERA 
behaviour. First, I control for firm size. Scholars have argued that firm size is 
positively associated with firm age, and thus controlling for firm size can isolate 
age related effects and reduce unobserved heterogeneity (Rothaermel & Boeker, 
2008). Furthermore, scholars have argued that larger firms exhibit a higher 
propensity of engaging in collaborative activity than smaller firms (Pangarkar & 
Klein, 1998). Furthermore, larger firms have a wider range of industry contacts, 
and more extensive personnel networks (Stuart, 1998). Firm size is measured by 
the natural logarithm of number of employees for firm i at year t-1 (e.g., Ahuja & 
Katila, 2001).  
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Second, I employ a Boolean variable to distinguish between firms incorporated in 
different country of origin. Scholars concerned with alliance behaviour in the 
biopharmaceuticals industry have found that firms from different countries have 
different propensities to collaborate due to country-specific characteristics such as 
culture (Pangarkar & Klein, 1998). As I have illustrated above, my sample firms 
are predominantly incorporated in the U.S., Europe, and Japan. I employ three 
distinct Boolean variables for each of these origins of incorporation.   
Third, I control for the financial strength of the firm. I expect that firms with high 
levels of financial strength will be more prepared to engage in ERA. I have argued 
above, that ERA is a strategically complex and risky strategic action. It is not hard 
to assume that firms with stronger financial ground will be more likely to engage 
in ERA and more intensively. This could be particularly true when firms are faced 
with high environmental uncertainty. Furthermore, strong financial performance 
may be associated with slack resources. I employ three accounting measures to 
measure financial strength for firm i at t-1: Return on Assets, Return on Equity, 
and Debt-to-Equity ratio. These accounting measures have been extensively used 
in strategic management research as proxies of financial performance (e.g., 
Wiggins & Ruefli, 2002).  
The control variables described above, hold important effects for firm behaviour in 
the context of ERA. As I have illustrated above, scholars have long identified firm 
size and financial strength as important firm-specific effects of firm strategic 
behaviour. While these variables are not of central importance to my conceptual 
development, I discuss their effects on the hypothesized relationships proposed in 
the next chapter where I present my empirical results.  
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5.6 Econometric modelling of dependent variables 
I have discussed above the operationalization and measurement of the dependent 
and independent variables involved in my conceptual framework. In this section, I 
illustrate appropriate econometric models to test my hypotheses. More specifically, 
I am concerned with three dependent variables. The first dependent variable 
ERA_BIN is a binary measure of capturing whether a firm engages in ERA at a 
specific point in time. The second dependent variable that I am concerned with, 
ERA_COUNT is a count measure that captures the focal firm’s intensity of ERA 
actions. The third dependent variable, STRAT_DEV, aims to measure strategic 
similarity among my sample firms over time. As illustrated above, STRAT_DEV 
can take non-negative continuous values.  
To empirically estimate these three dependent variables given my set of 
independent and control variables discussed above, I need to employ a set of 
econometric models. Given the nature of my dependent variables, the widely 
applied linear regression model and the basic Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
solution provide an insufficient estimation technique. In my efforts to model firm 
ERA activity (ERA_BIN and ERA_COUNT), I employ a set of nonlinear 
regression models specifically designed to address the particular nature of my 
dependent variables. In the case of strategic similarity, I employ the linear 
regression model but apply a Generalized Least Square (GLS) estimator rather 
than OLS.  
Recall, that my concern lies with the ERA actions of a set of competing firms over 
time. These pooling of observations across cross-sectional units (firms) over time 
(years) is defined as panel data (Baltagi, 1995: 1). Panel data offers several 





), but it also raises certain challenges, especially in the case where the 
researcher’s focus lies with dependent variables that cannot be modelled by the 
linear regression model.  Management scholars have argued that panel data can be 
employed to demonstrate causality among a set of constructs (Echambadi, 
Campbell, & Agarwal, 2006). While claiming causality can be an adventurous 
endeavour, which I do not fully engage, I take under consideration suggestions 
from these scholars in order to improve the strength of my empirical analysis. In 
line with (Echambadi et al., 2006: 1804)
55
, I employ alternative econometric 
models as robustness checks to ensure that the correlations among the variables 
involved in the hypothesized relationships proposed above, are robust across 
different specifications. Scholars in the strategy literature have highlighted the 
importance of applying alternative models to avoid biased results when faced with 
panel data designs (Bowen & Wiersema, 1999).    
Furthermore, I employ alternative measures of my constructs to eliminate 
measurement error and increase the validity of my empirical analysis (Echambadi 
et al., 2006). More specifically, I employ two sets of measures. The first set is the 
two lagged year single term for the independent variables described above. The 
second set is concerned with the natural logarithm values (log) of the two year 
lagged single term. As I illustrate in more detail in the next chapter where I present 
my results, these alternative model specifications yield similar results (in terms of 
direction and significance). The Log models however, perform slightly better. One 
                                                 
54 For a critique on cross-sectional designs see Bowen and Wiersema (1999). 
55 Echambadi et al. (2006) raise some excellent points on the (mis)treatment of interaction 
effects. I provide an in-depth discussion of modelling interaction effects in the next chapter.  
151 
 
reason for this slightly better performance, in terms of overall model fit, may be 
that the log values standardize the single terms of the independent variables.  
My aim here is not to be exhaustive of the application of these econometric 
models, but illustrate the rationale behind choosing these models for estimating my 
dependent variables, and testing the hypothesized relationships that I am 
concerned with. To complement my discussion of such rationale, I briefly illustrate 
how these models are derived. As my interest lies with ERA and firm strategy, I 
also briefly discuss the application of these econometric models in strategy related 
empirical work.  
 
5.6.1 Modelling the likelihood of a firm engaging in ERA (ERA_BIN) 
ERA_BIN predicts whether firm i engages in ERA at time t. Put it differently, 
ERA_BIN captures the probability that ERA (as an event) takes place or not. 
ERA_BIN is thus coded as a dichotomous (binary) variable. ERA_BIN equals 1 if 
firm i at year t engages in 1 or more ERA actions (event occurs) and 0 otherwise 
(event does not occur). ERA_BIN can be characterized as a limited dependent 
variable (LDV) as it can only take a limited range of values (in this case 1 or 0).  
ERA_BIN, as a LDV variable, cannot be estimated by estimators employed for 
continuous variables such as the OLS model which has been widely applied in 
strategy research (Wiersema & Bowen, 2009). In contrast with the more straight 
forward application of linear regression models and the OLS estimator, LDV 
models are inherently more complex to apply and have been largely misinterpreted 
by strategy scholars (Hoetker, 2007). I discuss in detail this point in the next 
chapter where I illustrate my empirical results and steps taken towards a best 
practice of applying LDV models. Suffice to say here, that there two fundamental 
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differences between LDV and OLS models. First, LDV models do not satisfy the 
linearity assumption of the OLS estimated linear regression models and are thus 
characterized as nonlinear. Second, LDV models are estimated through maximum 
likelihood, and as such there is no single measure that can describe the ―fit‖ (as is 
the F-test in the OLS case) of the model to the data (Wiersema & Bowen, 2009).  
Given the above, I estimate ERA_BIN through a logistic regression
56
 (Logit) 
model. A Logit model is a specific type of a regression model focusing at binary 
outcomes (Long, 1997).  More specifically to estimate the probability of 
ERA_BIN equals 1, given a set of independent variables, I need to estimate 
P(y=1|x) = F(a+bx) [1] where F is the logistic cumulative density function (cdf): 




      (Equation 2) 
 
Strategy scholars have employed LDV models (mostly Logit) to predict various 
strategic actions such as alliance activity (Chung et al., 2000; Park et al., 2002), 
entry to a new technological subfields (Mitchell, 1989), innovator-imitator race 
(Ethiraj & Zhu, 2008), and location strategies (Alcácer & Chung, 2007). 
 
 
                                                 
56
 For a full proof of the Logit model see (Long, 1997: 40).  
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5.6.2 Modelling the intensity of a firm engaging in ERA (ERA_COUNT) 
I model the second dependent variable of interest, ERA_COUNT, as a count 
variable that takes non-negative and integer values. A count variable is best 
modelled by count specific regression models rather than linear regression models 
(Hausman, Hall, & Griliches, 1984; Long & Freese, 2006). Count regression 
models assume that variables of interest follow a Poisson distribution as described 
in equation 3. 
𝑃𝑟 𝑦 µ =
𝑒−µµ𝑦
𝑦 !
   for y = 0, 1, 2, ….   (Equation 3) 
In the Poisson distribution, the mean and variance equals to µ, and as such the 
distribution assumes equidispersion. Looking closer at the distribution of 
ERA_COUNT (figure 5-2), however, I observe an overdispersion
57
 of ERA 
actions towards larger firms (statistically overdispersion is common for count 
models).  
 
Figure 5-2. Frequency distribution of ERA_COUNT 
 
                                                 
57 In the presence of overdispersion, estimates based on the Poisson regression models yield 
inefficient results (downward biased standard errors). (Long and Freese, 2006: 376). 
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To account for such overdispersion, I employ a negative binomial regression 
model as described in equation 4. The negative binomial model accounts for 
overdispersion among observations by adding a parameter a that reflects 
unobserved heterogeneity (Long & Freese, 2006: 243).  In my case,  





where εi is the parameter a, and assumed to be uncorrelated with the independent 
variables as in the case of the linear regression model. Given the above calculation 
of µ, the (Poisson) distribution of observation i is calculated by equation 4.  




    (Equation 4) 
If the parameter a is equal to zero, then the negative binomial regression model 
reduces to the Poisson regression model. Following (Long & Freese, 2006), I 
further test for overdispersion by testing the hypothesis that the parameter a equals 
to zero (H0: a = 0). To test this hypothesis, I run the full Poisson and negative 
binomial regression models (including all explanatory variables) and then compare 




(01) test in STATA). More specifically, I find 
significant evidence of overdispersion (G
2
 = 350.943; p < .01)
59
, and thus the 
negative binomial regression model is preferred.  
                                                 
58 From basic algebra E(exp(εi)) = 1, which corresponds to the strong exogeneity assumption 
of the linear regression model. 
59 G2 = 2(lnLNBRM – lnLPRM) = 2 (-1437.085 – (-1612.5565)) = 350.943, where LNBRM and 
LPRM is the Log likelihood for the negative binomial regression model (NBRM) and the 
Poisson regression model (PRM) respectively (Long and Freese, 2006: 246). 
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Count models have been extensively applied in strategy research. Most notably, 
scholars have employed such models to predict organizational performance (e.g., 
Ahuja & Katila, 2004; Baum et al., 2000; Stuart, 2000), market entry (e.g., Baum 
& Korn, 1999), competitive actions (e.g., Chen, Su, & Tsai, 2007; Derfus, 
Maggitti, Grimm, & Smith, 2008), entry in technological fields (George, Kotha, & 
Zheng, 2008), alliance activity (Park et al., 2002), and boundary spanning search 
(Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). In line with these studies, I take additional steps to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity in relation to my panel data design. I discuss 
this in more detail in section 5.8.4.   
 
5.6.3 Modelling strategic similarity (STRAT_DEV) 
As I have illustrated above, I operationalize strategic similarity through the 
STRAT_DEV measure.  STRAT_DEV is a continuous variable (takes continuous 
values between 0.258 and 4.659) and thus can be estimated through linear least 
square estimators such as OLS. However, when faced with a panel data design, the 
OLS assumption of homoscedastic disturbances across time is often violated
60
. 
Simply, the linear regression model assumption of homoscedastic disturbances 
suggests that there is no additional information in the regressors about the 
variances of the disturbances (Baum, 2006: 133). It is thus expected that cross-
sectional units (firms) exhibit different variances across time, suggesting the 
existence of heteroskedasticity (Baltagi, 1995). Another common problem arising 
with panel data is that estimated errors are not independently distributed 
(correlated with each other). To account for heteroskedastic disturbances across 
                                                 
60 Put it differently, this violation implies that estimated errors are either not identically 
distributed or not independently distributed (non- i.i.d errors).  There two general ways to 
deal with non-i.i.d errors (Baum, 2006).  
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panels, I employ a Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator. In strategy 
research, (Rothaermel, Hitt, & Jobe, 2006) offer a similar application of GLS 
estimation to investigate the impact of vertical integration and strategic 
outsourcing on product success.     
5.6.4 Implementation of econometric models using STATA 10.0 
As I have illustrated above, there are three dependent variables that I am 
concerned with. These dependent variables are measured differently and as such 
are estimated through different econometric models. To employ these econometric 
models, I use the STATA 10.0 statistical package. STATA is a powerful statistical 
software with a wide range of features and applications. In contrast with other 
statistical software packages, STATA offers a command based interface which 
allows the execution of multiple commands through STATA-specific command 
files (DO files). This is a powerful feature when dealing with a wide range of 
models. In addition to STATA basic features, I have employed three additional 
packages for post-estimation analysis. I have used the SPost library developed by 
Scott Long and colleagues for estimation and graphical analysis of the Logit and 
count models (Long & Freese, 2006: 9). Recall that hypotheses H3a and H3b are 
concerned with the interaction effect of COMP_ACT and firm-specific variables 
FIRM_RES and FIRM_EXP. To estimate and graphically represent this 
interaction effect, and its impact on the focal firm’s ERA activity (likelihood and 
intensity), I employ the inteff command developed by Norton and colleagues 
(Norton, Wang, & Ai, 2004). Finally, I employed the estout package for creating 
the model tables presented in the next chapter. 
 As I have illustrated above, my panel data design offers several strengths but also 
raises several econometric challenges. One such challenge is the existence of 
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unobserved heterogeneity across panels (firms). To account for the existence of 
unobserved heterogeneity across firms, I employ the STATA cluster-robust- 
variance/covariance estimator (VCE)
61
. This estimator accounts for non-i.i.d errors 
across panels (for a proof of this estimator see Baum, 2006: 139). The VCE 
estimator is employed through the cluster() option available in all three 
econometric models employed. To run the cluster() option, I develop a firm-
specific variable that indicates the structure of within-cluster observations 
(observations for the same firm). When the cluster() option is included to the 
regression command, STATA reports standard errors calculated by the VCE 
estimator (robust standard errors).  
Given my panel design, it is very likely that my data are exposed to firm specific 
effects that are unobserved. To account for such effects, and increase the 
robustness of my empirical analysis, I employ the fixed-effects
62
 counterparts for 
the models described above. This must be treated as an alternative analytical 
strategy than the VCE estimator described above. I employ a Hausman-type test 
(Hausman, 1978) to test the appropriateness of fixed effects models in comparison 
with alternative models. In the case of the STRAT_DEV estimation through 
GLS
63
, the Hausman test suggests that fixed effects models are more efficient than 
random effects for my dataset. In the case of the LDV (Logit and negative 
                                                 
61 The basic idea underlying the VCE estimator is that the estimated logistic probabilities for 
observations of the outcome (in this case ERA_BIN and ERA_COUNT) in a cluster are 
more highly correlated than across clusters (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2004). Practically, the 
VCE estimator returns larger P values (overstated in the simple versions of the models) for 
the z statistic for each independent variable in the LDV models.  
62β coefficients in the fixed-effects Logit models are calculated through Chamberlain’s 
(1980) conditional likelihood function due to the presence of the incidental parameters 
problem (Baltagi, 1995: 210). 
63 For similar applications in strategy research, the reader can refer to the studies of Gimeno 
and Woo (1996) and Moliterno and Wiersema (2007). 
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binomial) models described above, the VCE estimator based models (logit and 
nbreg with cluster() option) are more efficient than the fixed-effects models. It is 
important to note here that these alternative models yield similar results (in terms 
of estimated β coefficients and standard errors).  
Unfortunately, in the case of the nonlinear models presented above (modelling 
ERA_BIN and ERA_COUNT), the SPost post-estimation library does not support 
fixed-effects models (in STATA these models are represented by the commands 
xtreg and xtlogit). This is an important limitation, given the complexity of 
interpreting nonlinear LDV models (Hoetker, 2007).  As I will illustrate further in 
the next chapter, the SPost library provides some excellent tools for the graphical 




CHAPTER 6.                       
RESULTS 
6.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this dissertation is to investigate firm strategic behaviour in 
the context of ERA. In chapter 4, I have offered a conceptual framework that 
provides two views of ERA behaviour. First, the competitor-driven view suggests 
that the focal firm engages in ERA when faced with high levels of competitors’ 
ERA activity (COMP_ACT). I thus expect a positive association between 
competitors’ ERA activity and the focal firm’s subsequent ERA actions (H1a,b). 
Second, the resource-driven view suggests that firms engage in ERA in relation to 
their idiosyncratic attributes. Empirically, I expect that firm resource commitment 
(FIRM_RES) and prior experience with ERA (FIRM_EXP) to be positively 
correlated with the likelihood and intensity of the firm’s ERA actions (H2a,b). 
Finally, I propose that these two views of ERA are complementary. More 
specifically, hypotheses H3a and H3b investigate how FIRM_RES and 
FIRM_EXP relate (expected moderating effect) with COMP_ACT.  
Overall, my empirical analysis provides support for this first set of hypotheses. 
Given however the application of non-linear econometric models to test my 
hypotheses, I interpret the results by not only focusing on the significance and 
direction of the estimated coefficients, but also I provide graphical representations 
and marginal effects of the hypothesized relationships. In so doing, I respond to 
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recent critiques on the application of non-linear models in strategy research (e.g., 
Hoetker, 2007) 
In the second part of my conceptual development, I am concerned with firm ERA 
behaviour and strategic similarity (H4 and H5). More specifically, I provide 
empirical evidence on how COMP_ACT, FIRM_EXP and FIRM_RES are 
associated with strategic similarity (measured through the strategic deviation 
concept) in the context of ERA (Deephouse, 1999). 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 provides descriptive statistics and 
briefly discusses model fit. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 focus on the first set of hypotheses 
concerned with the likelihood and intensity of the firm engaging in ERA 
respectively. Section 6.5 extends the empirical findings in predicting firm ERA 
activity by discussing the marginal effects of the independent variables presented 
above. Section 6.6 presents empirical results on the second part of the conceptual 
framework which associates ERA drivers and strategic deviation. Section 6.7 
briefly discusses additional effects from my empirical analysis which are not 
directly relevant to my conceptual framework and hypotheses tested, but have a 
significant effect on predicting ERA behaviour.  
 
6.2 Descriptive statistics and model fit 
Table 6.1 presents summary statistics. In terms of the dependent variables, I 
observe a significant and positive correlation among ERA likelihood and ERA 
intensity (0.4413). The mean value of ERA likelihood of 0.797 suggests that 
sample firms intensively engage in ERA across time. However, the large standard 
deviations observed indicate an overdispersion of ERA actions across the observed 
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time frame. I furthermore observe a significant and positive correlation between 
R&D- and marketing- oriented ERA actions (0.6754). Such correlation confirms 
(Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004)’s finding on the complementary nature of R&D and 
marketing related collaborating activities.  In addition, strategic deviation is 
negatively correlated with ERA likelihood and ERA intensity suggesting that 
across sample firms ERA activity is associated with conformity.  
 
With respect to my independent variables, I do not generally observe high 
correlations. An exception is the high correlation observed between FIRM_EXP 
and firm ERA intensity. Recall that ERA intensity is measured as the number of 
inward collaborative agreements for firm i at time t. On the other hand, 
FIRM_EXP is operationalized as the number of inward collaborative agreements 
for firm i at time t-2. The significant and high correlation (0.8471) suggests the 
existence of an important effect between FIRM_EXP and ERA intensity. As I will 
illustrate below, firm ERA experience is a strong predictor of both the likelihood 
and intensity of firm’s ERA actions. Furthermore, the financial related control 
variables, Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) appear to be 
highly correlated (0.7492).  This is somewhat expected as both of these accounting 
variables contain net income as part of their calculation. Their positive and 
significant correlation suggests an expected positive relationship between high 
levels of total assets and equity as reported in the firm annual reports. I also 
observe a relatively high correlation between size and the dependent variables 
ERA_BIN and ERA_COUNT. I discuss further the effect of firm size on 





         Table 6-1 Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 ERA intensity 6.128378 7.008605 0 42 1
2 ERA likelihood 0.7972973 0.4023528 0 1 0.4413* 1
3 R&D ERA actions 4.141892 5.049682 0 29 0.9640* 0.4139* 1
4 Marketing ERA actions 1.986486 2.526975 0 16 0.8471* 0.3967* 0.6754* 1
5 Strategic Deviation 1.625183 0.9753496 0.258988 4.65939 -0.4880* -0.2240* -0.4799* -0.3946* 1
6 Competitors' ERA activity 190.7027 93.28727 34 348 0.2546* 0.2892* 0.2184* 0.2697* -0.0075 1
7 ERA experience 5.297297 6.602783 0 42 0.8190* 0.3616* 0.7794* 0.7141* -0.4222* 0.3309* 1
8 Resource commitment 0.1511328 0.2374016 0.0049 3.4471 -0.052 -0.0083 -0.0463 -0.0516 0.0135 -0.005 -0.0342
9 Size 4.15612 0.6368739 2 5.2154 0.5442* 0.3862* 0.5050* 0.4998* -0.3024* 0.1503* 0.5243*
10 Return on Assets 0.0833553 0.0792111 -0.524 0.2689 0.3300* 0.1784* 0.3185* 0.2786* -0.1152* 0.0821* 0.2935*
11 Return on Equity 0.1773419 0.1937005 -0.7102 2.5317 0.4057* 0.1942* 0.3903* 0.3449* -0.1792* 0.0333 0.3638*
12 Debt to Equity 1.109995 0.854773 0.0615 6.4847 0.1400* 0.0629 0.1373* 0.1139* -0.1116* -0.0187 0.1261*
13 Is American 0.4594595 0.4987752 0 1 0.0131 0.0433 -0.0091 0.0546 0.1341* -0.002 0.0278
14 Is European 0.3783784 0.4853928 0 1 0.1762* 0.0902* 0.2003* 0.0883* -0.2164* -0.0106 0.1496*
15 Is Asian 0.1351351 0.342157 0 1 -0.2232* -0.1817* -0.2285* -0.1623* 0.0927* 0.0149 -0.2110*
16 ERA experience*Resource commitment 0.7524369 1.0598 0 9.4164 0.6366* 0.3216* 0.5976* 0.5709* -0.3403* 0.3378* 0.8447*
17 Competitors' ERA activity*ERA 
experience*Resource commitment
177.4016 287.6936 0 2636.592 0.5718* 0.2819* 0.5302* 0.5260* -0.2951* 0.4497* 0.7894*
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
8 Resource commitment 1
9 Size -0.3723* 1
10 Return on Assets -0.3985* 0.3392* 1
11 Return on Equity -0.2753* 0.4213* 0.7492* 1
12 Debt to Equity -0.1796* 0.4595* -0.0388 0.2953* 1
13 Is American 0.1461* -0.1172* 0.1141* 0.0522 -0.1410* 1
14 Is European -0.0894* 0.2931* 0.026 0.1017* 0.2645* -0.7193* 1
15 Is Asian -0.0545 -0.1985* -0.1966* -0.2141* -0.1718* -0.3644* -0.3084* 1
16 ERA experience*Resource commitment 0.1456* 0.3304* 0.1952* 0.2456* 0.0036 0.0405 0.1273* -0.1903* 1
17 Competitors' ERA activity*ERA 
experience*Resource commitment
0.1498* 0.3025* 0.1493* 0.1694* -0.0032 0.0241 0.1120* -0.1520* 0.9585* 1
*significant at p<0.05; N = 592
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The statistical models employed to test hypotheses H1-H5 exhibit a good fit in 
terms of overall model significance and variance explained (as reported by R
2
). 
Let’s first consider the fit of the models predicting firm ERA activity. The 
alternative models presented in tables 2 and 3 are estimated through maximum 
likelihood (ML). Assessing the fit of ML-based models is more complicated than 
linear regression models. While in the case of linear regression models researchers 
assess model fit through the observed R
2
, such approach is inadequate for ML-
based models. In line with recent critiques of misinterpreting ML-based models 
(Hoetker, 2007), I provide 3 different criteria
64
 to assess model fit; 1) the LR test; 




 (McFadden Adjusted R
2
 and Cragg-Uhler R
2
); 
and 3) the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).  
As illustrated in tables 6.2 and 6.3, the LR test
66
 for all alternative models is 
significant at p < 0.001 indicating that I can safely reject the null hypothesis H0: β0 
= ... = βk = 0, for K predictor variables. I furthermore observe a significant increase 
over the control only model (LR = 116.942) when explanatory variables are 
included. The pseudo R
2’s, presented here, further reflect the LR test for 
alternative models
67 . In terms of the McFadden’s adjusted R2, I observe a 
significant increase over the controls model when COMP_ACT, FIRM_EXP and 
                                                 
64 I use the fitstat command in STATA developed, as part of the SPost library, by Long and 
Freese (2006) to estimate these criteria. 
65 Pseudo R2 measures reported here must not be interpreted as directly equivalent to the 
OLS R2 (Hoetker, 2007: 339).  
66 For a complete proof of calculating the LR test see Long (1997:103). 
67 In addition, I have calculated the adjusted count R2 for all the alternative models. The 
adjusted count R2 captures the proportion of correct predictions for Pr(ERA_BIN)=1 beyond 
the number that would be correctly predicted by choosing the largest marginal (Long, 1997: 
108). The controls only model exhibits an adj. Count R2 of 0.042 compared to 0.256 for the 
full model. In line with the pseudo R2 measures presented above, the full model 
significantly outperforms the controls only model in terms of goodness of fit.  
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Table 6-2 Alternative Logit models for predicting firm ERA likelihood (ERA_BIN) 
 
Controls M1.2.2 M1.2.7 M1.3.8 M1.3.7  M1.4.2 M1.4.8 M1.5.1 M1.5.1i M1.5.5 M1.5.5i 
COMP_ACTi,t-2 0.00708**       
(0.003) 
COMP_ACTi,t-2 1.09036***      
(0.313) 
FIRM _EXPi,t-2 0.95226***      
(0.170) 
0.67491***      
(0.157) 
 0.37440*        
(0.180) 
FIRM _EXPi,t-2   (log)  1.69116***      
(0.224) 
 1.34611***      
(0.232)
 0.73805         
(0.967) 
FIRM_RESi,t-2 2.00761         
(1.800) 
0.43612         
(0.547) 
0.34199         
(0.467) 
FIRM_RESi,t-2  (log) 1.90857***      
(0.300) 
 1.52007***      
(0.403) 
 1.62265***      
(0.483) 
FIRM_EXP*FIRM_RESi,t-2  2.11837+       
(1.316) 
FIRM_EXP*FIRM_RESi,t-2 (log) -0.25939         
(0.369) 
Sizei, t-1  1.99777***      
(0.380) 
1.72179***      
(0.347) 
1.75744***      
(0.346) 
0.71070**       
(0.247) 
0.51879        
(0.322) 
2.31036***      
(0.443) 
2.85019***      
(0.395) 
1.11852***      
(0.308) 
1.25329***      
(0.297) 
1.45548***      
(0.397) 
 1.50869***      
(0.441) 
ROA i,t-1  -8.29641       
(6.336) 
-9.88227       
(6.269) 
 -10.50201       
(6.578) 
 -8.17893        
(5.432) 
-15.33286**       
(5.020) 
-2.50710         
(6.179) 
 2.17155         
(4.091) 
-10.70926**       
(3.923) 
-10.85423**       
(4.103) 
 -8.97450       
(6.053) 
-8.10964         
(6.653) 
ROE i,t-1  4.74169         
(3.818) 
5.47042       
(3.742) 
 5.74378        
(3.936) 
 3.81252         
(3.512) 
 6.97245**       
(2.650) 
2.82284         
(2.907) 
1.10902         
(1.998) 
 5.74648*        
(2.248) 
5.74591*        
(2.370) 
 4.86763        
(3.158) 
 4.55445        
(3.352) 
D-E i,t-1  -0.81215*        
(0.36)
-0.73204*        
(0.342)
 -0.75754*        
(0.346) 
-0.44843+        
(0.247)
-0.48883**       
(0.156) 
-0.67774*        
(0.287)
 -0.42802*        
(0.210) 
-0.67456**       
(0.210) 
-0.63677**       
(0.211) 
 -0.36522+        
(0.201) 
-0.36381+        
(0.197) 
Is US firm 0.16768         
(0.446) 
0.11242         
(0.454) 
 0.12336         
(0.466) 
 -0.10291         
(0.266) 
 0.27631         
(0.331) 
-0.12429         
(0.534) 
-1.28536**       
(0.427) 
-0.24319         
(0.359) 
-0.37766         
(0.364) 
 -0.80318*        
(0.406) 
-0.85408*        
(0.432)
Is Japanese firm -0.94573**       
(0.329) 
-1.06037**       
(0.384) 
-1.08328**       
(0.389) 
 -0.17857         
(0.236) 
 0.61916+        
(0.324) 
 -0.48753         
(0.425) 
-1.85832***      
(0.564) 
-0.34382       
(0.251) 
-0.52386*        
(0.263)
-0.65976        
(0.430) 
 -0.70644        
(0.459) 
Is European firm -0.16671         
(0.352) 
 -0.10283         
(0.407) 
-0.09047         
(0.421) 
-0.59577*        
(0.294)
-0.34855         
(0.313) 
 -1.04462**       
(0.346) 
-2.32558***      
(0.404) 
 -0.81030**       
(0.301) 
-0.95327**       
(0.326) 
 -1.55488**       
(0.480) 
-1.60333**       
(0.516) 
Constant  -5.62156***      
(1.307) 
-5.82843***      
(1.185) 
-10.12673***      
(1.805) 
-2.44977***      
(0.715) 
-0.83942         
(1.153) 
-7.17968***      
(1.741) 
-3.88322***      
(1.018) 
-3.26559**       
(1.044) 
-3.63911***      
(0.960) 
 -0.15255         
(0.811) 
-0.08178         
(0.781) 
Log Likelihood -236.5433 -222.2826 -218.8899 -174.4226 -120.5021 -230.2508 -203.1268 -187.8151 -185.5127 -114.0534
McFadden's Adj. R
2 
0.198 0.216 0.228 0.378 0.34 0.185 0.277 0.326 0.33 0.367 0.363
Cragg-Uhler R
2 
0.285 0.346 0.36 0.531 0.479 0.306 0.419 0.478 0.487 0.513 0.514
LR test: x
2 116.942***  145.463***  152.248***  241.183*** 151.134*** 126.304***  180.552***  211.176***  215.781*** 164.031 164.408
BIC 517.736 495.593 488.807 399.873 290.832 511.515 457.267 433.021 434.793 284.163 290.015




M1.6.1 M1.6.1.i M1.6.2 M1.6.2i M1.6.3 M1.6.3i 
COMP_ACTi,t-2 0.00333 (0.002)  0.00503+ (0.003) 
COMP_ACTi,t-2 (log)  0.41057+ (0.300) 0.40705+ (0.302)  0.42587  (0.262)  0.70710+ (0.362) 
FIRM_RESi,t-2 *FIRM_EXPi,t-2   0.04197***      (0.013)  0.08373**       (0.027) 
FIRM_RESi,t-2 *FIRM_EXPi,t-2  (log)  6.00640***      (1.537)  23.06058*       (10.535) 
FIRM_RESi,t-2*FIRM_EXPi,t-2  (log)  -0.70040***      (0.111)  -0.63504         (0.709) 
COMP_ACTi,t-2*FIRM_RESi,t-2*FIRM_EXPi,t-2  (log)  -3.25408+        (1.999) 
COMP_ACTi,t-2  *FIRM_RESi,t-2 *FIRM_EXPi,t-2  -0.00019+        (0.000) 
COMP_ACTi,t-2*FIRM_RESi,t-2 * FIRM_EXPi,t-2 (log)  -0.01309         (0.144) 
Size i,t-1   0.57694+        (0.336) 0.57616+        (0.335)  1.31028***      (0.259)  1.27077***      (0.254)  1.16934***      (0.245)  1.10639***      (0.241) 
Return on Assets (ROA)  i,t-1    -14.38749*        (5.660)  -14.44633**       (5.483) -13.78441***      (3.236)  -13.33556***      (3.293)  -10.78795*        (4.843) -10.26318*        (4.974)
Returns on Equity (ROE) i,t-1  6.67678*        (2.957)  6.72436*        (2.818)  7.01175***      (2.077)  6.40038**       (2.146)  5.18619+        (3.141)  4.51977       (3.142) 
Debt-to-Equity (D-E) i , t-1  -0.53045***      (0.153)  -0.53183***      (0.158) -0.67237***      (0.173)  -0.64321***      (0.176)  -0.45120*        (0.205)  -0.41922*        (0.212) 
Is US firm  0.44673         (0.358)  0.45665         (0.376) -0.46813         (0.368) -0.56644       (0.370) -0.58929+        (0.341)  -0.71843*        (0.350) 
Is European firm   0.83743*        (0.371)  0.83880*        (0.372) -0.5679+        (0.3)  -0.57585*        (0.291)  -0.78615**       (0.287) -0.80078**       (0.278) 
Is Japanese firm -0.33271         (0.316) -0.32819         (0.304) -1.16148***      (0.331)  -1.18741***      (0.331)  -1.26442***      (0.335) -1.29121***      (0.329) 
Constant  -3.08794       (1.947)  -3.07810        (1.951)  -4.04281***      (0.909) -4.13475***      (0.933)  -5.45613***      (1.613) -6.54633**       (2.001) 
Log Likelihood -123.1779 -123.1742 -185.5346 -183.2144 -170.6853 -168.9844
McFadden's Adj. R
2 0.321 0.316 0.334 0.338 0.384 0.387
Cragg-Uhler R
2 0.464 0.464 0.486 0.495 0.54 0.547
LR test: x
2 145.782*** 145.790***  215.737***  220.377*** 245.435*** 248.837*** 
BIC 302.412 308.633 428.46 430.196 398.761 401.736
Notes: 
 N = 592 across 37 firms
H3a: COMP_ACT*FIRM_EXP*FIRM_RES
Models have been estimated by taking into account intragroup correlation across panels (in STATA, through the cluster() option)
Standard errors in parentheses; significant at: 
+




Table 6-3 Alternative negative binomial regression models for predicting ERA intensity (ERA_COUNT) 
 
Controls M1.2.2 M1.2.7 M1.3.8 M1.3.7  M1.4.2 M1.4.8 
COMP_ACTi,t-2 0.00321***      
(0.001) 
COMP_ACTi,t-2 (log)  0.54539***      
(0.095) 
FIRM _EXPi,t-2  0.08718***      
(0.013) 
FIRM _EXPi,t-2  (log)  0.68863***      
(0.037) 
FIRM_RESi,t-2  1.55714+       
(1.076) 
FIRM_RESi,t-2 (log)  0.88172***      
(0.161) 
Size i,t-1  1.18472***      
(0.171) 
1.16093***      
(0.178) 
 1.16620***      
(0.176) 
0.60644***      
(0.129) 
 0.29740***      
(0.071) 
1.36242***      
(0.199) 
1.48820***      
(0.165) 
Return on Assets (ROA)  i,t-1    2.57583+        
(1.427) 
 0.26549         
(1.848) 
0.31562         
(1.849) 
 0.76676         
(0.908) 
 0.54761         
(0.522) 
1.93378        
(1.377) 
2.20621**       
(0.837) 
Returns on Equity (ROE) i,t-1  0.49275**       
(0.178) 
0.91272        
(0.606) 
 0.87178        
(0.585) 
 0.18845         
(0.206) 
0.17925+        
(0.105) 
0.48155         
(0.440) 
0.25920         
(0.272) 
Debt-to-Equity (D-E) i , t-1 -0.16907       
(0.126) 
-0.24258        
(0.154) 
 -0.25069+        
(0.152) 
-0.12597+        
(0.075)
 -0.03531         
(0.035) 
-0.19464        
(0.134) 
 -0.09949         
(0.090) 
Is US firm  0.33435        
(0.205) 
 0.50371*        
(0.196) 
0.50362*        
(0.196) 
 0.23089+        
(0.136) 
 0.24863***      
(0.067) 
 0.18790         
(0.257) 
 -0.39385+        
(0.215) 
Is Japanese firm 0.50591**       
(0.174) 
 0.54521**       
(0.175) 
 -0.11545         
(0.150) 
0.05633         
(0.122) 
 0.33064***      
(0.062) 
-0.16252         
(0.146) 
 -0.67384***      
(0.165) 
Is European firm 0.01243         
(0.130) 
0.54521**       
(0.175) 
0.54551**       
(0.175) 
 0.23393*        
(0.116) 
 0.12149+        
(0.071) 
0.26153         
(0.237) 
-0.33672         
(0.270)
Constant  -3.90739***      
(0.695) 
 -0.72564***      
(0.205) 
 -0.7759***      
(0.213) 
-1.72451***      
(0.482) 
-0.91841***      
(0.272) 
-4.61720***      
(0.835) 
-2.60024***      
(0.413) 
Log Likelihood -1936.326 -1506.709 -1498.212 -1430.15 -1236.373 -1518.104 -1472.781
LR test: x
2 325.466***  382.174***  399.169*** 535.293***  588.589*** 355.990***  446.636*** 
McFadden's Adj. R
2 0.091 0.107 0.112 0.152 0.186 0.099 0.126
Cragg-Uhler R
2 0.426 0.479 0.494 0.599 0.688 0.456 0.534










 H2b: FIRM_EXP*FIRM_RES  H3b: COMP_ACT*FIRM_EXP*FIRM_RES   
 M1.5.3  M1.5.3i  M1.5.5  M1.5.5i  M1.6.1  M1.6.1i  M1.6.4  M1.6.4i  
COMP_ACTi,t-2 
      
0.00181** 
(0.001) 
0.00392***      
(0.001) 
COMP_ACTi,t-2  (log) 
    
 0.15600**       
(0.054)  
 0.22141*        
(0.104)  
  FIRM_EXPi,t-2 0.08159***      
(0.012)  
0.07890***      
(0.018)  
      FIRM_RESi,t-2 0.87290+        
(0.545)  
 0.85242+        
(0.578)  
      FIRM _EXPi,t-2  (log) 
  
0.64926***      
(0.047)  
 0.10373         
(0.095)  
    FIRM_RESi,t-2 (log) 
  
 0.16193+       
(0.099)  
0.55619***      
(0.097)  
    FIRM_EXPi,t-2*FIRM_RESi,t-2 (log)  
   
-
0.24266***      
(0.042)  
 -
0.28193***      
(0.025)  
-0.38771**       
(0.129)  
  FIRM_EXPi,t-2*FIRM_RESi,t-2 
 
 0.01961         
(0.119)  
    
0.35249*** 
(0.065) 




     
 0.02071         
(0.026)  
  FIRM_EXPi,t-2*FIRM_RESi,t-2 *COMP_ACTi,t-2  
       
-
0.00350***      
(0.001) 
Sizei,t-1    
0.71469***      
(0.152)  
 
0.71914***      
(0.149)  
 
0.39847***      
(0.106)  
0.45606***      
(0.097)  
 0.26174*        
(0.129)  




1.00783***      
(0.126) 
Return on Assets (ROA) i,t-1     1.55488+        
(0.912)  
 1.55979+        
(0.899)  
 0.76767+        
(0.447)  
0.91824*        
(0.448)  
 0.02591         
(0.990)  




1.46293^        
(1.100) 
 








Returns on Equity (ROE) i,t-1  0.08741         
(0.200) 
 0.08371         
(0.199) 
 0.13325       
(0.095) 
 0.13288      
(0.082) 
 0.47015*        
(0.215) 




0.04213         
(0.309)
Debt-to-Equity (D-E) i , t-1 0.10276        
(0.074) 
 -0.10162        
(0.074) 
 -0.01889         
(0.032) 
-0.01173         
(0.034) 
-0.11862        
(0.073) 




-0.14084+        
(0.083)
Is US firm 0.10265         
(0.169) 
 0.09963         
(0.165) 
 0.11203         
(0.111) 
0.04767         
(0.094) 
0.55100***      
(0.120) 




0.24492^        
(0.153)
Is Japanese firm 0.09500         
(0.121) 
-0.09675         
(0.121) 
 0.01154         
(0.104) 
-0.12608         
(0.106) 
0.25987**       
(0.083) 




-0.11854         
(0.131)
Is European firm 0.13133         
(0.144) 
 0.12715         
(0.147) 
 0.19739+        
(0.114) 
0.07332         
(0.100) 
0.65863***      
(0.094) 




0.23111^        
(0.158)
Constant  -2.25254***      
(0.619) 
-2.26651***      
(0.603) 
-2.19756***      
(0.230) 
-2.29827***      
(0.220) 
 -1.59038*        
(0.618) 
-1.96009*        
(0.847)
-1.15412***      
(0.219) 
-1.18217***      
(0.206)
Log likelihood -1422.649 -1422.603 -1233.492 -1224.071 -1270.127 -1269.75 -1437.31 -1404.262
LR test: x
2  546.900***  546.992***  594.352***  613.194*** 521.081 521.835 517.578***  583.675*** 
McFadden Adj. R
2 0.155 0.154 0.187 0.192 0.163 0.163 0.146 0.165
Cragg-Uhler R
2 0.607 0.607 0.692 0.703 0.644 0.644 0.587 0.631
BIC 2915.443 2921.727 2535.497 2522.884 2608.769 2614.243 2944.764 2885.044
Notes: 
 N = 592 across 37 firms
Models have been estimated by taking into account intragroup correlation across panels (in STATA, through the cluster() option)
Standard errors in parentheses; significant at: 
+
 p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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(controls) and 0.387 (full model). Similarly for the Cragg-Uhler R
2
, I observe a 
significant increase on fit between the controls only model (0.285) and the full 
model (0.547). While I cannot comment on the magnitude of R
2 
observed, this 
significant increase in magnitude indicates that the explanatory variables of 
interest outperform the controls only model in terms of variance explained.  To 
further assess the goodness of fit of the models presented, I employ the Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC). The BIC measure is used to compare nested and non-
nested alternative models (Long, 1997: 110). Referring back to tables 6.2 and 6.3, 
the smaller the BIC value the better the fit with the data observed. In support with 
the other measures of fit, I observe a significantly lower value of models including 
the explanatory variables of interest compared to the controls only model. In terms 
of best fit, models M1.5.5 and M1.6.1 exhibit the lower BIC values. Furthermore, 
the log term models outperform their original counterparts. Comparing single term 
models, M1.3.7 is the best performing model indicating the strong explanatory 
power of firm ERA experience in predicting ERA likelihood.   
Let’s now consider the goodness of fit for the count models employed to predict 
ERA intensity.  I employ alternative negative binomial regression models
68
 to 
predict ERA intensity. Similar to the above, the count models employed here are 
estimated with maximum likelihood. As such, I use the same set of criteria to 
assess goodness of fit. As illustrated in tables 4 and 5, the LR test indicates that all 
alternative models explain a greater proportion of variance compared to the 
restricted model (constant only). In line with the LR test, both pseudo R
2
 measures 
illustrate a significant increase on variance explained by the full model compared 
                                                 
68 As a robustness check I have also estimated the Poisson version of the alternative models 
reported here. The Poisson models yield similar results in terms of the direction and the 
significance reported in the negative binomial regression models presented in Table 6.3. 
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to controls only model. The full model exhibits a McFaden Adj. R
2
 of 0.165 
compared to 0.091 to the controls only model. In terms of the Cragg-Uhler R
2
, the 
full model outperforms the controls only model by 0.2. When I introduce the 
independent variables separately, FIRM_EXP related models are the strongest 
performers on every measure of fit. In contrast, FIRM_RES models provide a 
marginal increase over the controls only model both in pseudo R
2
 measures and 
the BIC. Model M1.5.5i exhibits the smallest BIC with 2522.884 significantly 
outperforming the full model.    
I now discuss the overall fit of the GLS alternative models predicting strategic 
deviation. In contrast with the above, the GLS estimator is based on the linear 
regression model assumptions and as such the goodness of fit is assessed similarly 
to its OLS counterpart by referring to model’s R2. To account for intra-group 
correlation, I employ the cluster option implemented in STATA. Overall, the 
alternative models exhibit a higher R
2
 both within and between group (firm) 
observations compared to the controls only model ranging from 0.0946 to 0.5509. 
More specifically, the alternative models explain a large variance across firms but 
perform poorly in between firm observations. As illustrated in table 6.1, I observe 
a significant increase in between R
2 
of all alternative models over the controls only 
model. The full model performs similarly with models M1.3.2 and M1.5.1 but 
significantly outperforms the controls only model and other alternative models.     
   
6.3 Results on hypotheses predicting firm ERA likelihood 
Hypothesis H1a posits that COMP_ACT will positively affect the focal firm’s 
ERA likelihood. As illustrated in Table 6.2, COMP_ACT has a positive and highly 
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significant relationship with ERA likelihood in all alternative models tested (single 
term model: β = 0.007, p<0.05; log model: β = 1.093, p<0.001). Thus, H1a is 
supported. As it is illustrated in figure 6.1, higher levels of COMP_ACT are 
associated with higher levels of likelihood (predicted probability) of the focal firm 
to engage in ERA.  
 
Figure 6-1. Impact of COMP_ACT on firm ERA likelihood 
As illustrated by the confidence intervals (figure 6.1), the model predicting ERA 
likelihood given COMP_ACT performs better at higher values of predicting 
Pr(ERA_BIN=1). Furthermore, COMP_ACT has a stronger effect at lower levels 
of predicting ERA_BIN than at higher levels. Put it differently, an increase at 
COMP_ACT from 3.5 to 5 (log model) will increase the predicted probability by 
0.4. At higher levels of COMP_ACT, an increase of COMP_ACT from 5 to 6 will 
increase Pr(ERA_BIN) by 0.2.    
Hypothesis H2a posits that there is a positive relationship between firm’s prior 
ERA experience (FIRM_EXP) and its resource commitment (FIRM_RES). As 
illustrated in Table 6.2, both FIRM_EXP (β = 0.952; p<0.001) and FIRM_RES (β 
= 1.908; p<0.001) exhibit a highly significant and positive relationship with firm 
ERA likelihood. In the case of resource commitment however, only one of the 
models provides support. More specifically, when FIRM_RES is measured as the 
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firm’s R&D intensity lagged by two years (Model M1.4.2) the effect is positive 
but non-significant. In the log alternative model, the coefficient of FIRM_RES 
turns highly significant and as before positive (Model M1.4.8). One explanation 
for the non-significance of the single term model may be that R&D intensity takes 
very small values compared to the rest of the continuous variables included in the 
statistical model. By introducing the logged term, the assumed distribution of 
FIRM_RES better matches the distribution of the other variables in the model. 
Given the above, hypothesis H2a is supported both for FIRM_EXP and 
FIRM_RES. As above, figure 2 further illustrates the predicted probability of firm 
ERA likelihood given certain levels of FIRM_EXP and FIRM_RES.  
 
Figure 6-2. The impact of FIRM_EXP and FIRM_RES on firm ERA likelihood 
 
Figure 6.2 provides important insights to the above predicted relationship. In the 
case of FIRM_EXP, I observe a very strong effect for firms with no experience 
and firms that previously performed at least one ERA action. Overall, the change 
in the range of the predicted probability is relatively small as firms with zero ERA 
experience are very likely to engage in ERA (predicted probability changes from 
0.8 to 0.96). I observe a similar effect for the impact of resource commitment to 
firm ERA likelihood. In this case however, the effect of FIRM_RES is larger as 
the predicted probability changes from a minimum of 0.4 to 0.9. Given the above, 
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H2a is generally supported but figure 2 suggests a non-linear relationship between 
FIRM_EXP, FIRM_RES and firm ERA likelihood.  
To further investigate the above hypothesis, I test for potential interaction effects 
between FIRM_EXP and FIRM_RES. As it is illustrated in Table 6.2, alternative 
models suggest the existence of an interaction effect between FIRM_EXP and 
FIRM_RES as a) the interaction variable coefficient is significant (p<0.05), b) 
there is a (slight) increase on the pseudo R square value of the interaction model 
(BIC larger for the interaction effect model). Given however the nature of the 
dependent variable of interest, I take under consideration suggestions of Norton 
and colleagues (Norton et al., 2004)
69
 on interpreting interaction effects, and 
produce a graphical representation of the interaction effect across my sample 
(―true‖ interaction effect for every observation). Figure 6.3 illustrates the existence 
of an interaction effect between FIRM_RES and FIRM_EXP. As it is illustrated, 
the effect of FIRM_RES*FIRM_EXP is positive for firms with low ERA 
likelihood while it turns negative for firms with high ERA likelihood with an 
inflection point around 0.5 of the predicted probability. As illustrated in the right 
hand side graph of figure 6.3, for most of the observations in the sample, the 
interaction effect is not significant, especially for firms with high ERA likelihood, 
indicating a weak effect of the interaction term. 
                                                 
69 I use the inteff library developed by Norton and colleagues (2003) on STATA to 




Figure 6-3. Interaction effect of FIRM_EXP and FIRM_RES 
 
Hypothesis H3a posits that FIRM_EXP and FIRM_RES significantly moderate the 
impact of COMP_ACT to firm ERA likelihood. As illustrated above investigating 
interaction effects on non-linear models is a challenging exercise as the marginal 
effect of the interaction term depends on the effect of the other independent 
variables to the dependent variable (Long & Freese, 2006). More specifically, as 
illustrated in Table 6.2 (model M1.6.3), the interaction effect of interest is negative 
and significant while both single terms of COMP_ACT and 
FIRM_EXP*FIRM_RES are positive and significant. While this will be sufficient 
to conclude that a moderating effect exists, in non-linear models this is not a 
sufficient condition (Bowen & Wiersema, 2004). Following best practice, I first 
employ the Norton and colleagues (2004) estimation function to calculate the 
―true‖ interaction effect between FIRM_EXP*FIRM_RES and COMP_ACT 
across my sample (see footnote 74). Figure 6.4 illustrates the relationship between 
the interaction term and the predicted probability of the likelihood of firm 




Figure 6-4. Interaction effect of FIRM_EXP*FIRM_RES and COMP_ACT 
I observe a curvilinear moderating effect between the predicted probability and the 
interaction term with an inflection point around 0.7 and range between 0.1 and 0.9. 
For lower values of the predicted probability, the more negative the interaction 
effect the higher the likelihood of a firm engaging in ERA. As the predicted 
probability approaches 1, the interaction effect impact is reversed. Less negative 
values are associated with higher predicted probability of observing 
Pr(ERA_BIN)=1. Furthermore, figure 4 provides us with an important insight on 
the outliers of the predicted probability distribution. I observe that firms with very 
low and very high predicted ERA likelihood exhibit the lowest interaction effect.  
 
6.4 Results on hypotheses predicting firm ERA intensity 
H1b posits that COMP_ACT positively affects the focal firm’s ERA intensity. As 
illustrated in Table 6.3, COMP_ACT has a positive and significant impact on 
ERA_COUNT (β = 0.545; p<0.001) thus providing support for H1b. As both 
Poisson and negative binomial estimators are based on Maximum Likelihood 
(Long, 1997), I provide a graphical representation of the hypothesized relationship 
to assist interpretation. In contrast with the ERA likelihood graphs presented in 
section 3, I plot the predicted probability of observing zero ERA intensity given 
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variables of interest. In light of consistency, the plotted graphs must be interpreted 
as predicting the opposite effect of the one hypothesized.  
 
Figure 6-5. Impact of COMP_ACT to firm ERA intensity 
 
As illustrated in Figure 6.5, the higher the value of COMP_ACT the lower the 
probability of observing zero ERA intensity. To disentangle this effect further, I 
plot the impact of COMP_ACT to ERA intensity for low ERA counts (0-9). As it 
is illustrated from the right hand side graph in figure 6.5, for zero, one, two, and 
three predicted ERA intensity (counts predicted) the higher the COMP_ACT (± 
one standard deviation around COMP_ACT mean)the higher the probability of 
observing a higher ERA count (intensity). However, for higher ERA counts (4 and 
above) I observe a reversed effect around COMP_ACT mean. While alternative 
statistical models tested suggest an overall positive and significant impact of 
COMP_ACT to ERA intensity such impact significantly decreases for higher 
predicted values of ERA intensity. I disentangle this effect further in section 6.5 
where I discuss the magnitude (marginal effects) of the independent variables of 
interest and their relationship to ERA likelihood and intensity. Taking the above 
under consideration, H1b is supported.  
H2b posits that firm ERA experience and resource commitment are positively 
related with ERA intensity. As illustrated in Table 6.3, I found a positive and 
178 
 
significant relationship of FIRM_EXP (β = 0.688; p < 0.001) and FIRM_RES (β = 




Figure 6-6. Impact of FIRM_EXP and FIRM_RES to ERA intensity 
 
Figure 6.6 illustrates the positive relationship between FIRM_EXP, FIRM_RES 
and ERA intensity. The higher the FIRM_EXP and FIRM_RES the lower the 
predicted probability of observing zero ERA intensity. The effect is stronger for 
firms exhibiting low levels of FIRM_EXP and FIRM_RES while turning zero for 
very large values of FIRM_EXP and FIRM_RES. I investigate further hypothesis 
H2b by testing for an interaction effect between FIRM_EXP and FIRM_RES. As 
illustrated in Table 6.3, I observe a significant moderating effect of 
FIRM_EXP*FIRM_RES. Such moderating effect suggests that while taken 
individually FIRM_EXP and FIRM_RES are positively related with ERA 
intensity, their interaction is negatively associated with ERA intensity. This 
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finding suggests a competing effect of FIRM_EXP and FIRM_RES when 
predicting ERA intensity.  
H3b posits a moderating effect of firm propensity factors (FIRM_EXP and 
FIRM_RES) between COMP_ACT and ERA intensity. Taking together, models 
M1.6.3 and M1.6.3i suggest the existence of a significant moderating effect 
providing support for hypothesis H3b. The interaction term of 
FIRM_EXP*FIRM_RES and COMP_ACT, introduced in model M1.6.3i, is 
significant and negative while the single terms remain significant and positive 
suggesting the existence of a moderating effect. The moderating effect presented 
in model M1.6.3i is supported by investigating the marginal effect of the 
interaction term across the sample (both factor and marginal change).  
 
6.5 Marginal effects  
In sections 6.3 and 6.4, I have presented results on hypotheses concerned with 
predicting firm ERA activity (H1-H3). The above results provide overall support 
for my hypothesized relationships in terms of direction. It is also important to gain 
a more in-depth understanding on the magnitude of the effects observed. In doing 
so, one can compare the predictive power of the independent variables to the 
dependent variables of interest. Scholars concerned with empirically investigating 
strategic behaviour, rarely discuss marginal effects in their empirical analysis. 
Following recent critiques on the application of nonlinear models to understand 
strategic choice (Wiersema & Bowen, 2009), I briefly discuss the magnitude 
(marginal effects) of the hypothesized relationships predicting firm ERA activity. 
Table 6.4 summarizes the marginal effects of the three main variables of interest, 
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COMP_ACT, FIRM_RES and FIRM_EXP, and their interaction, to firm ERA 
likelihood and intensity.  
Let’s first investigate the marginal effects of COMP_ACT, FIRM_EXP and 
FIRM_RES independently for ERA likelihood and intensity. In terms of predicting 
firm ERA likelihood, FIRM_RES exhibits the strongest marginal effect with 
0.1749 compared to COMP_ACT and FIRM_EXP with 0.1232 and 0.0554 
respectively. More importantly, when all three values are introduced to the full 
model, the combined marginal effect of FIRM_EXP and FIRM_RES significantly 
outperforms that of COMP_ACT. This observation illustrates that 
FIRM_RES*FIRM_EXP is much stronger predictor of firm ERA likelihood than 
COMP_ACT.  
In terms of predicting ERA intensity, I overall observe the same patterns on the 
marginal effects of explanatory variables. In this case however, individual 
marginal effects of COMP_ACT, FIRM_EXP and FIRM_RES are stronger. 
FIRM_RES has the strongest marginal effect with 8.3028 compared to 
COMP_ACT and FIRM_RES with 0.0137 and 0.3615 respectively. Again, when 
COMP_ACT and FIRM_RES*FIRM_EXP (firm propensity) are introduced in the 
full model, firm propensity strongly outperforms COMP_ACT. The marginal 
effects observed in the full model, illustrate the existence of a strong moderating 
effect of firm propensity to the relationship of COMP_ACT and firm ERA 
intensity. More specifically, the marginal effect of the interaction term 
COMP_ACT*FIRM_EXP*FIRM_RES is almost equal with the marginal effect of 
COMP_ACT. Taken together, these marginal effects illustrate that firm propensity 
is a much stronger predictor of firm ERA intensity than competitors’ ERA activity. 
As such I would expect firms with high ERA propensity to engage in ERA with a 
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high intensity irrespective its competitors’ actions. However, the marginal and 
factor change of the propensity term suggests that there is a large variation of the 
marginal effect of firm propensity around its mean. Put it differently, firms with 
varying degrees of ERA propensity will respond very differently when engaging in 
ERA. 
Table 6-4. Marginal and factor change of variables predicting firm ERA 
likelihood and intensity 
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 FIRM_EXP 0.0483 0.0059  




                                                 
70 Values have been extracted from model M1.5.1i by running the SPost prchange command 





 (Hypothesis H3a)  








Predicting ERA intensity (effects reported from negative binomial regression 
















1.8218  (2.1871) 8.3028 
(3.6470) 
1.5128 (1.6867) 
Firm propensity model 
FIRM_EXP 0.5462 0.4882 1.1230 
FIRM_RES 1.4389 2.6179 1.3560 
FIRM_EXP*FIRM
_RES 
-2.8411 -1.1421 - 0.5517 
FULL MODEL (Hypothesis H3b) 
COMP_ACT 1.6114 2.5179 1.9098 
FIRM_EXP*FIRM
_RES 




-21.3290 -2.4191 -0.5371 
6.6 ERA and strategic choice: predicting strategic deviation 
I have illustrated above how competitors’ ERA activity, firm ERA experience and 
its resource commitment are associated with the likelihood and intensity of 
engaging in ERA actions. My empirical analysis so far provides statistical support 
for the hypotheses proposed in chapter 4 and my conceptual framework. In this 
section, I provide empirical results for hypotheses H4 and H5 which connect the 
strategic deviation concept, as a proxy of strategic similarity, to the independent 
variables of interest. While so far I have illustrated how and in what magnitude 
                                                 
71 Values have been extracted from model M1.6.3i by running the SPost prchange command 
(Long & Freese, 2006) in STATA.  
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COMP_ACT, FIRM_EXP and FIRM_RES, and their interaction, predict firm 
ERA activity, the empirical analysis presented in this section provide further 
insights for the competitive behaviour of my sample firms in the context of ERA.  
Hypotheses H4 and H5 predict the relationship between COMP_ACT, FIRM_RES 
and FIRM_EXP and strategic deviation (STRAT_DEV). The STRAT_DEV 
measure empirically captures the relevant distance of a firm’s strategy compared 
with the sample mean. Briefly, I focus on two relevant strategic dimensions; R&D-
oriented ERA and market-oriented ERA (see section 5.5.2 for a rationale for 
choosing these strategic dimensions). Across these two dimensions, I calculate the 
STRAT_DEV measure for firm i at time t. Figure 6.7 illustrates the time trend for 
the two strategic dimensions that the STRAT_DEV measure calculation is based. 
In total, firms in the sample engage in more R&D-oriented ERA actions than 
market-oriented ERA actions. The time trend illustrated in figure 6.7 suggests that 
firm ERA behaviour changes over time. More specifically, between 1991 and 
2006, firms focus more on R&D related ERA actions rather than marketing related 
ERA actions, as RND_ERA mean is almost two times larger than MKT_ERA 
mean. Looking closely at the sample, this observation supports the industrial 
model that large biopharmaceuticals firms were faced with resource constraints 
after the emergence of the biotechnology paradigm. Going back to figure 6.7, I 
observe two convergent points in 1995 (0.28 v 0.40) and 2005 (0.40 v 0.51) where 
RND_ERA and MKT_ERA proportional means almost equate. In the discussion 
chapter, I provide a detailed discussion on additional empirical analysis that I have 
carried out to investigate this important trend of firm ERA behaviour in relation to 




Figure 6-7.  Proportional sample mean trend line of RND v MKT ERA 
 
Figure 6-8. Strategic Deviation scatter plot for sample firms 
 
Figure 8 illustrates strategic deviation of firm i at time t compared with the rest of 
the sample population and the sample mean. I analytically observe a similar 
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pattern for most of the observations in the sample. More specifically, firms exhibit 
the same proportion of agreements across the two strategic dimensions of 
MKT_ERA and RND_ERA.  
As I have illustrated in the previous chapter, I operationalize STRAT_DEV as a 
continuous variable. I employ two set of statistical estimations to predict 
STRAT_DEV. I start with the OLS estimator as the base line as it is the most 
applied estimator of panel data in strategy research. I then provide a Generalized 
Least Square (GLS) estimator to account for any violations of the general linear 
model assumptions that my panel data may be sensitive to (refer to section 5.6.3 
for a complete rationale on this). I first discuss the results on hypotheses proposed 
above based on the GLS estimation models.  
As illustrated in Table 6.1, STRAT_DEV takes continuous values between 0.258 
and 4.659 with a mean of 1.625 and a standard deviation 0.975. Recall that 
STRAT_DEV captures the strategic distance across a set of strategies for my 
sample firms. The lower the value of STRAT_DEV the smaller the firm’s strategic 
distance compare to the sample mean at a particular point in time. In contrast, the 
higher the STRAT_DEV the more differentiated the firm from the sample mean 
across a set of strategies. Going back to Table 6.1, I observe a negative correlation 
between STRAT_DEV and ERA likelihood and ERA intensity (dependent 
variables in the above section).  
Tables 6.5 (single term) and 6.6 (log term) illustrates the alternative GLS models 
for predicting STRAT_DEV. In the first model, I introduce only the control 
variables. The model suggests that Return on Equity (ROE) is negatively 
associated with STRAT_DEV (β = -0.36932; p < 0.05). This result suggests that 
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firms with poor financial performance will exhibit a lower STRAT_DEV, and thus 
conforming towards their competitors. However, when independent variables of 
interest are introduced in later models ROE turns insignificant. In addition, the 
controls only model illustrates a strong and negative relationship between 
European firms (Is European) and STRAT_DEV (β = -0.42245; p < 0.001). This 
effect is consistent across all alternative models. 
As above, I proceed with my statistical analysis by introducing each variable to a 
separate model and then provide a full model by including all variables.  Model 
M1.2.2 illustrates a non-significant and very weak relationship between 
COMP_ACT and STRAT_DEV. In turn, Model M1.3.2 reveals a highly 
significant and negative relationship between FIRM_EXP and STRAT_DEV (β = 
-0.4557; p < 0.001).  This finding suggests that firms with higher levels of 
FIRM_EXP will exhibit lower levels of STRAT_DEV. In terms of FIRM_RES, 
Model M1.4.2 provides no support for a significant relationship with 
STRAT_DEV. In the log term version (M1.4.8), however, the relationship above 
turns significant (β = -0.25332; p < 0.01). This alternative model suggests a 






Table. 6-5. Alternative GLS estimation SINGLE TERM fixed effects models for predicting strategic deviation (STRAT_DEV) 
. . . . .
Coef Std. Err Coef Std. Err Coef Std. Err Coef Std. Err Coef Std. Err Coef Std. Err Coef Std. Err
COMP_ACTi,t-2 -0.00126** 0 -0.00068+ 0 -0.00061 0
FIRM_EXP i,t-2 -0.03876*** -0.008 -0.03902*** -0.008 -0.03844** -0.013
FIRM_RES i,t-2 0.11123 -0.231 0.18472 -0.226 0.18651 -0.229
FIRM_EXPi,t-2*FIRM_RESi,t-2 -0.00422 -0.074 -0.14325** -0.05 -0.06352 -0.16
FIRM_EXPi,t-2*FIRM_RESi,t-2 *COMP_ACTi,t-2 -0.00029 -0.001
Size i,t-1  0.84948*** -0.206 0.72095*** -0.174 0.52160** -0.176 0.73607*** -0.178 0.73831*** -0.182 0.85479*** -0.205 0.86606*** -0.206
Return on Assets (ROA)  i,t-1   -0.96441 -0.846 -0.91584 -0.834 -1.14882 -0.916 -0.94636 -0.898 -0.94312 -0.901 -1.12155+ -0.873 -1.13102^ -0.874
Returns on Equity (ROE) i,t-1 -0.15478 -0.343 -0.16561 -0.339 -0.13528 -0.347 -0.15733 -0.34 -0.15767 -0.34 -0.14278 -0.342 -0.16177 -0.344
Debt-to-Equity (D-E) i , t-1 0.06356 -0.067 0.05956 -0.066 0.05803 -0.068 0.05927 -0.067 0.05933 -0.067 0.05708 -0.067 0.05894 -0.067
Constant -1.62564* -0.811 -1.12450^ -0.71 -0.50332 -0.744 -1.21301^ -0.742 -1.22278^ -0.763 -1.63348* -0.811 -1.70147* -0.822
Overall R
2
0.037 0.064 0.024 0.066 0.066 0.052 0.053
N = 592 across 37 firms; Observations per group: min=13; avg.=15.9;max=16
Significant at: 
+
 p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Country Dummies (Boolean) dropped 
M1.6.4i
Notes:









Coef Std. Err Coef Std. Err Coef Std. Err Coef Std. Err Coef Std. Err Coef Std. Err Coef Std. Err
COMP_ACTi,t-2 -0.18064** 0.063 -0.29765** 0.091 -0.05986 0.114
FIRM_EXP i,t-2 -0.27717*** 0.06 -0.22481*** 0.056 -0.52672** 0.2
FIRM_RES i,t-2 -0.18012^ 0.132 -0.14057 0.159 0.03006 0.192
FIRM_EXPi,t-2*FIRM_RESi,t-2 -0.13319^ 0.085 0.02481 0.03 -0.43589** 0.138
FIRM_EXPi,t-2*FIRM_RESi,t-2 *COMP_ACTi,t-2 0.09262*** 0.027
Size i,t-1  0.83015*** 0.203 0.53596* 0.245 0.49634** 0.173 0.70981** 0.22 0.82010*** 0.231 0.94218*** 0.241 0.82602*** 0.241
Return on Assets (ROA)  i,t-1   -0.9614 0.846 0.11985 1.01 -1.50434+ 0.9 -0.04525 0.972 0.1604 0.979 -0.11566 0.95 -0.13944 0.939
Returns on Equity (ROE) i,t-1 -0.13477 0.343 -0.20281 0.339 -0.1049 0.347 -0.21935 0.341 -0.23155 0.34 -0.21673 0.34 -0.24999 0.336
Debt-to-Equity (D-E) i , t-1 0.06687 0.067 0.05403 0.074 0.04917 0.068 0.08925^ 0.07 0.0854 0.069 0.12993+ 0.07 0.13710* 0.07
Constant -0.8756 0.721 -0.44243 1.047 -0.73368 0.755 -1.52494^ 0.971 -1.60189+ 0.971 -0.94848 0.901 -1.59577+ 0.911
Overall R
2
0.037 0.055 0.027 0.055 0.06 0.06 0.083
Significant at: 
+
 p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Country Dummies (Boolean) dropped 
M1.6.1i
Notes:
N = 592 across 37 firms; Observations per group: min=13; avg.=15.9;max=16
M1.2.7 M1.3.6 M1.4.8 M1.5.5 M1.5.5i M1.6.1
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Table 6-7. Alternative GLS estimation SINGLE TERM random effects models for predicting strategic deviation (STRAT_DEV) 
 
Notes: 
N=592 across 37 firms; Observations per group: min=13; avg.=15.9; max=16 















COMP_ACTi,t-2 -0.00003 0.001 0.00078+ 0.001 0.00064 0.001
FIRM_EXP i,t-2  -0.04557*** 0.01 -0.04476*** 0.008
-
0.05365*** 0.015
FIRM_RES i,t-2 -0.17828 0.203 -0.08126 0.154 -0.10955 0.148
FIRM_EXPi,t-2*FIRM_RESi,t-2 0.06505 0.076 -0.21317*** 0.059 -0.31644* 0.158
FIRM_EXPi,t-2*FIRM_RESi,t-2 *COMP_ACTi,t-2 0.00039 0.001
Size i,t-1  -0.14837 0.119 0.02318 0.11 -0.16279 0.13 0.00951 0.119 0.01722 0.118 -0.11544 0.107 -0.1124 0.108
Return on Assets (ROA)  i,t-1   -0.19846 0.593 -0.07967 0.53 -0.79468 0.68 -0.4808 0.658 -0.52547 0.66 -0.50803 0.59 -0.52663 0.599
Returns on Equity (ROE) i,t-1 -0.38956* 0.181 -0.28479* 0.14 -0.31064+ 0.181 -0.23529 0.143 -0.23028 0.144 -0.26764 0.168 -0.22861 0.17
Debt-to-Equity (D-E) i , t-1 0.04328 0.08 0.0168 0.07 0.02991 0.082 0.00866 0.069 0.0121 0.069 0.01575 0.071 0.01265 0.071
Is US firm -0.02944 0.142 0.08139 0.11 0.00934 0.14 0.10134 0.12 0.09201 0.124 0.11323 0.135 0.12118 0.126
Is Japanese firm -0.40774*** 0.123 -0.28909** 0.09 -0.38098** 0.121 -0.27543** 0.093 -0.28907** 0.093 -0.24542* 0.12 -0.23779* 0.114
Is European firm -0.02219 0.153 -0.02868 0.15 -0.02836 0.154 -0.03501 0.152 -0.04247 0.153 -0.00468 0.152 -0.00417 0.152
Constant 2.45703*** 0.446 1.88608*** 0.4 2.56341*** 0.48 1.97319*** 0.426 1.95332*** 0.42 2.23149*** 0.388 2.24654*** 0.396
R
2  
(within) 0.0005 0.0344 0.0012 0.0352 0.0352 0.0149 0.0146
R
2 
(between) 0.3164 0.5641 0.351 0.5687 0.5687 0.5459 0.5509
R
2 
(overall) 0.0994 0.199 0.1108 0.2021 0.2021 0.1794 0.5509
Wald chi square 54.67***  102.31*** 46.66*** 112.73*** 112.73***  130.96***  133.57***





Table 6-8 Random effects GLS estimation LOG TERM models for predicting strategic deviation (STRAT_DEV) 
 
Notes: 
N=592 across 37 firms; Observations per group: min=13; avg.=15.9; max=16 

















COMP_ACTi,t-2 -0.01386 0.082 0.06554 0.083 0.30670*** 0.079
FIRM_EXP i,t-2 -0.29752*** 0.039 -0.27907*** 0.05 -0.26828+ 0.163
FIRM_RES i,t-2 -0.25332* 0.109 -0.08025 0.135 -0.08502 0.131
FIRM_EXPi,t-2*FIRM_RESi,t-2 0.00432 0.076 0.13510*** 0.022 -0.44127*** 0.101
0.11340*** 0.02
Size i,t-1  -0.12881 0.116 -0.03457 0.12 -0.21425+ 0.123 -0.06939 0.149 -0.06807 0.142 -0.0396 0.124 -0.02071 0.119
Return on Assets (ROA)  i,t-1   -0.2311 0.591 0.78464 0.667 -1.01396 0.744 0.61596 0.773 0.60054 0.758 0.88433 0.645 0.84843 0.654
Returns on Equity (ROE) i,t-1 -0.37963* 0.178 -0.34693* 0.153 -0.26091 0.176 -0.32711* 0.157 -0.32618* 0.155 -0.37684* 0.149 -0.41415** 0.156
Debt-to-Equity (D-E) i , t-1 0.04164 0.08 0.03112 0.067 0.00787 0.08 0.02539 0.067 0.02583 0.067 0.05195 0.073 0.07105 0.065
Is US firm -0.03512 0.144 0.12229 0.105 0.20511 0.137 0.1858 0.168 0.18668 0.159 0.05843 0.117 -0.01707 0.113
Is Japanese firm -0.41925*** 0.124 -0.22593* 0.09 -0.18411 0.141 -0.1653 0.154 -0.16602 0.146 -0.29608*** 0.09 -0.34752*** 0.089
Is European firm -0.02387 0.154 -0.01419 0.196 0.1273 0.168 0.04114 0.214 0.04263 0.209 -0.06942 0.192 -0.12481 0.193
Constant 2.44957*** 0.584 2.10490*** 0.431 2.05591*** 0.469 2.01630*** 0.408 1.99863*** 0.444 1.79237** 0.629 0.58709 0.564
R
2  
(within) 0.001 0.0275 0.0026 0.0271 0.0271 0.0175 0.0475
R
2 
(between) 0.3006 0.6652 0.4482 0.6626 0.6616 0.6536 0.6491
R
2 
(overall) 0.0956 0.2204 0.1408 0.2208 0.2207 0.2119 0.2359
Wald chi square 53.29***  189.30***  59.48*** 180.96*** 181.17  175.85*** 172.35***
 M1.6.1i
FIRM_EXPi,t-2*FIRM_RESi,t-2 *COMP_ACTi,t-2 





Table 6-9 Robustness check - OLS alternative models for predicting strategic deviation 
 
coeff. Std. Err coeff. Std. Err coeff. std. err coeff. std. err coeff. std. err coeff. std. err coeff. std. err coeff. std. err
COMP_ACT (t-2) 0.00034 0.001 0.00127** 0.001 0.00101+ 0.001
FIRM_EXP(t-2) -0.05441*** -0.009 -0.05174*** -0.009 -0.05931*** -0.016
FIRM_RES(t-2) -0.58626* -0.274 -0.27956+ -0.201 -0.31391+ -0.197
FIRM_EXP(t-2)*FIRM_RES(t-2) 0.05355 -0.077 -0.28028*** 0.054 -0.44141** 0.159
FIRM_EXP(t-2)*FIRM_RES(t-2)*COMP_ACT(t-2) 0.00063 0.001
SIZE(t-1) -0.42496** -0.129 -0.43548** 0.133 -0.12841 -0.127 -0.48136*** -0.133 -0.17031 -0.137 -0.1644 -0.139 -0.29682* 0.119 -0.29363* 0.121
ROA(t-1) 1.26807 -0.916 1.23834 0.902 0.72038 -0.616 -0.16512 -0.854 -0.02829 -0.736 -0.0312 -0.737 0.18227 0.682 0.10574 0.669
ROE(t-1) -0.78878* -0.308 -0.77599* 0.303 -0.28284 -0.189 -0.53766* -0.25 -0.17296 -0.165 -0.17307 -0.162 -0.27053 0.233 -0.18650 0.206
D-E(t-1) 0.1204 -0.101 0.12330 0.101 0.02853 -0.071 0.08087 -0.1 0.01223 -0.073 0.01627 -0.072 0.02773 0.077 0.02113 0.075
IS_AMERICAN 0.04755 -0.127 0.05243 0.131 0.14572 -0.102 0.15905 -0.128 0.19636+ -0.107 0.19094+ -0.109 0.20348+ 0.113 0.21152+ 0.108
IS_EUROPEAN -0.26024* -0.113 -0.25385* 0.115 -0.16696+ -0.086 -0.17353 -0.123 -0.12916 -0.096 -0.1386 -0.099 -0.09096 0.112 -0.08381 0.109
IS_ASIAN 0.0331 -0.151 0.03491 0.151 0.00892 -0.148 0.03162 -0.156 0.00696 -0.15 0.00273 -0.151 0.03979 0.149 0.03931 0.149
Constant 3.36378*** -0.475 3.33368*** 0.469 2.40178*** -0.436 3.72538*** -0.495 2.63006*** -0.49 2.61316*** -0.494 2.76524*** 0.408 2.80415*** 0.412
R square 0.1204 0.1214 0.2098 0.1375 0.2143 0.2151 0.1915 0.1935
N=592; significance levels at ***p<0.001, **p<0.05, *p<0.1; +p<0.10
coeff. std. err coeff. std. err coeff. std. err coeff. std. err coeff. std. err coeff. std. err coeff. std. err
COMP_ACT (t-2) 0.04031 -0.09 0.14386+ -0.081 0.38525*** -0.07
FIRM_EXP (avg 2 lags) -0.36469*** -0.039 -0.34429*** -0.062 0.2055+ -0.163
FIRM_RES (avg 2 lags) -0.37780*** -0.092 -0.0749 -0.148 -0.13688 -0.146
FIRM_EXP (avg 2 lags)*FIRM_RES (avg 2 lags) 0.05447 -0.072 0.17876*** -0.022 -0.39163*** -0.1
FIRM_EXP (avg 2 lags)*FIRM_RES (avg 2 lags)*COMP_ACT (t-2) 0.11276*** -0.02
SIZE(t-1) -0.43273** -0.132 -0.08579 -0.137 -0.50729*** -0.134 -0.1287 -0.197 -0.13942 -0.193 -0.02314 -0.139 0.00804 -0.138
ROA(t-1) 1.24503 -0.905 1.39886+ -0.701 -0.38976 -0.822 1.22033 -0.787 1.17343 -0.773 1.70192* -0.671 1.76569* -0.686
ROE(t-1) -0.78222* -0.304 -0.36159+ -0.18 -0.37571+ -0.218 -0.33014+ -0.181 -0.33032+ -0.175 -0.44362* -0.168 -0.49976* -0.187
D-E(t-1) 0.12236 -0.101 0.02257 -0.069 0.02096 -0.089 0.01369 -0.068 0.01528 -0.068 0.05644 -0.071 0.07301 -0.068
IS_AMERICAN 0.05116 -0.131 0.16176+ -0.092 0.38447*** -0.104 0.22217 -0.153 0.24656+ -0.145 0.07864 -0.103 0.003 -0.101
IS_EUROPEAN -0.25565* -0.116 -0.13865 -0.087 0.06959 -0.153 -0.07881 -0.173 -0.06041 -0.166 -0.24622** -0.084 -0.29852** -0.084
IS_ASIAN 0.03403 -0.151 0.00232 -0.195 0.24207 -0.178 0.0538 -0.226 0.07864 -0.224 -0.0735 -0.189 -0.1274 -0.19
Constant 3.18608*** -0.578 2.29677*** -0.473 2.76627*** -0.4 2.25584*** -0.434 2.13338*** -0.462 1.32401* -0.613 0.07174 -0.564
R square 0.1211 0.2246 0.1611 0.2255 0.2264 0.2169 0.2423
N=592; significance levels at ***p<0.001, **p<0.05, *p<0.1; +p<0.10
FULL MODEL(M1.6.4) FULL MODEL(M1.6.4i)
OLS estimation LOG TERM models for predicting strategic deviation (with cluster option)
FIRM_RES(M1.4.8) FIRM_PROP(M1.5.5) FIRM_PROP(M1.5.5i)COMP_ACT(M1.2.7) FIRM_EXP(M1.3.7)
FIRM_PROP(M1.5.1) FIRM_PROP(M1.5.1i)
FULL MODEL(M1.6.1) FULL MODEL(M1.6.1i)
controls only COMP_ACT(M1.2.2) FIRM_EXP(M1.3.2) FIRM_RES(M1.4.2)
OLS estimation SINGLE TERM models for predicting strategic deviation (with cluster option)
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In relation to hypotheses H4 and H5 of predicting STRAT_DEV, full model 
M1.6.4 suggests that COM_ACT exhibits a positive and significant relationship 
with STRAT_DEV (β = 0.00078; p < 0.10) while the interaction term 
FIRM_EXP*FIRM_RES, describing firm ERA propensity, is significantly and 
negatively associated with STRAT_DEV (β = -0.21317; p < 0.001). These 
statistical findings, taken together, suggest that firms faced with high levels of 
COM_ACT will exhibit a higher tendency to strategically differentiate while 
higher FIRM_EXP and FIRM_RES (as firm-specific propensity factors to engage 
in ERA) are negatively associated with STRAT_DEV and thus leading to 
conformity. In addition, model M1.6.4i illustrates that there is no significant 
interaction of competitors’ ERA activity and firm propensity predicting 
STRAT_DEV.  
 
6.7 The significant effect of firm size in predicting firm ERA activity 
 
The specified models presented above illustrate several important effects that have 
not being covered above as they are not directly part of my conceptual framework. 
Consistently across the econometric alternative models employed, I found firm 
size to be a significant predictor of firm ERA activity (ERA_BIN and 
ERA_COUNT). Scholars in the strategy literature have consistently highlighted 
the important effect of firm size on organizational action. I add to this discussion 
by briefly discussing the effect of firm size in predicting firm ERA activity.  
Let’s first consider the significant effect of firm size when predicting ERA 
likelihood and ERA intensity. As illustrated from the estimated alternative models, 
firm size has a highly significant and positive relationship with both ERA 
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likelihood and intensity. More specifically, larger firms in the sample will exhibit a 
higher probability engaging in ERA than smaller firms for the same level of 





Figure 6-1 The effect of firm size on ERA likelihood 
 
In terms of FIRM_RES, larger firms have a higher probability of engaging on 
ERA than smaller firms in line with varying levels of COMP_ACT and 
FIRM_EXP. However, middle size firms with smaller FIRM_RES will exhibit a 
higher increase on their respective ERA likelihood that small or large firms. I 
observe a similar effect of firm size when predicting ERA intensity. For example 
as illustrated in figure 10, smaller firms are more likely to exhibit a lower 




Figure 6-2 the effect of firm size on ERA intensity 
 
The effect of firm size however turns insignificant when predicting strategic 
deviation (table 6.5). In contrast with firm size, past financial performance (3 
control variables) has an inconsistent and insignificant effect across alternative 
models tested. If I consider the controls only models, I observe a positive and 
significant relationship between firm past financial performance (only for the ROA 
measure) and ERA likelihood and intensity.  
 
6.8 Sensitivity analysis 
The statistical analysis presented above provide overall empirical support for my 
hypothesized relationships and my conceptual framework. To increase the validity 
of my empirical analysis, I have three additional steps. First, I have employed a 
series of alternative econometric models to check the robustness of my empirical 
results. As I have discussed in section 5.6, my panel data design offers several 
strengths but also provides the researcher with several empirical challenges. Two 
of such challenges for example are unobserved heterogeneity and measurement 
error (e.g., Echambadi et al., 2006). As a robustness check to the alternative 
econometric models presented above, I have employed a series of additional 
models. In the case of predicting firm ERA activity (H1-H3), I have employed 
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both fixed- and random- effects Logit and negative binomial regression models. 
As illustrated in Table 6.10, alternative panel models provide consistent results (in 
terms of direction and significance), with the VCE cluster models presented above 
(Tables 6.2 and 6.3).  








ES single term / 





single term / interaction 
term  model 
Panel Logit alternative models (xtlogit)  
FE      (inverted 
significance)/  
RE     /  (full support) 
Panel negative binomial regression alternative models (xtnbreg)  
FE    / / 
RE    / / 
 
Furthermore, I test for reverse causality between my dependent and independent 
variables of interest by introducing the lagged term of the dependent variable in 
the models employed above. My estimations suggest that there is no evidence of 
reverse causality when estimating ERA_BIN, ERA_COUNT and STRAT_DEV 
(all alternative models). In terms of measurement error, single and log terms 
employed above yield similar estimates both in terms of direction and significance.  
Following Long and Freese (2006), I estimate the Cook’s statistic to identify 
influential residuals (outlier cases) that may affect that robustness of my estimated 
models. Cook’s statistic captures the effect of an ith observation when removed 
from the calculation of the estimated coefficient vector β (hat) (Long and Freese, 




Figure 6-3. Cook's statistic for full specification Logit model 
 
To account for outlier cases (figure 6.3 provides an example), I remove 
observations with high levels of cook’s distance compare to the sample, and re-
estimate the alternative models presented above. The outlier cases identified do not 
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This dissertation asks “What is the role of firm strategy in ERA?‖ In answering 
this overarching question, I set out to identify conditions that are associated with 
patterns of competing firms’ behaviour when engaging in the acquisition of 
external resources. In doing so, I define External Resource Acquisition (henceforth 
ERA) as the strategic action to acquire external resources. By external resources, I 
refer to critical resources, that is ―those factors that enable the firm to participate in 
its product market relatively more efficiently and effectively‖ (Peteraf & Barney, 
2003: 316). In my empirical context, the global biopharmaceuticals industry, such 
critical resources take the form of knowledge based assets such as for example 
biological molecules, chemical libraries and other technological assets relevant to 
the drug development and discovery process.  
As I have illustrated above, ERA has been perceived as a core strategic action for 
firm survival (Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 2003). In today’s hypercompetitive 
environments, firms are faced with changing technological bases, pressures to 
innovate, and short lived competitive advantages (Wiggins & Ruefli, 2002). In 
response, competing firms intensively engage in ERA in order to adapt to new 
technological regimes, improve competitive parity and ultimately sustain 
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competitive advantage through the identification of opportunities and the 
elimination of environmental uncertainty. Thus, ERA can be broadly perceived as 
a strategic action that firms engage in order to adapt to their competitive 
environment. 
Strategy scholars thus far have predominantly treated ERA as solely a resource-
driven action directed by firm-specific idiosyncratic attributes. While there are 
theoretical reasons for such treatment, which I discuss further later on, this 
predominant view of ERA treats the competitive environment of the firm as an 
exogenous factor, and thus fails to provide a sufficient explanation of ERA. I 
challenge this view by arguing that firms engage in ERA not only to improve their 
competitive position driven by their idiosyncratic attributes, but also to respond to 
their competitive environment and more specifically their competitors’ ERA-
related actions. I thus aim to provide a more complete treatment of firm ERA 
behaviour. As such, I propose that ERA can also be seen as a competitor-driven 
action. My view allows for a broader theoretical understanding on firm behaviour 
in the context of ERA. As such, I frame my arguments in the context of strategic 
choice theories. Overall, my empirical results, presented in chapter 6, provide 
support for both the resource- and competitor- driven views of ERA.  
In this chapter, I discuss further my empirical findings in relation to prior empirical 
studies and relevant theory. I thus illustrate how my empirical analysis connects 
with the research questions I have set out to answer and the potential contributions 
that this research makes towards providing a better understanding on the complex 
link between ERA and firm strategy.  
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This chapter is organized as follows. I frame my empirical results within the 
theoretical framework of strategic choice. As such, I review my empirical findings 
in relation to the two views of ERA offered above. I then build on the significant 
interaction effect of competitors’ ERA activity and firm level propensity factors 
(resource commitment and experience with ERA), and provide some theoretical 
insights on how the two views of ERA can be combined. I conclude this chapter 
with discussing limitations and suggesting avenues for further research. 
7.2 Strategic choice theories and ERA 
 
I have briefly argued above that to better understand ERA, a broader theoretical 
perspective must be adopted. I thus discuss my conceptualization of ERA and my 
empirical analysis in the context of strategic choice theories. Under this broad 
theoretical framework, competing firms can either take actions to differentiate 
from their competitors or conform to their competitors’ actions. Differentiation and 
(interorganizational) imitation have been perceived as the two extremes of firm 
strategic behaviour
72
. On one hand, the RBV promotes differentiation by arguing 
that firms gain competitive advantage through acquiring or developing 
idiosyncratic resources (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). On the other hand, 
scholars have argued that imitation is a more viable strategic choice when firms are 
faced with high strategic uncertainty and seek legitimacy among their competitors 
by engaging in similar strategic actions (Haunschild & Miner, 1997; Lieberman & 
Asaba, 2006).  
                                                 
72 As discussed in chapter 3, these two extremes of strategic choice must be viewed as a 
theoretical device rather than a complete description of firm strategy. 
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In the context of ERA, scholars have very much focused on differentiation and 
have significantly underplayed the role of imitation. My main argument is that 
ERA can be perceived as both a resource- and competitor-driven action. As such, I 
expect that firms direct their ERA actions with respect to their idiosyncratic 
attributes and their competitive environment. My empirical analysis, as presented 
in chapter 6, provides new insights to this front. I specifically find that 
competitors’ ERA actions are positively associated with firm ERA activity 
(likelihood and the intensity), and thus provide empirical support for my argument 
that ERA can be perceived as competitor-driven. Furthermore, my empirical 
analysis provides support for a positive association of firm-specific idiosyncratic 
attributes and ERA action. More interestingly, my empirical analysis suggests the 
existence of a moderating effect between firm-specific attributes and competitors’ 
ERA activity in predicting the focal firm’s ERA activity. This finding suggests a 
more complex picture of ERA than assumed before.  
This section proceeds as follows. In Section 7.2.1, I illustrate how my empirical 
analysis connects with the theoretical foundations of RBV and prior empirical 
work concerned with the firm-specific attributes of interest; resource commitment 
and prior experience. Section 7.2.2 is concerned with competitive explanations of 
ERA and more specifically imitation-based theories of competitive dynamics. 
Section 7.2.3 provides a more in-depth discussion on the important interaction 
effect of competitors’ ERA activity and firm-specific attributes when predicting 
ERA related actions (likelihood and intensity). This section concludes with a 
summary of my contributions.  
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7.2.1 ERA and the resource based view of the firm 
The RBV has been the most prominent theoretical framework for understanding 
firm behaviour and competitive advantage in the strategic management literature 
(Hoopes et al., 2003). The RBV treats firms as entities of idiosyncratic costly-to-
copy resources (Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991). In turn it is assumed that, the 
strategic actions of firms are thus driven by the firm’s idiosyncratic resources 
(Chen, 1996). Under this theoretical framework, firm behaviour is directed by such 
resource-driven actions to develop or acquire critical resources and achieve 
competitive advantage through unique product market strategies (Foss & Knudsen, 
2003). In the theoretical context of the RBV, competing firms will strategically act 
to acquire external resources, only when such resources can be purchased at a price 
lower than their discounted present value suggesting the existence of informational 
advantages not reflected in the price of the resource traded in strategic factor 
markets (Barney, 1986; Foss & Knudsen, 2003).  Thus, ERA, as a strategic action, 
will make sense when the focal firm possesses superior (and in that sense 
asymmetric) information for the value-generating potential of the resource to be 
acquired in relation to that of its competitors. Under this treatment of ERA, 
assuming the presence of strategic factor markets, scholars suggested that firms 
must focus their strategic efforts to develop resources internally, as only such 
resources can lead to competitive advantage (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). 
In today’s competitive environments, however, firms are faced with high 
uncertainty on what resources to possess in order to outperform their competitors. 
This is particularly true when firms compete in environments with rapid 
technological change and long innovation cycles (Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 2003). 
Scholars thus far have significantly revisited RBV on what directs firms’ resource-
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driven actions and suggested that firms are not independent entities but rather 
strategically dependent (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006). Empirical work in this 
context has suggested that firms engage in the acquisition of critical resources in 
order to access other firms’ valuable resources through alliance networks (Das & 
Teng, 2000), to alleviate resource constraints (Combs & Ketchen, 1999), and to 
access complementary resources (Rothaermel, 2001b) and further enhance their 
knowledge base (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Prabhu et al., 2005). 
As such empirical work so far highlights the importance of firm-specific 
idiosyncratic resources when firms engage in ERA. Actually, it is very much the 
characteristics of these idiosyncratic resources that do not only drive firms to 
engage in ERA but enable ERA to be a value-creating strategic action. This is no 
surprise as the theoretical premises of the RBV, and consequently the notion of 
strategic factor markets, suggest that resources must be valuable, rare, inimitable 
and non-substitutable to provide firms with a competitive advantage over their 
competitors (Barney, 1991). The main assumption under these necessary 
conditions is that firms are inherently heterogeneous in the resources that they 
possess (Peteraf & Barney, 2003: 311). The RBV attributes strategic behaviour to 
such heterogeneous resources owned by the firm. It makes sense then to view ERA 
as a resource-driven action with the objective to enhance the value creating 
potential of the resources that the firm controls. Thus within the RBV paradigm 
firms ―are encouraged to innovate by searching out new resources…as the basis 
for organizational rents‖ (Galunic & Rodan, 1998: 1193). 
To test this view of ERA, and complement prior empirical research, I am 
concerned with two main constructs; resource commitment and ERA experience. 
Resource commitment captures the levels of internally developed resources owned 
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by the firm. I am also concerned with the levels of experience that the focal firm 
has accumulated by engaging in ERA related actions. My empirical analysis tests 
how these two attributes associate with patterns of ERA among competing firms.  
Overall, my empirical findings (see chapter 6; sections 3 and 4) show a positive 
association of resource commitment and prior experience with firm ERA activity.  
This empirical finding supports prior evidence on the direct and positive 
relationship of internal resources-what I term resource commitment- and ERA. For 
example, in their seminal study of the semiconductor industry, Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven (1996: 147) found that firms with fewer resources will exhibit lower 
rates of resource acquisition through alliance formation. My empirical analysis 
also provides support for previous empirical studies that have illustrated that 
highly R&D intensive firms will heavily engage in ERA (Hagedoorn, 1993), and 
will be better positioned to build on resources acquired externally (Veugelers, 
1997: 314). Furthermore, Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) conceptualize internal 
resource development and ERA
73
 as two distinct innovative strategies and provide 
empirical support that these two activities are indeed complementary, high levels 
of internal know how increase the return of ERA. They further show that such 
complementarity is positively associated with higher levels of innovative 
performance (as a measure of organizational performance).  
The observed positive association of resource commitment and ERA can be also 
explained through the notion of absorptive capacity, which defined as ―the ability 
to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial 
ends‖ (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). In terms of resource commitment, Cohen and 
                                                 
73 Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) are not concerned with ERA per se but focus more on the 
acquisition of knowledge based assets. My conceptualization and operationalization of ERA 
takes into account such assets.  
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Levinthal (1990) argue that absorptive capacity is a by-product of internal R&D 
efforts. Thus, the ability to utilize external knowledge depends on internal R&D, 
and it is consequently reflected on R&D spending (similar to how resource 
commitment is defined here).  This positive relationship is not only related with 
the firm’s absorptive capacity but also with its broader technological environment. 
Scholars have shown that firms competing in highly intensive technological 
environments, will be more likely to engage in ERA (Miotti & Sachwald, 2003: 
1484). In this case, firms will invest further on internal R&D in order to be able to 
better respond to new technological advancements in their environment. Not all 
scholars however agree with the positive relationship described above. For 
example, Jones et al. (2001) perceive ERA as a substitute for low levels of internal 
resources. Specifically, they argue that ―firms with adequate resources for 
competing in new technology or industry will be less likely to look for external 
technology sources than those having limited or incomplete resources‖. Drawing 
from a survey of US based firms, they provide empirical support for a negative 
relationship between ERA and internal resources (Jones et al., 2001: 262). Another 
rationale of the positive relationship described above, is that firms with a larger 
resource base and higher levels of investments on internal R&D will be able to 
better exploit potential combinations of internal resources with resources acquired 
externally (Lane, Koka, & Pathak, 2006: 846).  
While I am not directly concerned with the specific attributes of the external 
resources being acquired, there has been substantial work on understanding how 
such attributes may affect the positive relationship of resource commitment and 
ERA. Scholars in this research stream have been very much concerned with how 
resources, especially knowledge-based, can be transferred from the parent to the 
206 
 
target organization e.g. (Kogut & Zander, 1992). This important issue of 
transferability is mainly captured in the concept of ambiguity, under which 
Simonin (1999: 597) argues that ―[ambiguity] lessens the propensity to learn from 
a partner. That is, when the degree of ambiguity associated with a partner’s 
competence is high, chances of effectively repatriating and absorbing the 
competence are rather limited‖. Drawing from a US sample of firms, Simonin 
provides empirical support to the negative impact of ambiguity to knowledge 
transfer.  
I am not only concerned with resource commitment but I also suggest that firm’s 
prior experience with ERA will be positively associated with firm ERA activity. 
My empirical analysis provides overall support for this hypothesized relationship. 
Firm experience has been identified as an important factor of firm behaviour in 
several contexts such as new product introductions (Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Nerkar 
& Roberts, 2004), alliance success (Anand & Khanna, 2000a), and market entry 
(Delios et al., 2008). The rationale behind such positive relationship between 
experience and consequent firm action is that successful organizations develop 
capabilities based on their experiential-based knowledge (Levinthal & March, 
1993: 86). Based on their experiential learning, organizations are more likely to 
engage in actions that have been previously successful. In relation to ERA, 
accumulated experience can be associated with more efficient search for resources 
that enable the firm to introduce new products (Katila & Ahuja, 2002). In this 
sense, not only experience is positively associated with firm action but also can be 
seen as directly related to how firms develop their resources and capabilities 
(Nerkar & Roberts, 2004). Accumulated experience with an organizational action 
however holds also negative consequences. As Levinthal and March (1993: 102) 
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argue ―the self-reinforcing nature of learning makes it attractive for the 
organization to sustain current focus‖. When firms are faced with environmental 
change however, experience may act as a resisting force to consequent actions. 
Paradoxically, the very distinct competencies a firm develops over time through its 
accumulated experience, can also restrict its response to environmental 
requirements, and thus make the firm rigid in terms of consequent actions 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992). I return again to this point when I provide further insights 
on the positive relationship between prior experience and ERA, and its interaction 
with competitors’ ERA activity.  
While confirming prior empirical findings, my empirical analysis provides further 
insights to the relationship between firm-level idiosyncratic attributes and ERA. 
By taking under consideration methodological advances and best practice on 
applying non-linear econometric models (Hoetker, 2007), I illustrate important 
differences on firm ERA behaviour, as captured by the likelihood and intensity of 
ERA-related actions, in relation to the different levels of ERA experience and 
resource commitment that the firm possesses. the findings discussed below suggest 
a much more complex firm ERA behaviour than illustrated by prior empirical 
studies.  
First, my empirical analysis shows (figures 2 and 6; chapter 6) that influence of 
ERA experience and resource commitment on the likelihood of the focal firm 
engaging in ERA is greater at lower levels of prior ERA experience (FIRM_EXP  
< log(2)) and resource commitment (FIRM_RES  < log(-1)). Indeed, at higher 
levels of prior experience with ERA and resource commitment, the predicted 
probability of the firm engaging in ERA remains constant, suggesting a stable 
probability of firm engaging in ERA. This consistent behaviour is also illustrated 
208 
 
at the low marginal change when predicting the probability of a firm engaging in 
ERA (table 6.2; chapter 6). Put it differently, this finding suggest that a large 
portion of my sample firms (592 firm-year observations) consistently engage in 
ERA over time. 
Second, by investigating simultaneously the effect of resource commitment and 
prior experience with ERA, I find that, resource commitment exhibits a higher 
marginal effect than prior experience in predicting ERA likelihood and intensity 
(table 6.3; chapter 6). This finding suggests that resource commitment is a stronger 
predictor than ERA experience, especially in the case of predicting ERA intensity. 
In relation to the discussion above, this finding highlights the importance of the 
resource base of the firm when engaging in ERA and thus further confirms RBV 
expectations.  
I provide further insights on predicting ERA intensity at different levels of firm-
level idiosyncratic attributes. In doing so, I investigate how different levels of ERA 
experience and resource commitment are associated with predicted ERA counts. 
Figure 7.1 illustrates predicted ERA counts around mean values of ERA 
experience and resource commitment (± one standard deviation around mean).  
 




In line with my expectations, firms with lower levels of prior ERA experience and 
resource commitment exhibit a higher probability of zero ERA intensity 
(Pr(y=0x)). Put it differently, higher levels of ERA experience and resource 
commitment are associated with higher ERA intensity. However, figure 7.1 
provides us with several other interesting insights. I observe a diminishing effect of 
the positive impact of ERA experience and resource commitment for high levels of 
predicted ERA intensity. This diminishing effect suggests a non-linear relationship 
between resource commitment and ERA intensity. More specifically, at a standard 
deviation below the mean value observed, higher levels of ERA experience and 
resource commitment increase the predicted probability for initial levels of ERA 
activity (02 predicted ERA actions).  Above this threshold, and for larger values 
of ERA intensity (29 predicted ERA actions), however, the predicted probability 
decreases significantly. I observe the same pattern at the mean and one standard 
deviation above the mean values of ERA experience and resource commitment but 
with a smaller diminishing effect in terms of the predicted probability. This 
important finding suggests that the positive and significant effect, illustrated 
above, between these firm-specific idiosyncratic attributes and ERA intensity, 
holds only when firms engage in few ERA-related actions. While I have initially 
hypothesized a linear relationship between these idiosyncratic attributes and ERA 
intensity, this finding suggests an inverted curvilinear relationship (inv U; figure 
7.1).  
My empirical analysis also provides further insights on the interaction effect 
between firm prior ERA experience and resource commitment. I found a 
curvilinear interaction effect between ERA experience and resource commitment 
on ERA likelihood (figure 3; chapter 6). More specifically, I observe a positive 
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interaction effect for firms with lower predicted ERA likelihood while such 
interaction turns negative for firms with high ERA likelihood (inflection point 
around 0.7 of the predicted probability). In the case of ERA intensity, I similarly 
observe a significant interaction effect between firm ERA experience and resource 
commitment (table 6.3; chapter 6). As indicated by the marginal effect of  the 
interaction term, while these two factors taken independently have a significant 
and positive effect on ERA intensity, their combined effect has a negative impact 
on predicted ERA intensity. This finding suggests that there is an additive effect of 
firm ERA experience and resource commitment on predicting ERA intensity. 
While, as discussed before, resource commitment is a stronger predictor of ERA 
intensity than ERA experience, this finding suggests that firms with low levels of 
resource commitment will direct their consequent ERA actions in relation to their 
prior experience. On the other hand however, firms with high levels of resource 
commitment will engage in ERA more intensively regardless their prior 
experience.  
In relation to my main empirical findings, I also find that for the same levels of 
ERA experience, size is a moderating factor. Thus, large firms will exhibit a higher 
likelihood of engaging in ERA than small firms. While firm size has a significant 
impact in terms of the effect of ERA experience to ERA likelihood, firm behaviour 
follows the same pattern as discussed above. In the case of resource commitment, 
large firms exhibit a stable behaviour (as indicated by the predicted probability) 
while smaller firms’ higher levels of resource commitment increase their 
likelihood of engaging in ERA and the intensity of their ERA-related actions. As 
with ERA experience, for the same level of resource commitment larger firms 
exhibit a higher ERA likelihood than smaller firms, and they are more likely to 
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engage in more ERA actions. One possible explanation of the effect of size is the 
presence of economies of scale and scope. In their empirical study of the 
pharmaceuticals industry, Henderson and Cockburn (1996) suggest that 
biopharmaceuticals research is benefited by the existence of economies of scale 
and scope. More specifically, they suggest that large firms are benefited from 
economies of scale and scope by spreading their investment on R&D across a 
wider resource base.  
 
7.2.2 ERA, imitation and competition 
In contrast with the RBV, which suggests that the firm’s optimal goal is to devise 
unique strategies based on its idiosyncratic attributes and differentiate from its 
competitors, competitive dynamics (CD) scholars have long argued that firm 
behaviour may be contingent to that of its competitors. In that sense firms may 
strategically act towards conforming rather than differentiating from their 
competitors. Several factors are associated with such strategic behaviour. Briefly, 
firms may respond to the strategic moves of their competitors (Chen & MacMillan, 
1992; Miller & Chen, 1994), adopt successful industry-wide strategic recipes or 
adapt to the strategic actions of similar competitors (Garcia-Pont & Nohria, 2002). 
While these factors are examined in somewhat individual research streams, and 
draw upon different theoretical perspectives, the underlying assumption here is that 
firms strategically choose to act in similar ways under the pressure of facing 
competitive disadvantage (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993). Put differently, 
competing firms are strategically interdependent. Such strategic interdependence 
suggests that the strategic actions of competing firms will increase the likelihood 
of a focal firm taking the same action. 
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Scholars have employed several concepts to describe such strategic 
interdependence as for example interorganizational imitation (Haunschild & 
Miner, 1997; Lieberman & Asaba, 2006) or group level pattern clustering (Gimeno 
et al., 2005). Firm imitative behaviour has been examined in several empirical 
contexts such as bank branching behaviour (Barreto & Baden-Fuller, 2006), 
international expansion moves (Delios et al., 2008; Gimeno et al., 2005), entry 
timing (Ethiraj & Zhu, 2008), and mergers & acquisitions (Haunschild & Miner, 
1997; Xia et al., 2008).  
To my knowledge, few empirical studies
74
so far have investigated 
interorganizational imitation in the context of ERA. I make a significant 
contribution towards this end by assessing the relationship between competitors’ 
ERA activity and the focal firm’s ERA likelihood and ERA intensity. More 
specifically, I hypothesize that a firm will engage in ERA as a strategic response to 
its competitors (Hypotheses H1a,b), and as such, I expect a positive relationship 
between competitors’ ERA activity and consequent ERA actions of the focal firm. 
My empirical analysis provides overall support for my hypotheses by illustrating a 
positive relationship between competitors’ ERA activity and the focal firm’s 
likelihood and intensity of engaging in ERA-related actions.  
In the case of ERA likelihood, the influence of competitors’ ERA activity is 
greater at lower levels (explain a larger change in the probability of the firm to 
engage in ERA). While my empirical design does not allow for observing the exact 
time sequence of ERA actions that the firm engage in, this finding suggests that 
firms will immediately respond to the ERA actions of their competitors. Put it 
                                                 
74 A recent exception is the study of Park and Zhou (2005) which investigates the 
competitive dynamics of strategic alliances. 
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differently, firms will be more sensitive to respond to initial levels of competitors’ 
ERA activity. This will be particularly true when firms are faced with high 
resource scarcity. In such competitive environments, firms will engage in ERA in 
order to weaken the competitive position of its rivals by preempting strategically 
important resources or denying access to partners (Lieberman & Montgomery, 
1988; Park & Zhou, 2005). Furthermore, my sample consists of large 
biopharmaceuticals firms that compete in similar product markets while faced with 
high environment uncertainty. For such firms, following the actions of their 
competitors may result in the preservation of the status quo (Lieberman & Asaba, 
2006: 367).  
In line with the finding presented above, I found that competitors’ ERA activity 
has a greater impact (as captured by its marginal effect) on ERA intensity than 
ERA likelihood. This finding suggests that firms are not only more likely to 
engage in ERA when they are faced with high competitors’ ERA activity but they 
respond to the frequency of the actions of their competitors. Drawing from neo-
institutional theory, Haunschild and Miner (1997) describe this effect as 
frequency-based imitation and argue that firms will engage in a similar practice (in 
my case action), both consciously and unconsciously, in order to increase their 
legitimacy among their competitors. As briefly described above, empirical research 
concerned with various practices/actions in several empirical contexts provide 
support for the existence of frequency-based imitation among competitor firms.  
In the context of ERA, I propose that such frequency-based imitation is primarily 
driven by a) the uncertainty of the resources that a firm must possess to achieve 
their strategic objectives across the markets that they compete, and b) the 
availability (scarcity) of such resources in the resource environment that the firm 
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competes in. Institutional theorists suggest that environmental uncertainty increase 
the importance of social considerations, and as such the higher the uncertainty that 
a firm is faced with the more will rely on adopted practices/actions (Haunschild & 
Miner, 1997: 479). Resource scarcity relates both with frequency-based imitation 
and competition. When firms compete in environments with high resource scarcity 
they are faced with higher levels of competition, and as such, they will more 
intensively engage in ERA to secure critical resources (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006: 
373).Resource scarcity must be considered here as an end state that firms are faced 
with after the resource space is occupied by a large number of competitor firms. 
When for example, biotechnologies where introduced to the biopharmaceuticals 
industry in the late 1980s, ERA-related actions start to emerge. Biotechnology has 
been considered as competence-destroying technology that established 
biopharmaceuticals firms must adapt to(Pisano, 1990). As such, 
biopharmaceuticals firms have rapidly started to engage in ERA-related actions in 
order to acquire biotechnology-related resources. In line with ecological views of 
frequency-based imitation, biopharmaceuticals firms in my sample and time frame 
observed, engage more intensively in ERA at the earlier stages of the introduction 
of biotechnology than at later stages. Figure 2 analytically illustrates this important 
time element across the observed sample frame.  
 
Figure 7-2 Total ERA activity of sample firms 
215 
 
I investigate this further by splitting the sample in two time periods and estimate 
the impact of competitors’ 
ERA activity to firm ERA 
likelihood and intensity. As 
illustrated in Table 7.1, the 
impact of competitors’ ERA 
activity to the likelihood and 
the intensity of the firm 
engaging in ERA, is much 
stronger at the first time 
period. This additional finding provides empirical support to the argument above 
that biopharmaceutical firms will be more likely to engage in ERA related actions 
at earlier stages of the biotechnology introduction. In these early stages, 
biopharmaceuticals firms will be more sensitive to the ERA actions of their 
competitors as they are faced with a) higher uncertainty in terms of the resources 
that should possess, b) a larger resource space, and c) limited prior ERA 
experience. As such, biopharmaceuticals firms will more intensively engage in 
ERA related actions in order to capture resource opportunities. To further deal with 
high levels of uncertainty, firms may engage in ERA in order to broaden their 
resource base and develop more capabilities that can be leveraged in respond to 
environmental change (Sirmon et al., 2007: 277). At the second time period, 
competitors’ ERA activity is negatively associated with ERA likelihood and 
intensity. At this late stage of the biopharmaceutical introduction, firms will be less 
likely to engage in ERA in response to their competitors, and with less intensity. 
Table 7-1 Two time periods effect of 






































This finding on the differential impact of competitors’ ERA activity across time 
suggests that frequency-based imitation is contingent to the resource environment 
that competitor firms are faced with. As such, I argue that high resource 
uncertainty and availability will be associated with stronger patterns of frequency-
based imitation, as indicated by the contrasting effect of competitors’ ERA activity 
at the first and second time period. At the earlier stages of the biotechnology 
introduction, firms may be more sensitive to the information they receive and share 
from their environment and as such more prone to follow the actions of their 
competitors. From an ecological point of view, firms will exhibit a higher pattern 
of ecological contagion while observing and interpreting the strategies of their 
competitors in relation to their own efforts (Dobrev, 2007). At the later stages of 
the phenomenon, I observe that competitors’ ERA activity is negatively associated 
with the likelihood and intensity of the firm to engage in ERA (table 7.1). As I 
argue later on (section 2.3), these firm-specific idiosyncratic attributes will direct 
the firm’s actions at varying levels of competitors’ ERA activity that the firm is 
faced with. Competing firms at this stage are faced with higher levels of 
competition for acquiring critical resources. At this later stage firms will be less 
prone to follow their competitors and direct their actions in relation to their internal 
resources and accumulated experience. As such firms may engage in ERA to 
differentiate from their competitors and thus swift away from competitive 
positions where they are faced with high competition. In contrast with earlier 
stages of the biotechnology paradigm, firms are faced with a more constrained 
resource space and as such stronger competition. At these later stages, firms are 
less likely to direct their actions in relation to that of its competitors. One 
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sociological explanation for this is that firms, as social actors, are less constrained 
by a collective frame of reference (Dobrev & Kim, 2006: 235). 
I investigate further this important time element of the impact of competitors’ ERA 
activity and the focal firm’s likelihood and intensity of engaging in ERA by 
assessing competitors’ ERA activity across different markets. In doing so, I 
analyze competitors’ ERA activity across the nine biggest therapeutic areas that 
my sample firms operate in. As illustrated in Table 7.2, competitors’ ERA activity 
has a differential impact on ERA likelihood and intensity across market segments. 
When looking at the total sample frame, this additional analysis provides further 
support to my overall finding of the positive impact of competitors’ ERA activity 
to ERA likelihood and intensity. This additional analysis also shows that the time 
element observed above is market specific. Looking closely at the differential 
impact of competitors’ ERA activity across the two time periods (columns 2 and 
3), I observe that the pattern illustrated above (table 7.1) holds only for the 
cardiovascular, cancer and respiratory markets.   
Both from a competitive dynamics and organizational ecology(Dobrev, Kim, & 
Carroll, 2002) point of view, scholars have argued that firms are faced with 
varying levels of competitors’ pressures across markets that compete in. As such, 
one might rightly argue that the likelihood and intensity of the firm to engage in 
ERA varies across different markets in relation to competitors’ ERA activity 
specific to that market.  
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Table 7-2 competitors' ERA activity and ERA across therapeutic markets 
 
7.2.3 The interaction effect of firm-specific propensity factors and 
competitors’ ERA activity 
I have illustrated so far how my empirical analysis connects with prior research 
under the theoretical expectations of RBV and interorganizational imitation 
theories. In this section, I provide further insights on the interaction effect between 
the firm-level propensity factors, ERA experience and resource commitment, and 
competitors’ ERA activity when predicting the likelihood and intensity of the focal 
firm engaging in ERA actions. By investigating this effect, I make a significant 
theoretical contribution. So far scholars concerned with ERA focused 
independently on either firm-level attributes as drivers of ERA or at a lesser degree 
with the competitive dynamics of competing firms engaging in ERA. I bridge these 
two rather independent streams of research by empirically showing how 
competitor- and firm- specific factors interact and consequently affect patterns of 
coefficient std. err marginal 
effect
coefficient std. err marginal 
effect
coefficient std. err marginal 
effect
competitors' ERA activity 
and ERA likelihood per 
therapeutic market
cardiovascular 0.02616 (0.064) 0.0017 0.23536** (0.082) 0.0293 -0.05888 (0.097) -0.0004
Central Nervous System 0.35801* (0.174) 0.0229 0.20128* (0.084) 0.0251 0.79575^ (0.524) 0.0050
infection 0.22560** (0.079) 0.0144 0.04873 (0.097) 0.0061 0.28759* (0.116) 0.0018
cancer 0.0377 (0.064) 0.0024 0.20099** (0.074) 0.0251 -0.10473 (0.086) -0.0007
immune 0.1603 (0.167) 0.0103 0.36654^ (0.239) 0.0457 0.32865^ (0.211) 0.0021
gastrointenstinal 0.12594 (0.189) 0.0081 -0.23720 (0.406) -0.0296 -0.33430^ (0.236) -0.0021
inflammatory 0.18832^ (0.126) 0.0121 0.06970 (0.148) 0.0087 0.21846 (0.340) 0.0014
respiratory -0.21425 (0.208) -0.0137 0.01561 (0.250) 0.0019 -0.69839* (0.353) -0.0044
metabolic 0.128 (0.161) 0.0082 -0.27265^ (0.185) -0.0340 0.15640 (0.240) 0.0010
competitors' ERA activity 
and ERA intensity per 
therapeutic market
cardiovascular -0.00636 (0.017) -0.0263 0.07493* (0.031) 0.1785 -0.02816* (0.013) -0.1698
Central Nervous System 0.07194*** (0.019) 0.2981 0.07767*** (0.023) 0.1850 0.06649** (0.022) 0.4009
infection 0.07077** (0.022) 0.2932 0.11218*** (0.030) 0.2673 0.03691+ (0.021) 0.2226
cancer 0.01255 (0.018) 0.0520 0.06906** (0.023) 0.1645 -0.00399 (0.019) -0.0241
immune 0.04932+ (0.029) 0.2044 0.16173* (0.064) 0.3853 0.02054 (0.028) 0.1238
gastrointenstinal -0.15753*** (0.046) -0.6528 -0.25456* (0.104) -0.6065 -0.12872** (0.042) -0.7761
inflammatory 0.03626+ (0.020) 0.1503 0.08019^ (0.051) 0.1910 0.02276 (0.022) 0.1373
respiratory -0.02426 (0.048) -0.1005 -0.02419 (0.049) -0.0576 -0.06477 (0.059) -0.3905
metabolic 0.07228* (0.030) 0.2995 0.01739 (0.048) 0.0414 0.06778+ (0.037)  0.4087
1991-1998 1999-2006total sample frame
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ERA behaviour among competing firms. In doing so, I address recent calls for 
further empirical research in this research stream (Capron & Chatain, 2008). 
Furthermore, I argue that to provide a more complete picture on the conditions 
under which firms engage in ERA, one needs to incorporate both firms specific 
factors and the external resource environment (Sirmon et al., 2007).  
Let’s first consider the interaction effect when predicting the likelihood of the firm 
engaging in ERA. My empirical analysis provides statistical support on the 
existence of a significant and negative interaction effect between competitors’ 
ERA activity and firm-level propensity factors. More specifically, I find that the 
firm-level propensity factors moderate the positive impact of competitors’ ERA 
activity to firm ERA likelihood. As I have illustrated in section 6.3 (section 3; 
chapter 6), I untangle this moderating effect further by analyzing its distribution 
across my sample. I observe a curvilinear (U-shape) relationship between the 
interaction effect and the predicted probability of observing an ERA action 
(Pr(ERA_BIN)= 1). At lower levels of the predicted probability (y <~0.7 in figure 4; 
chapter 6), the interaction effect increases (takes a larger negative value; negative 
slope) while the predicted probability increases. However, after that inflection 
point the higher the observed predicted probability the smaller (moves closer to 
zero; positive slope) the interaction effect. Moreover, I observe that the interaction 
effect turns zero at the very low and very high levels of the predicted probability. 
While this finding provides general support for the existence of a moderating 
effect between firm propensity factors and competitors’ ERA activity and the 
likelihood of the focal firm to engage in ERA (Hypothesis H3a), my empirical 
analysis suggests that such moderating effect is stronger for firms that exhibit low 
likelihood of engaging in ERA. In contrast, the moderating effect significantly 
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diminishes (approaches zero) for firms with higher levels of predicted ERA 
likelihood.  
I observe a similar moderating effect when predicting ERA intensity. As illustrated 
by the estimated marginal effects in the full model (table 6.4; chapter 6), resource 
commitment and prior ERA experience, taken together, are a much stronger 
predictor than competitors’ ERA activity in predicting ERA intensity. While this 
effect is in line with the corresponding marginal effects in predicting ERA 
likelihood, the magnitude of the effect is much stronger in the case of ERA 
intensity. This finding suggests that firms with higher levels of experience and 
resource commitment are exhibit lower ERA intensity. To illustrate this point 
further, I investigate the interaction effect of firm propensity factors and 
competitors’ ERA activity for a standard deviation around its mean.  
 
Figure 7-3 the moderating effect of firm propensity factors and competitors' 
ERA activity 
As illustrated in figure 3, at half standard deviation above competitors’ ERA 
activity mean, the moderating effect of propensity factors on the relationship 
between competitors’ ERA activity on predicting ERA intensity decrease 
significantly. The moderating effect however significantly diminishes at lower 
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levels of propensity factors. This suggests that firms with high levels of propensity 
factors will be less likely to engage in ERA actions in response to competitors’ 
actions. As such, these firms will be less prone to engage in frequency-based 
imitative behaviour. In relation to the discussion presented above, I show that firm-
specific idiosyncratic attributes- resource commitment and ERA experience-will 
direct the firm’s actions in relation to its competitors and the firm’s resource 
environment. The observed moderating effect suggests that firms with high levels 
of resource commitment and prior experience with ERA will have an independent 
view of the resource environment in relation to their competitors. Such 
independent view of the resource environment can be constructed by increased 
legitimacy associated with high levels of prior ERA actions.  From a competitive 
view point, these firms are insulated by high levels of competition. On the other 
hand, firms with lower levels of resource commitment and experience will be more 
prone to the actions of their competitors, and thus face high levels of competition. 
While these firms may not be able to intensively engage in ERA actions, given 






Table 7-3 Summary of contributions 
Empirical finding Theoretical perspective Contribution 
ERA as a resource-driven action 
Prior experience and resource commitment are 
positively associated with ERA likelihood and 
intensity 
RBV 
Resource constraints as driver 
of ERA 
Higher levels of absorptive 
capacity are associated with 
higher potential to utilize 
externally acquired resources 
Firm-specific idiosyncratic 
attributes drive firm ERA behaviour 
Higher levels of internally 
developed resources are associated 
with higher ERA likelihood 
intensity 
Asymmetric effect of firm propensity factors:  
FIRM_EXP > FIRM_RES when predicting 
ERA likelihood 
FIRM_RES > FIRM_EXP when predicting 
ERA intensity 
RBV Heterogeneous firm ERA behaviour 
at varying levels of experience and 
resource commitment 
Two stage strategic process when 
firms engaging in ERA 
ERA as a competitor-driven action 
Competitors’ ERA activity has a positive and 
significant effect on the likelihood and intensity 




Firms engage in ERA as a response 
to competitors’ ERA-related actions 
Imitative behaviour Frequency-based imitation as an 
explanation of ERA actions. 
The positive and significant effect of 
competitors’ ERA activity to the likelihood and 
the intensity of the firm engaging in ERA is 
diminishing over time. 
Biopharmaceuticals firms will be more likely to 
organizational ecology Differential impact of competitors’ 
ERA activity across time suggests 
that frequency-based imitation is 
contingent to the resource 
environment that competitor firms 
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engage in ERA related actions at earlier stages 
of the biotechnology introduction. 
are faced with. 
Such contagion effect is stronger at 
the earlier stages of the 
biotechnology technological 
paradigm. 
Firm-specific propensity factors, ERA 
experience and resource commitment moderate 
the positive effect of competitors’ ERA activity 
to the focal firm’s ERA likelihood and intensity 
RBV 
Competitive dynamics 
Firms respond to their competitors’ 
actions in relation to their 
idiosyncratic attributes 
Firms with high levels of resource 
commitment and prior experience 
are insulated from competitors’ 
pressures when engaging in ERA 
Firms with low levels of resource 
commitment and prior experience 





7.3 Limitations and further research 
This dissertation investigates the link between ERA and firm strategy. Drawing 
from an extensive sample of ERA actions of the largest global biopharmaceutical 
firms, and a time frame that captures the emerging technological paradigm of 
biotechnology, this dissertation provides an extensive empirical account of 
strategic behaviour when competing firms engage in ERA.  
While this dissertation contributes both theoretically and empirically in better 
understanding the complex link between firm strategy and ERA, it is faced with a 
number of limitations. 
First, I have excluded from my empirical analysis any interfirm collaborative 
agreement that did not explicitly concerned with the acquisition of a resource. 
While this restriction in the way that ERA actions are coded increases the 
internal validity of the study, it excludes a large number of collaborative 
agreements that might indirectly involve some short of resource acquisition. For 
example, scholars concerned with strategic alliances have shown how firms 
engage in collaborative agreements to acquire higher-order resources, such as 
specific capabilities, to gain competitive advantage (e.g., McEvily & Marcus, 
2005). An extension of this dissertation might be to include such collaborative 
agreements and investigate differences in patterns of firm ERA behaviour for 
different types of resources.  
Second, scholars concerned with the link between idiosyncratic resources and 
competitive advantage have intensively critiqued the operationalization of 
internal resources through the use of R&D intensity. As I have argued in section 
5.5.3, my main concern is not with internal resources and their implication for 
225 
 
competitive advantage. My resource-driven view of ERA, however, is built on 
the premises of the RBV and the assumption that idiosyncratic resources 
contribute to competitive advantage. A better proxy of internal resources may 
increase the construct validity of my study. For example, strategy scholars have 
used patent data to measure the structural characteristics of the resource base of 
the firm (e.g., Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Grant, 1996). Apart from using a different 
proxy, I could follow recent attempts to employ sophisticated mathematical 
techniques to more effectively measure resource commitment. One way to do 
this would be to use a similar approach with Dutta, Narasimhan, and Rajiv 
(2005) that employ a stochastic frontier estimation technique to measure R&D 
capability.    
Third, my empirical analysis could benefit from an alternative operationalization 
of ERA likelihood. Remember, that the likelihood of a firm engaging in ERA 
(H1-H3) is operationalized as a dichotomous variable. While, my empirical 
analysis takes under consideration best practice of employing nonlinear (in this 
case Logit) models to predict ERA likelihood, econometric models employed can 
only predict whether a firm engages in ERA but not when. To also account for 
when an event occurs, a survival analysis must be employed. Survival analysis 
allows the probability of an event at one point in time to differ from the 
probability of that event occurring at a different point in time (Morita, Lee, & 
Mowday, 1993). A future study could employ a survival analysis to 
simultaneously investigate when and whether my sample firms engage in ERA. 
For example, this methodology would be particularly appropriate for extending 
the additional empirical analysis presented in the discussion chapter on different 
patterns of ERA across market. In particular, strategy scholars have employed 
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survival models to model entry in markets and technological fields (e.g., 
Mitchell, 1989). Such future study could also contribute to the population 
ecology field by investigating further the evolution of resource spaces and ERA. 
In this case, I will be able to observe similarities in patterns of ERA behaviour 
for a set of competing firms across different resource spaces and over time. 
Following recent research on competition for external resources and imitation 
(Dobrev, 2007), such study could extend the empirical support for imitation in 
the context of ERA. While this dissertation makes the first step on investigating 
imitation in this context, more empirical work is needed if we are to really 




CHAPTER 8.        
CONCLUSION 
 
I have set out to investigate the link between ERA and firm strategy. 
Specifically, I have drawn from the empirical context of the biopharmaceuticals 
industry, and the emerging paradigm of biotechnology, to answer my 
overarching research question “What is the role of firm strategy in ERA?”. To 
answer this research question, I build on strategic choice theories, and propose 
two distinct but complementary views of firm ERA behaviour. In my resource-
driven view of ERA, I expect firms to direct their ERA actions according to their 
idiosyncratic attributes. In the competitor-driven view of ERA, I propose that 
firms engage in ERA as a response to their competitive environment. Overall, my 
empirical findings provide support for my thesis. 
Theoretically, this dissertation suggests a more complex picture of firm strategic 
behaviour when firms engaging in ERA than previously assumed.  
Empirically, this dissertation complements recent efforts of simultaneously 
investigating firm- and competitor- specific explanations of strategic action (e.g., 
Park et al., 2002). My empirical analysis suggests that firms with high levels of 
idiosyncratic attributes are less likely to engage in ERA in response to 
competitors’ actions. Such firms, will have an independent view of the resource 
environment in relation to their competitors. On the other hand, competing firms 
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with low levels of idiosyncratic attributes are more prone to their competitors’ 
actions. These firms will be more likely to strategically conform towards their 
competitors’ strategy. In line with previous empirical research on ERA, I find 
that firms with high levels of resource commitment and prior experience will 
gain more from engaging in ERA. However, my empirical analysis goes one step 
further and shows that the very idiosyncratic attributes that firms develop over 
time, may restrict their response to environmental requirements, and thus make 
them rigid in terms of consequent actions. Furthermore, my empirical analysis 
shows that internal resources are a more powerful predictor of firm ERA activity 
than prior experience accumulated over time. In relation to my assumption of 
ERA as a competitor-driven action, I show that firms are not only more likely to 
engage in ERA when they are faced with high competitors’ ERA activity but 
they also respond to the frequency of the actions of their competitors. This is an 
important contribution as it provides further insights on imitative behaviour in a 
novel empirical context (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006).  
In addition to my main empirical findings, this dissertation suggests that firm 
strategic behaviour in the context of ERA changes over time. While scholars 
have argued that ultimately firms engage in ERA to adapt to environmental 
changes, no empirical accounts exist to this end. Specifically, I find that in the 
early stages of the biotechnology paradigm, biopharmaceutical firms are more 
sensitive to the ERA actions of their competitors as they are faced with a) 
higher uncertainty in terms of the resources that should possess, b) a larger 
resource space, and c) limited prior ERA experience. As such, competing firms 
will intensively engage in ERA in order to capture resource opportunities that 
will enable them to broaden their resource base and develop more capabilities 
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that can be leveraged in respond to environmental change (Sirmon et al., 2007) 
but also prevent competitors from gaining access to critical resources 
(Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). At later stages of the biotechnology 
paradigm, however, firms direct their actions in relation to their idiosyncratic 
attributes. Competing firms are faced with a more constrained resource space 
and stronger competition for resources. This empirical finding provides 
support for Kogut and Zander’s (1992) view of short- versus long-term 
strategy when competing firms are faced with shifting technological 
paradigms. 
In this dissertation, I have taken the first step towards understanding the complex 
link between firm strategy and ERA. By no means, this has been an easy 
endeavour as my thesis draws from different theoretical perspectives and aims to 
provide a more holistic understanding of firm ERA behaviour. A natural next 
step would be to investigate further this interesting yet challenging research 
topic. For example, one way forward would be to employ more sophisticated 
quantitative methods towards investigating firm ERA behaviour across markets. 
Through my empirical analysis of ERA during the biotechnology paradigm, I 
came across some other interesting empirical results that warrant further 
investigation. Most notably, I found that firm ERA behaviour is contingent to the 
evolution of the biotechnology paradigm. Connecting to the population ecology 
literature, this finding could lead to further interesting research about ERA and 
the evolution of firm behaviour in the biopharmaceuticals industry. In the future, 
I would also like to employ a multi-level empirical analysis to further understand 
ERA. At a broader level, I feel that our understanding of firm strategy can be 
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APPENDIX A – QUERYING 
THE RECAP ALLIANCES 
DATABASE 
 
This is an example of querying the RECAP alliances database for any 
agreements that contain sample firm ―Glaxosmithkline‖ in the development stage 
of ―Lead Molecule‖. The query returns a screen with 42 agreements between 
Glaxosmithkline and other firms. This screen contains main information on the 
agreements such parties involved, the date of signing, agreement type, the total 




As an example, consider the first result of the query. This agreement involved 
Glaxosmithkline (as the client) and the Institute of Cancer Research. The 
agreement can be characterized as a licensing R&D based agreement. The 
database holds no information for the exact value of the agreement. This is not 
surprising as some times firms do not include this information in the press 
release. By clicking on the parties field, we get a second screen with more 
extensive information and a copy of the original press release. One important 
information not included in the above result screen is the therapeutic area 
(disease field) that the technology of the agreement will be applied. Using this 
information, we can derive market-specific ERA data on the sample firms.  
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